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This book explores recent developments, constraints and opportunities relating 
to the advancement of sexual and reproductive health and rights in Africa.
Despite many positive developments in relation to sexual and reproductive 
health in recent years, many Africans still encounter challenges, for instance in 
poor maternity services, living with HIV, and discrimination on the basis of 
age, gender, sexual orientation or identity. Covering topics such as abortion, 
gender identity, adolescent sexuality and homosexuality, the chapters in this 
book discuss the impact of culture, morality and social beliefs on the enjoyment 
of sexual and reproductive health and rights across the continent, particularly 
in relation to vulnerable and marginalized groups. The book also explores 
the role of litigation, national human rights institutions and regional human 
rights bodies in advancing the realization of sexual and reproductive health and 
rights in the region. Throughout, the contributions highlight the relevance of 
a rights-based framework in addressing topical and contentious issues on sexual 
and reproductive health and rights within Sub-Saharan Africa.
This book will be of interest to researchers of sexuality, civil rights and 
health in Africa.
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Over the years, significant steps have been made towards the realization of 
Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights (SRHR) across the globe. Following 
the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) that 
resulted in the ICPD Programme of Action in Cairo, 1994, and the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995, several countries globally com-
mitted to, and have taken concrete steps towards, the realization of SRHR at 
the state and global levels. However, although steps have been taken towards 
achieving this goal, the comprehensive realization of SRHR still remains a chal-
lenge. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in General 
Comment No. 14 also defines the obligations that State parties have to fulfil in 
order to implement the right to health at the national level. 
In Africa, due to androcentric social-political systems rooted in coloniality, 
apartheid, xenophobia, Afrophobia, transphobia, homophobia, ableism, sexism 
and racism, many African countries still lag behind with regard to their obliga-
tions to protect, promote and advance SRHR. 
Systems designed to discriminately provide access to power, resources, and 
opportunities perpetuate inequality at both the structural and individual levels 
of society, thereby entrenching the power imbalance. Therefore to compre-
hensively realize SRHR, an intersectional approach that appreciates how mul-
tiple systems of oppression interact simultaneously to determine an individual's 
SRHR must be adopted. 
The right to health contains both freedoms and entitlements. Freedoms 
include the right to control one's health, including the right to be free from 
non-consensual medical treatment and experimentation. Entitlements include 
the right to a system of health protection (i.e. health care and the underlying 
social determinants of health) that provides equality of opportunity for people 
to enjoy the highest attainable standard of health. 
The realization of SRHR requires us to challenge the unequal distribu-
tion of power in society and to strive to restore peoples dignity which is a 
pivotal principle permeating the right to health. Contextual changes that are 
needed so as to remove obstacles, oppressive systems and conditions that make 
people vulnerable to SRHR violations must also be identified and actualized. 
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Thus decolonization, anti-racism work and intersectional frameworks must be 
employed in reshaping, researching and analysing the global health architecture. 
As per the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, SRHR are integral elements 
of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health. The mandate recognizes that many obstacles stand 
between individuals and their enjoyment to sexual and reproductive health. 
These obstacles are interrelated and entrenched, operating at different levels: in 
clinical care, at the level of health systems, and in the underlying determinants 
of health. In addition to biological factors, social, economic and other condi-
tions bear upon a woman’s sexual and reproductive health. 
The importance of a ‘policy approach’ to the right to health, especially in 
relation to sexual and reproductive health, and in poverty reduction, cannot 
be overemphasised. 
It is therefore incumbent on state to ensure that laws, policies and practices 
do not lead to rights abuses or violations. Laws, policies and practices determine 
who has access to the benefits of SRHR services, the quality of SRHR services 
people will receive, and how SRHR systems are structured and governed. 
For instance, in many African countries, SRHR related laws and policies are 
applied to adolescents in a manner that depicts them as emotionally and intel-
lectually weak. This approach not only disempowers them by undermining 
their sexual agency and bodily autonomy but also denies them access to SRHR 
information and services. Additionally, in most African countries, the hegem-
onic conceptualization of sexuality as being strictly heteronormative has led to 
the criminalization of persons of non-heteronormative and diverse sexualities, 
which infringes on individuals’ right to equality and non-discrimination, pri-
vacy and inherent dignity. It is especially important to ensure access to services 
and information for those in vulnerable situations or historically subjected to 
discrimination, such as adolescent girls, migrant women, women with disabili-
ties, urban, slum dwellers, refugees, LGBTIQA+ and gender diverse persons 
and communities. 
The right to health is an inclusive right, extending not only to timely and 
appropriate health care, but also to the underlying determinants of health. 
Access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and 
reproductive health is also recognized as important. This volume, Advancing 
sexual and reproductive health and rights in Africa: constraints and opportunities, which 
is edited by Ebenezer Durojaye, Gladys Mirugi-Mukundi and Charles Ngwena 
is a powerful and timely resource that will definitely be useful in the advance-
ment of SRHR in Africa. It captures recent developments across Africa that 
may have an impact on the enjoyment of SRHR and will go a long way in 
stimulating discourse on various integral facets of SRHR. Moreover, the book 
will be instrumental in helping people understand the role national human 
rights institutions and regional human rights bodies play in advancing the reali-
zation of SRHR in the region. It is a useful resource to researchers, academics, 
policymakers, civil society organizations, students and other persons interested 
in the subject of SRHR. It addresses contemporary issues relating to SRHR 
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in Africa giving priority to both sexual health and rights as well as reproduc-
tive health and rights. We must work together to attain the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals on gender equality and health and well-being 
– particularly those aimed at ensuring universal access to sexual and reproduc-
tive health rights and reducing maternal mortality. 
The book is instructive not only from the standpoint of engaging in debate 
and exploring the role of national human rights institutions and regional human 
rights bodies in advancing the realization of sexual and reproductive health and 
rights in the region. It also underscores the importance of litigation as a means 
of remedying human rights violations and advancing sexual and reproductive 
health and rights. 
Whether before, during or after a public health crisis or any other situa-
tion that places people in vulnerable situations, sexual and reproductive health 
rights must be protected as an integral element of the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health must 
be protected and promoted. 
I highly commend this book to scholars, researchers, practitioners, human 
rights activists, advocates for law reform, civil society groups, lawyers, and 
policymakers and analysts from across Africa and beyond. 
Dr. Tlaleng Mofokeng 
UN Special Rapporteur on the right to the 
highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health 
Preface 
The idea for this book was conceived during the Colloquium on Advancing 
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights organized by the Dullah Omar 
Institute (DOI), University of the Western Cape in conjunction with Kenya 
Legal & Ethical Issues Network on HIV and AIDS (KELIN) in August of 2018. 
The Colloquium was part of a project on ‘Advancing Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Rights in East and Southern Africa’, funded by AmplifyChange 
and jointly implemented by KELIN, Initiatives for Strategic Litigation in 
Africa (ISLA) and the Dullah Omar Institute. The Colloquium was attended 
by 30 participants across Africa with diverse backgrounds including academics, 
activists, personnel of national human rights institutions, officials of regional 
human rights bodies and civil society groups. At that Colloquium, papers on 
various aspects of sexual and reproductive health and rights were presented. 
Some of the papers presented form part of this book while other papers were 
sourced from contributors who could not attend the Colloquium. 
One of the motivations for this book is based on recent developments 
across the region on sexual and reproductive health and rights. While on one 
hand, religious and cultural practices have continued to pose serious threats 
to the realization of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the region, 
on the other hand, recent jurisprudence from the regional bodies such as the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and national courts offer 
a glimpse of hope for the region. These latter developments reinstate the point 
that opportunities exist to ensure the realization of SRHR. To this extent, this 
book offers an interesting contribution to knowledge and debate on SRHR 
in Africa. It addresses important issues, some of which are often enmeshed in 
controversy. For instance, despite the unacceptably high incidence of maternal 
death often as a result of unsafe abortion, many countries in the region still 
adopt highly restrictive laws and practices on abortion. It should be noted that 
the Maputo Protocol is the first human rights instruments to grant women the 
right to abortion on certain grounds. It is indeed ironic that the region with 
the most progressive instrument on abortion also has one of the worst statistics 
on deaths resulting from unsafe abortion. This calls for drastic actions on the 
part of African leaders. African governments must recommit themselves to 
addressing challenges hindering access to sexual and reproductive health care 
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services for all on a non-discriminatory basis. This entails addressing the special 
needs of vulnerable and marginalized groups 
All hands must be on deck to ensure that African countries achieve Sustainable 
Development Goal 3, reinforced by AU Agenda 2063 and Continental 
Framework for the Operationalisation of Sexual and Reproductive health and 
Rights (Maputo Plan of Action 2016–2030), to improve the health and well-
being of all. Policymakers, government departments/ministries civil society 
groups, religious bodies, research institutions and other stakeholders need to 
join hands to ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health care 
services for all. As agreed during the Abuja Declaration, African leaders must 
provide resources to realize access to sexual and reproductive health care ser-
vices for all. In this regard, no one, regardless of his or her gender, age, social 
status, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, identity or other associational status, 
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Almost 25 years after the historic International Conference on Population 
Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994 and the Beijing Declaration of 1995, 
the world has witnessed some major developments regarding the promotion 
and protection of sexual and reproductive health as human rights. Issues relat-
ing to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) have been receiving 
more attention from governments across the world, including African gov-
ernments. Despite these positive developments, however, challenges remain. 
Sub-Saharan Africa still accounts for the highest number of people living with 
HIV in the world. Teenage pregnancies and unsafe abortions have resulted in 
avoidable deaths among women of reproductive age. Moreover, Africa remains 
one of the most dangerous places in the world for a woman to give birth. 
The maternal mortality ratios (MMR) in many African countries remain very 
high. For instance, the MMR in Nigeria is 814 deaths per 100,000 live births 
(one of the highest in the world).1 The average number of deliveries attended 
by a skilled health care worker in Africa is put at about 47% lower than the 
world’s average of 60% and 88% in Southern and Eastern Asia, respectively.2 
Contraceptive use among young women remains very low. About two-thirds 
of all births are still to young women aged 20–25.
Other regional challenges include negative attitudes towards non-conform-
ing sexuality on the basis of age, gender, sexual orientation or identity. Existing 
rights in international and regional human rights instruments can be invoked 
to apply to sexual and reproductive health. These include the rights to life, 
dignity, privacy, non-discrimination, equality, liberty, freedom from inhuman 
and degrading treatment, health, scientific benefit and family. At the ICPD in 
Cairo, the international community defined reproductive rights to include:
[T]he right of men and women to be informed and to have access to safe, 
effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their 
choice of regulation of fertility which are not against the law, and the right 
of access to appropriate health-care services that will enable women to go 
safely through pregnancy and childbirth and provide couples with the best 
chance of having a healthy infant.3
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2 Durojaye, Mirugi-Mukundi and Ngwena
A meeting convened by the World Health Organization defined sexual rights to
include the right of all persons, free of coercion, discrimination and violence, to:4 
• Seek, receive and impart information related to sexuality; 
• Sexuality education; 
• Respect for bodily integrity; 
• Choose their partner; 
• Decide to be sexually active or not; 
• Consensual sexual relations; 
• Consensual marriage; 
• Decide whether or not, and when, to have children; and 
• Pursue a satisfying, safe and pleasurable sexual life 
2 Overview of sexual and reproductive 
rights issues and challenges 
While the international community has made remarkable progress in advanc-
ing SRHR, some major challenges remain with regard to realizing these rights. 
Since ICPD and the Beijing Declaration, the world has seen more attention 
given to issues that affect the rights and well-being of women. For instance, 
the rate of maternal mortality has decreased considerably from about half a 
million deaths annually in the 1990s to about 230,000.5 Despite this remark-
able progress, many of the African countries failed to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goal 5, which was to reduce the number of maternal deaths 
by 75% by 2015, but the rate of maternal deaths remains unacceptably high.6 
Many factors account for this, including lack of political will, poor allocation of 
resources to maternal health, a high rate of unsafe abortions and lack of access 
to skilled health care providers during birth, especially for women in rural areas 
or disadvantaged communities.7 
In the same vein, progress has been made with regard to providing life-sav-
ing medications in the context of HIV/AIDS. At the end of 2018, an estimated 
23 million out of 37 million people living with HIV were said to be on treat-
ment8 a remarkable improvement from 2010 when it was around 17 million 
people on treatment. This has led to a dramatic decrease in HIV-related deaths 
from 1.7 million in 2004 to 770,000 at the end of 2018.9 Further, the rate 
of mother-to-child transmission of HIV has reduced considerably.10 Indeed, 
many of the countries that are worst affected by the HIV epidemic in Africa are 
now providing medications to reduce transmission from pregnant women to 
the unborn child and for the treatment for children, with the number of people 
receiving treatment eaching 940,000 at the end of 2018.11 However, this still 
falls short of the 1.7 million children in need of HIV treatment, and disparities 
still exist among the regions. 
Furthermore, evidence has shown that there has been an increase in the num-
ber of women using one form of contraception or another in many parts of the 




for the prevention of unwanted pregnancy and unsafe abortions. However, 
unmet need for contraception remains high in many countries in the region. 
Hence, the fertility rates for many African countries are still very high. While 
the average fertility rate in sub-Saharan Africa is 4.5, it can be as high as 5.4 
in Nigeria and 5.9 in Mali.13 Lack of access to sexual and reproductive health 
information and services, and cultural practices such as child marriage, power 
imbalances and lack of information account for the high fertility rate in the 
region. Lack of respect for the agency of young women coupled with cultural 
and religious factors continue to limit access to sexual and reproductive health 
services, including access to contraception to those in the region.14 It is known 
that fertility rate influences maternal mortality and the well-being of a woman, 
as the higher the fertility rate, the higher the risk to the woman’s health. 
While progress has been made to address the impact of harmful cultural 
practices affecting the enjoyment of sexual and reproductive health and rights 
of women in the region, these practices have continued. Over the last few 
years, many African countries have taken drastic measures including the enact-
ment of laws prohibiting or criminalizing child marriage and female genital 
cutting/mutilation (FGC/M). These measures have been propelled by con-
tinental-wide efforts such as the African Union Campaign to end child mar-
riage.15 This campaign aimed to promote the rights of women and girls in 
Africa by advocating for the eradication of child marriage in the continent. 
The campaign received the support of many African countries and led to law 
reforms in some countries to address gender inequality and raise the marriage-
able age at a national level.16 However, the number of child marriages taking 
place in Africa is still high and of great concern. Reports have shown that 
in Africa, 35% of women have been married before reaching 18 compared 
to 30% in South Asia.17 A similar situation applies to FGC/M. While many 
countries in the region have experienced progress in combating this cultural 
practice through legislative reforms and public awareness campaigns, the prac-
tice has continued unabated.18 Of the over 200 million girls that have under-
gone FGC/M, about 70% of them live in Africa. Indeed, about eight African 
countries have recorded over 80% FGC/M prevalence.19 Strong religious and 
cultural views on this practice have led to its continuance in many parts of the 
region. There is a need for political will, education and continued engagement 
with communities where this practice takes place. 
In many African countries, discrimination and human rights abuse of sexual 
minorities have continued. Individuals and states have continued to exhibit 
homophobic tendencies against persons of different gender identities or sexual 
orientations across the region. Reports have documented violent attacks on 
individuals based on their perceived or real gender identity or sexual orien-
tation.20 In addition, a significant number of African countries have enacted 
laws or policies criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual relationships.21 Even 
in countries where same-sex relationships are lawful, violent attacks based 
on gender identity or sexual orientation are common.22 Violence against 
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orientation not only undermines the enjoyment of human rights, it also hin-
ders programmes and efforts at addressing HIV and other sexual and repro-
ductive health challenges. However, there seems to be a glimmer of hope, as 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, hitherto silent, has 
recently taken a progressive stance on this issue.23 
3 Opportunities 
Treaty human rights bodies such as the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Committee on the Rights of the Child
(CRC), the Committee on the Elimination of All forms Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) and the Human Rights Committee have all
issued very useful General Comments/recommendations and concluding
observations that have further clarified the meaning and content of sexual
and reproductive health and rights. For instance, in its general comments
14 and 22, the CESCR noted that states are obligated to ensure availability,
accessibility, acceptability, quantity of sexual and reproductive health care
services.24 It further noted that states must respect, protect and fulfil sexual
and reproductive health and rights of all, especially vulnerable and marginal-
ized groups. The Committee noted that denial of sexual and reproductive
health services to an individual based on gender, sexual orientation or iden-
tity, refugee or asylum status, health status or age will amount to a breach of
the state’s obligation under the Covenant.25 
On the other hand, the CEDAW Committee has affirmed that failure 
by states to ensure access to health care services particular to women’s needs 
will amount to an act of discrimination contrary to the provisions of the 
Convention.26 It has recently affirmed that acts of violence, including harmful 
practices, homophobic attacks and forced sterilization amount to violation of 
women’s fundamental rights and freedom.27 In the same vein, the Committee 
on Rights of the Child has issued different general comments to clarify the 
sexual and reproductive health and rights of children and adolescents.28 The 
Committee has emphasized the need for states to respect the rights of children 
and adolescents to sexual and reproductive health services without parental 
consent. It has further noted that states are to ensure the removal of all forms of 
barriers, including legal, religious, cultural and social, to sexual and reproduc-
tive health services for children and adolescents.29 
In September 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 
Sustainable Developments Goals (SDGs), which contain 17 goals.30 The over-
arching goal of the SDGs is to ensure that no one is left behind in the fight 
to eradicate poverty worldwide. The SDGs contain some important targets 
relating to sexual and reproductive health. In particular, goals 3 on healthy 
living and 5 on gender equality are very relevant to addressing some of the 
sexual and reproductive health challenges facing Africans. SDG 3 aims specifi-
cally to reduce maternal mortality ratios to 70 deaths per 100,000 by 2030.31 





of births attended by skilled medical personnel, contraceptive prevalence use, 
adolescent birth rate, antenatal care coverage and ensuring universal access to 
family planning services. These positive developments can propel governments 
and policymakers in Africa to live up to their obligations under these different 
human rights instruments. 
At the regional level, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights has continued to play an important role in developing norms and 
standards to advance sexual and reproductive health as human rights. These 
include its adoption of thematic resolutions, general comments, concluding 
observations and other promotional activities. Of the recent developments on 
SRHR in Africa, some points are worthy of note—the adoption of general 
comments 1 and 2 on Article 14 of the Maputo Protocol, the adoption of 
Resolution 275 and the joint general comment on child marriage and other 
harmful practices. 
In 2012, the African Commission adopted its first General Comment to 
clarify the provision of Article 14 (1) (d) and (e) of the Maputo Protocol, 
which is the first provision to explicitly address HIV as a human rights issue.32 
The Commission has clarified that among the steps to be taken by states to 
meet the obligations under this provision, included the creation of an enabling 
legal environment that is respectful of the fundamental rights of all, including 
people living with HIV or at risk of the epidemic.33 General Comment 2 of 
the Commission addresses various aspects of sexual and reproductive health, 
including access to safe abortion services, contraceptive services and sexuality 
education for young people.34 It urges African governments to ensure that bar-
riers to sexual and reproductive health services are removed.35 States are further 
enjoined to ensure the provision of youth-friendly services to meet the sexual 
and reproductive health needs of young people.36 It particularly urges states to 
ensure access to safe abortion services to all women in the region in accordance 
with the Maputo Protocol.37 These general comments are historic in the sense 
that they broke the silence on some contentious sexual and reproductive health 
issues that are often treated with kid gloves. 
Perhaps one of the most significant contributions of the African Commission 
to the development of sexual and reproductive health and rights is the affirma-
tion of the rights of sexual minorities in the landmark Resolution 275.38 In this 
Resolution, the African Commission condemns all forms of violence against 
persons based on real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.39 It 
invokes the provisions of the African Charter on equality and non-discrimi-
nation, dignity and freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
and calls all African states to address all forms of violence against persons based 
on sexual orientation or identity. The Resolution came in the wake of violent 
attacks on people perceived to be of different sexual orientation and identity 
and the enactment of draconian laws to punish homosexual activities in coun-
tries such as Nigeria and Uganda.40 While in recent years some countries have 
intensified homophobic tendencies to the issue of non-conforming sexuality, 
the African Commission has taken a bold step in protecting the rights of all 
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individuals from violence regardless of their gender identity or sexual orienta-
tion. This is a milestone in the annals of the Commission’s history and portrays 
a positive development in the recognition of the rights of sexual minorities in 
the region 
In its first ever Joint General Comment, the African Commission and the 
Expert Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child in Africa addressed 
the human rights violations in the context of child marriage and other harm-
ful cultural practices.41 This Joint General Comment is significant in that it 
addresses a very serious and sensitive issue. Child marriage has remained a 
source of concern to human rights advocates and policy makers in the region. 
Despite several efforts made to curtail this practice, it has withstood resistance 
from communities and regions where it is practised mainly on religious and 
cultural reasons. 
The Joint General Comment expresses concerns about the prevalence of 
child/early marriage in the region and its human rights implications. It specifi-
cally notes that this practice undermines various rights in the African Charter, 
Maputo Protocol and the African Children’s Charter.42 Beyond condemning 
child marriage a human rights violation of the girl-child, the Joint General 
Comment makes concrete culturally appropriate recommendations addressing 
this serious human rights concern.43 These include the need to ensure verifica-
tion of birth and the issuance of birth certificates, full implementation of laws 
and imposition of sanctions, education and awareness campaigns and institu-
tional measures to guarantee access to justice and rehabilitation of the girl-child 
already involved in child marriage.44 
In 2017, the African Commission adopted a very progressive document to 
combat sexual violence and its consequences in Africa. This document-Guide-
lines to Combat Sexual Violence and its Consequences in Africa-remains one 
of the most important documents by the African Commission on this issue.45 
Drawing on existing international norms and standards regarding sexual vio-
lence, the Commission adopts a broad and progressive definition of violence 
against women. The document further provides comprehensive examples of 
sexual violence to include, among others, rape, including marital rape, sexual 
harassment, female genital mutilation, virginity testing, child marriage, forced 
pregnancy, forced abortion, nudity and forced sterilization.46 This is a progres-
sive approach by the Commission, which complements the provisions of the 
Maputo Protocol on violence against women. The guidelines take into con-
sideration the lived experiences of African women regarding all forms of sexual 
violence they daily encounter. 
The various efforts of the regional human rights bodies have been con-
solidated by the adoption of the continental framework known as the revised 
Maputo Plan of Action 2016–2030 on universal access to sexual and reproduc-
tive health care services in Africa.47 The Plan of Action aims at reaffirming 
commitments made during the ICPD in 1994 and the SDGs 2015, and contains 
detailed and costed actions towards realization of universal access to SRHR by 







outlines policies and programmes that African governments should adopt with 
a view to ensuring universal access to SRHR in the region. It is an ambitious 
fourteen-year plan that proposes to address some of the sexual and reproduc-
tive ill-health facing many Africans and improve their living conditions and 
well-being. For instance, it proposes an integration of SRHR services with 
HIV/AIDS, STIs, maternal health and new-born and family planning services. 
It recommends the involvement of men, families and communities, civil soci-
ety groups, private and public sectors, and South-south cooperation towards 
the realization of universal SRHR services in the region.49 
In addition to these significant developments at the regional level, some 
national courts have begun to provide important jurisprudence bordering on 
the promotion and protection of the rights to sexual and reproductive health. 
For instance, courts in Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Malawi and Zimbabwe 
have handed down judgments that advance the sexual and reproductive health 
and rights of individuals. Some of the cases adjudicated included forced deten-
tion for inability to pay maternity fees,50 respect for adolescent sexual develop-
ment and expression,51 promotion of rights of sex workers in the context of 
mandatory HIV testing52 and declaration of child marriage as unconstitutional.53 
These developments in the region provide opportunities for accountability 
on the part of African governments to live up to their obligations and to realize 
SRHR under international law and the African regional human rights system. 
The above developments clearly indicate that there are sufficient norms and 
standards in the region not only to hold states accountable, but also to advance 
the SRHR of vulnerable and marginalized groups. This calls for renewed com-
mitment and political will on the part of African governments. More impor-
tantly, it calls for the involvement of other stakeholders such as civil society 
groups and national human rights institutions to act as watchdogs to the gov-
ernments by ensuring accountability and creating awareness on SRHR issues. 
4 Objectives 
The main objective of this book is to explore recent developments, constraints 
and opportunities relating to the advancement of sexual and reproductive 
health and rights in Africa. It aims to highlight the relevance of a rights-based 
framework to addressing topical and contentious issues on sexual and repro-
ductive health and rights in the region. Other objectives are: 
• To stimulate debate on the impact of culture, morality and social beliefs on 
the enjoyment of sexual and reproductive health and rights, particularly in 
relation to vulnerable and marginalized groups; 
• To explore the role of national human rights institutions and regional 
human rights bodies in advancing the realization of sexual and reproduc-
tive health and rights in the region; 
• To discuss the importance of litigation as a means of advancing sexual and 
reproductive health and rights. 
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5 Significance of this book 
Attempts have been made to explore the subject of sexual and reproductive 
health and rights in Africa from different perspectives and by different authors. 
Some of these publications have explored the application of human rights to 
sexual and reproductive health challenges in Africa. Others have examined the 
impact of socio-cultural practices on the enjoyment of sexual and reproductive 
health and rights. However, none captures the recent developments on this 
issue within the African region. The edited volume, Strengthening sexual and 
reproductive health as human rights in Africa, by Ngwena and Durojaye54 published 
in 2014 seeks to address the application of human rights to the enjoyment of 
sexual and reproductive health in the region. It contains very interesting chap-
ters addressing different issues, including HIV/AIDS, adolescents’ sexuality, 
maternal mortality, child marriage, unsafe abortion and protection of women 
in armed conflict. The volume, however, does not address some contentious 
issues on sexual and reproductive health in the region such as homosexuality, 
conscientious objection to abortion services, the potential role of litigation in 
advancing SRHR and the role of national and regional human rights bodies in 
advancing SRHR. 
The book Protecting human rights of sexual minorities in Africa55 which was 
published in 2017 focuses entirely on the human rights challenges facing sexual 
minorities in Africa. It addresses the various acts of violence and human rights 
abuses perpetrated against sexual minorities across Africa. While the book 
focuses on sexual rights issues as experienced by sexual minorities, it does not 
deal with broader social, cultural and religious issues that affect sexual and 
reproductive health in the region. 
This book addresses contemporary issues relating to SRHR in Africa. It 
attends to both sexual health and rights issues and reproductive health and 
rights issues. It captures developments that are more recent across Africa and 
their impact on the enjoyment of SRHR. The book further explores the role 
of national courts in advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights across 
the region. Important case-law from some African countries is discussed to 
emphasize the need to hold states accountable for the violation of sexual and 
reproductive health and rights. 
In line with the views of other commentators, this book affirms that 
addressing the sexual and reproductive health and rights of Africans, particu-
larly vulnerable and marginalized groups, is a matter of life and death that 
deserves urgent interventions from governments.56 It recognizes that religious 
and cultural practices may sometimes interfere with the enjoyment of sexual 
and reproductive rights of the people. More importantly, the book makes the 
link between the SDGs and the right to health, including sexual and reproduc-
tive health and rights. 
It suggests that applying a rights-based approach to issues of sexual and 
reproductive health would have great potential to improve the living con-






marginalized groups in particular. It further claims that the existing norms and 
standards on the right to sexual and reproductive health provide an impetus for 
its realization in the region. Therefore, the inability by a state to ensure that all 
individuals, regardless of their gender, age, sexual orientation or identity, enjoy 
to the fullest their sexual and reproductive health, amounts to failure to meet 
its human rights obligations.57 
6 Relevance 
This book will be useful to researchers, students, academics, people working 
in civil society organizations, government departments/institutions, judiciary, 
international organizations, human rights institutions/bodies and individuals 
interested in the issue of sexual and reproductive health and rights. 
7 Structure 
This book is divided into three parts and contains 14 chapters addressing diverse 
issues on SRHR, with contributions from academia, human rights activists and 
members of regional human rights bodies and national human rights institu-
tions. Part I addresses issues relating to reproductive health and rights. Part II 
deals with sexual health and rights, while Part III features chapters addressing 
mechanisms for the realization of sexual and reproductive health and rights. 
Due to language barriers, the book covers situations in Anglophone countries 
in the region. The summary of the chapters is presented below. 
7.1 Part I – Reproductive health and rights 
In Chapter 2, Satang Nabaneh examines the lack of regulation regarding the 
scope of conscientious objection to abortion in South Africa. The chapter 
seeks to clarify the essential conditions needed to ensure that women who 
seek access to abortion services are treated with respect for their reproductive 
autonomy and human dignity. It concludes by reflecting on how the right to 
freedom of conscience should be balanced with women’s right to legal abor-
tion services and care. 
The focus of Chapter 3 by Ibrahim Obadina is on the nexus between unsafe 
abortion and maternal mortality in Nigeria. The chapter proposes that asking 
the ‘woman question’, and more particularly the ‘Nigerian woman question’, 
should guide policies, laws and judicial decisions relating to women’s sexual 
and reproductive health and rights, including abortion services in Nigeria. It 
notes that asking the ‘Nigerian woman question’ means examining how the 
peculiar experiences of Nigerian women have been ignored by laws rooted 
in patriarchy across the country. Although criminal statutes have incorporated 
exceptions to the lifesaving requirement, the chapter argues that the country 
can draw inspiration from the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa 
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abortion on certain grounds, in consonance with women’s reality and experi-
ence in Africa. 
Chapter 4 by Robert D. Nanima examines how the abortion question 
can be mainstreamed into the discussion on the right to health of women in 
Uganda. He argues that the restrictive regime on abortion exacerbates the 
marginalization of women and deepens already existing polarities. In his view, 
these polarities tend to pit the woman against the community, thereby under-
mining the right to health and well-being of Ugandan women. The chapter 
then engages in a discussion of the international and regional norms and stand-
ards applicable to the realization of safe abortion services for women and how 
this can be applied to Ugandan women. It particularly discusses the importance 
of the provision of the Maputo Protocol on abortion and the implications 
of the reservation entered by the Ugandan government. The chapter makes 
some recommendations to the Ugandan government on how to deal with the 
polarization of abortion in the country. 
In Chapter 5, Michelle Rufaro Maziwisa examines the obligations of the
government to promote, protect and fulfil human rights in the context of ado-
lescent girls’ reproductive health and rights using Zimbabwe as a case study. The
chapter specifically notes that the right to contraception constitutes a critical part
of the realization of this. The chapter further argues that constraints such as lack
of information, socio-cultural factors and need for parental consent often limit
access to contraception for adolescents in the country. Existing international
and regional norms on SRHR impose obligations on the Zimbabwean govern-
ment to ensure access to contraception services for adolescents in rural areas.
The chapter concludes by urging the Zimbabwean government to take more
proactive measures, consistent with its obligations under international law, with
a view to ensuring access to contraception for adolescents in rural areas. 
Chapter 6 by Sibusiso Mkwananzi discusses an important but often ignored 
issue of men’s involvement in the realization of the SRHR of women. Using 
South Africa as a case study, the chapter examines the various challenges 
women and girls face in realizing their SRHR and proposes that the involve-
ment of men in SRHR of women has the potential to advance the rights of 
women. It highlights some of the benefits and constraints of involving men in 
the promotion and protection of SRHR of women and girls in the country. 
The chapter makes useful recommendations of how men can effectively be 
involved in the realization of the SRHR of women and girls. 
7.2 Part II – Sexual health and rights 
Godfrey Dalitso Kangaude discusses the human rights issues in relation to
sexuality of adolescents in Malawi in Chapter 7. He argues that most parents
have difficulties recognizing their children as sexual. Parents react negatively to
childhood sexual development by prohibiting sexual conduct rather than pro-
moting positive sexual behaviours. Using Malawi as a case study, the chapter








in early adolescence requires recognizing children and adolescents as possess-
ing an evolving sexual agency, and supporting them to develop positive sexual
behaviours and practices as they begin to pursue romantic and sexual interests.
The chapter recommends a rights-based approach to addressing the sexual and
reproductive health of adolescents in Malawi in ways consistent with gender
equality norms and in line with the country’s obligations under international
law. 
In Chapter 8, Ebenezer Durojaye and Satang Nabaneh examine the effec-
tiveness of criminalization of FGC/M in The Gambia. The chapter discusses 
the nexus between FGC/M and human rights as well as the reasons often 
adduced to support the use of criminal law to address FGC/M. Furthermore, 
it focuses on the amendment to the Women’s Act in The Gambia, which 
prohibits FGC/M. The paper evaluates the utility of the approach adopted 
by the Gambian government vis-a-vis its obligation under the Protocol to the 
African Charter on the Rights of Women (African Women’s Protocol). The 
chapter concludes by recommending that beyond criminalization, states should 
complement this approach with other strategies such as education and aware-
ness programmes. 
Chapter 9 by Adetoun T Adebanjo examines the role of culture and reli-
gion in the criminalization of homosexuality in Nigeria and proposes a mid-
dle ground where the rights of gay people can be respected, notwithstanding 
Nigerian cultural, moral and religious beliefs. The chapter discusses the rele-
vant provisions of Nigeria’s Criminal and Penal Codes, and Shari’a law, which 
had criminalized homosexuality long before the introduction of the Same-Sex 
Marriage (Prohibition) Act of 2013. It further argues that Nigeria’s anti-gay 
laws contradict provisions of the Nigerian Constitution and principles of fun-
damental human rights enshrined in international and regional human rights 
instruments. Taking into consideration the particular situation of Nigeria, the 
chapter recommends short and long-term measures that the Nigerian govern-
ment should adopt with a view to ensuring securing the rights of homosexuals 
in the country. These include relaxing some of the stringent measures and pro-
visions of the Same-Sex Act and ultimately working towards decriminalization 
in the future. 
The focus of Chapter 10 by Kutlwano Pearl Magashula is on the rights of 
transgender people in Botswana. The chapter explores the implication of the 
Gender marker case on the lives of transgender persons in Botswana. It argues 
for more inclusive approaches to legal gender recognition in order to build 
a pluralistic society that safeguards the rights of all its members. It calls for a 
reflection on the array of human experience and influence, as well as compli-
ance with international human rights standards in relation to legal gender rec-
ognition. The chapter concludes by proposing alternative approaches to legal 
gender recognition informed by learnings from progressive national laws and 
advancements in comparative jurisprudence. It considers the implication and 
benefits of less restrictive approaches to legal gender recognition and registra-
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Chapter 11 by Berry D. Nibogora discusses the challenges with the promo-
tion and protection of the rights of sexual minorities under the African human 
rights system. In particular, the chapter examines Resolution 275 adopted by 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It discusses the pro-
vision of international regional human rights instruments in relation to sexual 
minorities and human rights abuses they encounter. The chapter traces the 
various activities and strategies that culminated in the adoption of the very 
progressive Resolution 275. It then examines the content of the resolution and 
makes recommendations to African governments towards its implementation. 
7.3 Part III – Mechanisms for realizing SRHR 
The focus of Chapter 12 by Tambudzai Gonese-Manjonjo and Ebenezer 
Durojaye is on the relevance of litigation to advance SRHR in the region. The 
chapter draws on the experiences of the Southern African Litigation Centre, an 
organization that focuses on strategic litigation as a tool for realizing the SRHR 
of individuals in southern African countries. It then discusses some of the chal-
lenges, gains and opportunities of strategic litigation in ensuring accountability 
and redressing violations experienced by vulnerable and marginalized groups 
within the region. Using three cases as examples, the chapter discusses how 
engaging with the courts at the national level can elicit positive results in soci-
ety as regards the realization of SRHR. The chapter concludes by admitting 
that despite the positive impact of strategic litigation, there are some challenges 
that need to be taken into consideration before deciding to embark on strategic 
litigation. 
In Chapter 13, Shatikha S. Chivusia examines the role of national human 
rights institutions (NHRIs) in advancing SRHR at the national level. Using 
the Kenyan National Human Rights Institution as a case study, the chapter 
discusses the findings of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 
(KNCHR) from its Public Inquiry into Violations of Sexual and Reproductive 
Health Rights in Kenya that was conducted in 2012 and from its work around 
the 2017 election period with regard to sexual and gender-based violence 
(SGBV) cases. The chapter concludes by making concrete recommendations 
on how the Kenyan NHRI can play a more proactive role in realizing the 
SRHR of women and girls in the country. 
Chapter 14 by Ayalew Getachew Assefa examines the role of the Expert
Committee on the Rights of the Child in Africa in realizing the SRHR of
children and adolescents in the region. The chapter highlights international
and regional norms in relation to the SRHR of adolescents and considers the
relevant principles on children’s rights on this issue. It further considers the
mandate of the Expert Committee and how this could help in advancing
the SRHR of children and adolescents in the region. The chapter discusses
the various mechanisms of the Expert Committee, including the state report
system, communication system and the investigation system. It further exam-





   
  











       
   
    
    
   
  
      
   




   
     
 




recommending how they can be more effective in advancing the SRHR of
children and adolescents in the region. 
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Abortion and ‘conscientious 
objection’ in South Africa
The need for regulation
Satang Nabaneh
1  Introduction
South Africa’s Choice on Termination of Pregnancy (CTOP) Act is a ground-
breaking law for women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights in South 
Africa and serves as a benchmark for law reform globally.1 The Act was part 
of a package of rights extrapolated from South Africa’s 1996 Constitution that 
recognizes the right to bodily and psychological integrity including the right to 
make decisions concerning reproduction and the right to health care, including 
reproductive health. The Act was partly a result of feminist political action,2 and 
a response to prevent the death of South African women through backstreet 
terminations.3 The Act is a complete departure from the 1975 Sterilization Act, 
which had stringent grounds for permitting abortion that were compounded 
by cumbersome administrative procedures.4
The Act provides for abortion on demand up to 12 weeks of pregnancy. 
Between 13 to 20 weeks, women5 can obtain abortion on the following grounds: 
physical or mental health, foetal anomaly, if the pregnancy is a result of rape 
or incest and on grounds of socio-economic circumstances. After 20 weeks of 
gestation, a woman can only terminate her pregnancy if determined by a medi-
cal practitioner that it poses a serious danger to the woman’s health or life, or if 
the foetus will ‘suffer from a severe physical or mental abnormality’.
The CTOP Act recognizes that in the first trimester, in addition to doctors, 
midwives who have undergone prescribed training could perform an abortion. 
With a view to enhancing accessibility to abortion services, an amendment to 
the CTOP Act in 2008 included the training of registered nurses to conduct 
the procedure during the first trimester. Broadening the role of healthcare 
workers including nurses to deliver services is viewed as a significant way for 
the realization of access to termination of pregnancy care.6
Despite the very liberal nature of the law, the Act does not directly address 
conscientious objection.7 Conscientious objection has been defined as ‘the 
refusal to participate in an activity that an individual considers incompatible 
with his/her religious, moral, philosophical, or ethical beliefs’. The hope was 
that the omission of a conscience clause in the Act would circumvent contro-
versy and legal challenges.8 Instead, it has the effect of serving as a major barrier 
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Given the unregulated practice of conscientious objection in South Africa, 
there is no clear answer as to what extent the CTOP Act allows healthcare pro-
viders to conscientiously object to performing abortions. This chapter investi-
gates the lack of regulation regarding the scope of conscientious objection to 
abortion in South Africa. The chapter aims to clarify the essential conditions 
needed to ensure that women who seek access to abortion services are treated 
with respect for their reproductive autonomy and human dignity. 
The chapter proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly considers the conceptual-
ization of conscientious objection. Part II of the chapter maps both the inter-
national and national framework on conscientious objection. Part III examines 
the impact of the conscientious objection on the rights of women. Part IV 
illustrates the ethical and legal challenges. The chapter concludes by reflecting 
on how the right to freedom of conscience should be balanced with women’s 
right to legal abortion services and care. 
2 Conceptualizing conscientious objection 
The concept of conscientious objection has been historically associated with 
the right to refuse to take part in the military or in a war due to religious or 
moral reasons.10 This has been co-opted in the healthcare arena. Recent devel-
opments have shown that freedom of conscience continues to be accepted as 
a limitation to reproductive healthcare, including women’s right to termina-
tion of pregnancy.11 The Global Doctors for Choice in their White Paper 
examining the prevalence and impact of conscientious objection, conclusively 
demonstrate an increase in the practice of healthcare providers’ refusal to pro-
vide abortion services.12 Health care providers continue to invoke ‘conscien-
tious objection’ to deny services including emergency contraception and other 
forms of contraception, sterilization and infertility treatment.13 As this chapter 
focuses on abortion care, conscience claims are mainly made on refusal to pro-
vide abortion care. 
Conscientious objection is a complex issue of competing rights: women’s 
rights to safe, legal abortion and the healthcare providers’ claimed right to 
refuse.14 As abortion remains a contentious moral issue, women’s legal right 
to access health services is sometimes in opposition to the provider’s right to 
refuse duty of care. In justifying the right to conscientious objection, John 
Rawls, for instance, sees the practice of conscientious objection as an exception 
to the prima facie duty to obey the law based on one’s personal conscience.15 
Within the context of health care, Bernard Dickens has argued that the right to 
conscientious objection precedes the legalization of abortion.16 
Various scholars have discussed freedom of conscience in health care follow-
ing Mark Wicclair’s comprehensive analysis of the three emerging approaches: 
conscience absolutism, the incompatibility thesis and compromise.17 On the 
one hand, according to absolutism or the maximum accommodation paradigm, 
a provider’s conscientious conviction is privileged over that of the patients, in 
which there is no obligation to disclose or refer.18 The argument in favour of 





of conscience. On the other hand, the incompatibility thesis means disallowing 
the exercise of conscientious objection as it is contrary to professional obliga-
tions.19 Thus, healthcare providers should not have a right to refuse.20 
In critically analysing the two aforementioned extreme positions, Wicclair 
argues for the compromise or balance approach, which involves a reasonable 
accommodation provided by the employer, but which also entails provider 
duties including referral.21 This, however, remains a lofty goal that is difficult 
to achieve in practice. It has also been illustrated that although it is possible to 
allow conscientious objection to abortion and still ensure women’s access to 
services, in most cases, it does not sufficiently protect women’s reproductive 
right.22 Wendy Chavkin et al have also noted that the balancing act between 
the competing rights becomes very difficult when there is a thin line between 
conscience based on religion and political position.23 The emergence of two 
main defences: that the exercise of conscientious objection should be allowed 
and that recommendations on how refusal can be managed to prevent the 
harms that it can create are premised on a call for respect of the moral integrity 
of healthcare providers.24 
Laura Harris et al., note that conscientious objection is ‘the only way to 
refuse to provide abortions that are permitted by law’.25 Those who are against 
the idea of conscientious objection have argued that unlike in the military, con-
scientious objection does not have a place in reproductive healthcare.26 Joyce 
Arthur and Christian Fiala label conscientious objection as a ‘dishonourable 
disobedience’27 to laws and ethical code and call for its ban due to its violation 
of patients’ rights.28 Another argument against conscientious objection is that 
the right to refuse jeopardizes women’s health and human rights, as it unfairly 
privileges a doctor’s conscience over that of their patients.29 Conscientious 
objection, they contend, weakens the full realization of reproductive rights and 
women’s equality.30 
Against this background, the recognition of the right to freedom of reli-
gion, conscience and thought, and state’s obligation to respect that right, is 
well established. This chapter works on the premise that there is a right to 
conscientious objection. However, this is not an absolute right as it should not 
unduly disadvantage or deny women access to health services which they have 
a legal right to receive. Ultimately, there should be an explicit law that regu-
lates conscientious objection and limits healthcare provider’s personal right of 
conscience. Freedom of conscience is recognized as a fundamental right at the 
international, regional and domestic levels. 
3 International and regional human rights standards 
Historically, objections based on the freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion have been invoked in relation to compulsory military service. The 
recognition of freedom of conscience is a component in a democratic and 
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human rights instruments and guarantees a right to conscience. South Africa, as 
a member of both the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), has 
signed and ratified these core international human rights treaties. 
This section examines international and regional frameworks on the right 
to freedom of conscience. The purpose of this analysis is to show the stand-
ards that South Africa has agreed to abide by under international and regional 
human rights instruments. 
3.1 United Nations level 
Freedom of conscience is guaranteed in international human rights instru-
ments. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
states ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion:
this right include freedom to… manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance’. This article is replicated in Article 18(1)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The
Human Rights Committee in General Comment 22 on Article 18 notes
that while the right to conscientious objection is not explicitly stated in
the Covenant, it believes that such a right could be read into Article 18.
However, the recognition of the right to conscientious objection by the
Committee was within the context of individual claims on the right to refuse
to perform military service. Article 18(3) of ICCPR further goes on to place
limitation on the manifestation of one’s religion or belief as this may affect
other people, as well as the state. Thus, the right to conscientious objection
is not absolute. International and regional human rights treaty bodies have
found that the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief can be subjected
to restrictions.31 
UN Human rights treaty monitoring bodies have also called on states to 
ensure that the exercise of conscientious objection does not hinder the access 
to reproductive health services. The Committee on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) responsi-
ble for compliance of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) issued General Recommendation 
No. 24 on Article 12 on Women and Health noting that refusal to provide 
certain reproductive health care for women is discriminatory. Additionally, it 
obligates states to take steps to guarantee access to services when providers are 
permitted to refuse to provide such services. 
In General Comment No 36 on the right to life, the Human Rights 
Committee notes that state parties have a duty to ensure that women and 
girls are able to effectively access safe and legal abortion by removing barri-
ers that are a result of the exercise of conscientious objection by healthcare 
professionals. 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Committee 











on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) issued General Comment 
No. 22 on the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health, which noted that 
the obligation to protect the right to health includes state obligations to take 
measures to prevent private actors from imposing barriers to services including 
conscience claims to refuse to provide abortion. 
The treaty monitoring bodies have likewise raised the issue of conscientious 
objection in their concluding observations on state party reports. Within the 
South African context, the Committee on ESCR, in its concluding observa-
tion on South Africa’s initial report in November 2018, recommended that 
health professionals ‘who invoke conscientious objection provide referrals 
within their own facility or to a nearby facility so that their objection does not 
impede women’s access to abortion services’. 
3.2 African regional level 
At the regional level, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Charter) provides for freedom of conscience under Article 8. The 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) is unique as it expressly recognizes 
abortion as a right. Article 14 of the Protocol obligates states to permit abortion 
where pregnancy poses a risk to the life or health of the woman or to the life 
of the foetus, or where pregnancy is a result of sexual assault, rape or incest. 
As of January 2019, more than 75 per cent of African states have ratified the 
Maputo Protocol.32 This is an indication of the favourable reception that the 
Protocol enjoys in the continent as the foremost legal instrument on women’s 
rights.33 However, it is important to note that some African countries have 
entered reservation to the provision on abortion upon ratification including 
Cameroon, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda.34 However, it is argued that reser-
vations cannot be construed as serving to restrict international and regional 
human rights obligations. 
Article 26 of the Protocol enjoins state parties to adopt budgetary measures,
to fulfil the rights guaranteed in the Protocol. While ratification is desirable,
implementation of the Maputo Protocol is absolutely imperative in order to
impact the lives of women. Implementation has been admittedly slow as women
continue to face barriers to access abortion services even in countries where
abortion has been liberalized. An estimated 6.2 million women have unsafe
abortion in the African region.35 Women from sub-Saharan African constitute
the highest incidence of deaths at 62 per cent (29,000) from unsafe abortion.36 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission) has also taken steps to provide interpretive guidance to women in 
Africa by elaborating on specific rights while assisting states to fulfil their obliga-
tions under the Maputo Protocol. Towards this end, the African Commission 
adopted General Comment No 2 in 2014 on Article 14(1) (a), (b), (c) and (f) 
and Article 14(2) (a) and(c) of the Protocol on reproductive health rights on 
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28 November 2014. The General Comment focuses on measures to promote 
and protect sexual and reproductive rights of women and girls including access 
to safe abortion.37 Article 14 (2) obligates state parties to take all appropriate 
measures to ensure medical abortion. 
Unprecedentedly, the Commission addressed states’ duty to adequately reg-
ulate the practice of conscientious objection in the reproductive health sphere. 
As the General Comment notes, healthcare providers directly involved in pro-
viding abortions services may invoke conscientious objection but not in emer-
gency situations. Premised on their obligations under the Maputo Protocol, 
states are obliged to: 
ensure that health services and healthcare providers do not deny women 
access to contraception/family planning and safe abortion information and 
services because of, for example, requirements of third persons or reasons 
of conscientious objection.38 
In addition, the General Comment further notes that state obligations relating 
to enabling and political framework also entail ensuring healthcare providers 
do not deny women access to safe abortion information and services.39 General 
Comment No 2 is a critical resource for ensuring access to safe and timely 
legal abortion. In particular, the African Commission sends a clear message to 
African states that permit conscientious objection, that they must establish and 
implement effective regulatory framework so as to guarantee that such refusals 
do not undermine women’s access to legal abortion services. 
The African Commission, which can receive communications alleging vio-
lations on the African Charter and its subsequent protocols, and the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) have not yet had the 
opportunity to develop their jurisprudence on the scope of the right of con-
scientious objection within the sexual and reproductive health services sphere. 
The other regional human rights systems also recognize an individual’s right 
to freedom of religion, conscience and thought. At the European level, the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is provided in Article 9 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. It further requires the exercise of the right to be ‘subject to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and as are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public […] health, or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.40 Limitation on the exercise of 
conscientious objection has been reaffirmed by the European Court of Human 
Rights in several cases in the context of reproductive healthcare. In the inter-
American human rights system, the American Convention on Human Rights 
also guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion with limitations 
(Article 12). Both the International American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) and the Inter-American Court have not explicitly addressed the 






















4 The legal scope of conscientious objection in South Africa 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO)’s Global Abortion Policies
Database, more than 70 countries allow health care providers to refuse to pro-
vide abortion care, invoking conscientious objection.41 Conscientious objection
is widely practised around the world and has been enshrined in law in countries
such as the United Kingdom, Australia, France and the United States.42 
4.1 The Constitution of South Africa 
The South African Constitution recognizes reproductive autonomy. Section 12(2)
of the Constitution guarantees a ‘right to make decisions concerning reproduc-
tion’. Section 27(1) of the Constitution also provides for the right of access to
healthcare services including reproductive healthcare. Section 27 further implies
that the state is not only obligated to refrain from unfairly interfering with the
individual’s right to pursue reproductive healthcare services, but also to provide
care where the individual is incapable of paying. The obligation arising from
this section would imply that the state and or other entities or individuals should
refrain from obstructing access to healthcare services including abortion without
justifications.43 A refusal of care would be deemed to be unjustifiable and thus
constitute an infringement of section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
Given that the South African Constitution is value-based, the right to repro-
ductive autonomy and access to reproductive healthcare are intimately linked 
to the rule of law and to the enjoyment of other rights including equality and 
respect for human dignity. Respect for human dignity is a foundational value 
that is crucial for addressing conflicting interests.44 The UN Working Group 
on the Issue of Discrimination against Women in Law and in Practice shares 
this same reasoning when it stated: 
The right of a woman or girl to make autonomous decisions about her 
own body and reproductive functions is at the very core of her fundamen-
tal right to equality and privacy, involving intimidate matters of physical 
and psychological integrity, and is a precondition for the enjoyment of 
other rights.45 
The Constitution recognizes the implied right to conscientious objection.
According to section 15 (1) of the Constitution, ‘everyone has the right to free-
dom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion’. The Constitutional
Court on respecting diversity has acknowledged that ‘the essence of equality lies
not in treating everyone in the same way, but in treating everyone with equal
concern and respect’. Like other constitutional rights, this right is not absolute. 
4.1.1 Limitation clause 
It is important to note that fundamental rights under the Constitution are 
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limitation clause takes as its premise, that fundamental rights cannot be enjoyed 
in such a way that does not pay attention to the rights of others or the wider 
societal interests. Thus, conscientious objection cannot be exercised in such 
a way that permits healthcare works to impose their anti-abortion views on 
women seeking abortion. While healthcare providers have a freedom to choose 
to refuse to participate in an abortion procedure, the rights of the pregnant 
woman and the interests of the society must be taken into account.46 
Section 36 limits the right to conscientious objection and imposes a duty to 
a minimum, to provide the pregnant client with information about where she 
can obtain an abortion. Section 36 of the Constitution supports the limitation 
of the right to conscientious objection where maternal life or health is in seri-
ous danger or there is a medical emergency. A health care worker can therefore 
not legally or ethically object to the rendering of care in cases of life- or health-
endangering emergencies associated with abortion procedures. 
4.2 Choice on termination of Pregnancy Act 
The Act, which took effect in 1997 ‘promotes reproductive rights and extends 
freedom of choice by affording every woman the right to choose whether to 
have an early, safe and legal termination of pregnancy according to her indi-
vidual beliefs’. 
As alluded to earlier, there is no express provision regulating conscientious 
objection in the CTOP Act. However, Ngwena noted that an earlier draft of 
the Bill contained a conscience clause that provided as follows:47 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), no person shall be under a legal duty, whether 
by contract or any statutory or any other legal requirement, to participate 
in the termination of pregnancy if he or she has a conscientious objection 
to termination of pregnancy. 
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not affect any duty to participate in 
treatment which is necessary to save the life or to prevent serious injury to 
the health of the woman, or to alleviate pain. 
(3) Any person having an objection referred to in subsection (1) shall be 
obliged to refer a woman who wants her pregnancy to be terminated to a 
medical practitioner or a registered midwife, as the case may be, who shall 
terminate the pregnancy. 
The Act does not explicitly mention a right to ‘conscientious objection’ for 
health care providers, but it is clear on the professional obligations of providers. 
Refusal to provide abortion only applies to the actual procedure, this means 
that those that are directly not involved do not have the right to refuse. A 
similar approach was adopted in the decision of the UK Supreme Court in the 
Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan. The Court held that:48 
It is unlikely that, in enacting the conscience clause, Parliament had in 
mind the host of ancillary, administrative and managerial tasks that might 
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be associated with those acts. Parliament will not have had in mind the 
hospital managers who decide to offer an abortion service, the administra-
tors who decide how best that service can be organised within the hospital, 
the caterers who provide the patients with food and cleaners… 
Accordingly, healthcare providers are under a legal and ethical obligation to 
provide care to patients suffering from complications of abortion. However, 
these regulations in the CTOP Act are not fully adhered to or implemented. 
However, the South African case of not having a conscientious objec-
tion clause is not unique, as in most African countries and elsewhere it is not 
addressed and hence, remains largely unregulated.49 In the African context, 
one of the exceptions to the rule is the Zambian Termination of Pregnancy 
Act of 1972 which allows for a limited scope of the exercise of conscientious 
objection. This has been supplemented by guidelines.50 A sharp contrast to this 
is the Zimbabwean Termination of Pregnancy Act of 1972 that is not lim-
ited in scope and does not adhere to international and regional human rights 
standards.51 
The CTOP Act makes it an offence if any person ‘prevents the lawful termi-
nation of a pregnancy or obstructs access to facility for the termination of preg-
nancy’. The penalty is a fine or imprisonment for up to ten years. It could be 
argued that healthcare providers, including nurses and midwives, who refuse or 
omit to refer a patient to another doctor who is prepared to terminate pregnan-
cies lawfully or a facility where abortion may be done, are preventing lawful 
termination of pregnancy or obstructing access to a facility for the termination 
of pregnancy. This section is rationally connected to the following: (i) the right 
to freedom of conscience is not absolute especially in relation to the medical 
profession; (ii) the constitutional and legal rights of women are protected as 
they are not obstructed from exercising such right; and (iii) it is reasonable, as 
it can be interpreted to mean that it does not compel health care providers in 
non-emergency cases to participate actively in abortion procedures. 
The Act further provides that a woman who requests an abortion from 
a medical practitioner or registered midwife ‘shall be informed of her rights 
under [the] Act by the person concerned’. The provision creates a duty on 
healthcare providers which is a reasonable and justifiable limitation on their 
right to freedom of conscience. Despite a healthcare provider’s opposition to 
abortion on grounds of conscience, he or she is obliged to give a woman infor-
mation about the law that enables her to exercise her constitutional and legal 
rights. Effective information when abortion is legal is ‘directly relevant for the 
exercise of personal autonomy.’ 
Despite the lack of defined scope of obligations incurred by healthcare pro-
viders as a result of the absence of an expressed conscientious clause in the 
Act, this does not mean the complete absence of regulatory laws. Since the 
Constitution is the supreme law, it follows that section 15 on freedom of 
conscience and section 36 on general limitation of rights apply to this Act. In 
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and Eastern European countries, health care providers have a constitutional 
right to conscientious objection.52 
It is noteworthy that courts in South Africa have not yet clarified the issue of 
conscientious objection. The case of Charles and Others v Gauteng Department of 
Health (Kopanong Hospital) was about a nurse’s refusal to prepare patients for 
follow-up treatment following a termination due to her religious beliefs at the 
Kopanong Hospital in Vereeniging which led to her reassignment by the direc-
tor to another department. She eventually quit in May 2004.53 On the basis of 
the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, she 
sued the then Minister of Health and the hospital for unfair discrimination on 
the grounds of religion and conscience. In 2007, the Labour Appeal Court of 
South Africa in Braamfontein transferred her case of a healthcare professional’s 
refusal to provide care to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA). 
The other known case was in 2010 when through an arbitration, a physician 
who was dismissed for protesting against termination of pregnancies was rein-
stated by the Free State Health Department on the basis that the dismissal was 
unfair.54 The anti-abortion discourses materializing in these two cases show a 
subtler means of deploying power. For instance, the pro-life movement utilizes 
labour laws grounded on non-discrimination and the exercise of the constitu-
tional right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion to 
slowly chip away at abortion access across the country. Opening the issue as 
one of a worker’s right to non-discrimination and utilizing labour laws would 
mean setting legal precedent that would claw back on a liberal abortion law. 
As the debate between women’s rights to safe and legal abortion versus 
the protection of healthcare provider’s moral integrity rages on, this line of 
strategy provides a discursive opportunity that facilitates the use of ‘freedom of 
conscience’ and ‘non-discrimination’ as legitimate ideation to push the pro-life 
movement agenda forward. This is akin to Marc Steinberg’s assessment of how 
actors will look for ‘gaps, contradictions and silences’ in order to ‘depict shared 
understanding of injustice, identity, righteousness for action, and a vision of 
the preferred future’.55 
4.3 National guidelines 
4.3.1 Draft national guidelines for implementation of termination of pregnancy 
services in South Africa 
Currently, South Africa does not have a formal system for conscientious objec-
tion declaration and practice. Recognizing such a gap, the National Department 
of Health developed draft guidelines for the provision of abortion in 2018.56 In 
these guidelines, the term ‘conscientious objection’ is being regulated as what 
it actually is: an obstruction to access or an obstruction to care as noted in the 
Act. This is because the guidelines are not based on the freedom of conscience 














does not stipulate conscientious objection. Section 10 of the Act notes that it is 
a crime for anyone to prevent a legal abortion or obstruct access to an abortion 
facility. The penalty is a fine or imprisonment for up to ten years. 
The guidelines obligate a practitioner who refuses to provide abortion ser-
vices based on personal beliefs to refer the client to a colleague or facility that 
is able to offer such services. The client’s right to information and access to 
health care services, including abortion, should always be provided for. The 
guidelines affirm that such refusal should not be to the detriment of the client 
seeking an abortion.57 
The guidelines also address the issue of conscientious commitment, that 
is, a health care provider adhering to their primary health professional ethics: 
duties to treat and care for patients.58 The individual conscientious objection of 
a health care worker cannot violate the rights of the other healthcare workers 
who are willing to provide abortion services.59 
4.3.2 Professional ethical guidelines 
The right to conscientious objection has been recognized in professional codes of
conducts from varied sectors.60 At the national level, professional ethical guide-
lines of South Africa’s medical, nursing and midwifery societies support and pro-
tect their members’ exercise of conscience while emphasizing providers’ duty to
prevent their beliefs from serving as a barrier to their patients access to services
and information. The 2013 South Africa Nursing Council’s Code of Ethics listed
termination of pregnancy and conscientious objection as ethical dilemmas that
nurses face but was silent on how they should be addressed. Subsequent revi-
sions provide that a nurse is required to tender in writing their refusal to their
employer.61 The Health Professions Council of South Africa recommends a sim-
ilar approach in allowing healthcare providers to object to providing termination
of pregnancy services on the basis of their religious and cultural beliefs.62 
Despite these professional ethical guidelines, conscientious objection relat-
ing to abortion has not been enshrined into law. The consequences of such a 
gap serves as an obstacle to the efficacy of a liberal abortion law in practice.63 As 
there are no clear laws or guidelines, the environment is conducive to health 
care providers acting within their ‘own’ interpretation of the law. Thus, this 
can lead to the systemic abuse and misinterpretation of what the right entails.64 
It also results to inadequate personnel to perform abortion procedures.65 
5 Ethical and legal challenges: the need to regulate 
Health providers who are unable to exercise their duty of care due to per-
sonal conscience still have ethical responsibilities to their patients.66 Due to 
the unregulated nature of conscientious objection in South Africa, it makes it 
difficult to translate the legal right to abortion into effective access to services. 
In order to regulate conscientious objection to abortion, there are certain con-
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(a) Duty to refer 
The International Federation of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ (FIGO) cri-
teria for conscientious objection includes: giving notice of one’s objection 
based on conscience grounds, referring patients to colleagues and providing 
emergency care when needed.67 The Technical Guidelines of the WHO on Safe 
Abortion also state that in order to ensure that the practice of conscientious 
objection does not delay care within the context of lawful abortion services, 
healthcare providers must refer women, or where referral is not possible, must 
provide safe abortion services to which women are legally entitled to.68 
Indeed, as the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court noted in the Doogan case: 
it is a feature of conscience clauses generally within the health care profes-
sion that the conscientious objector be under an obligation to refer the 
case to a professional who does not share that objection. This is a necessary 
corollary of the professional’s duty of care towards the patient. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that a healthcare provider who refuses to ter-
minate a pregnancy lawfully and omits to refer a patient to another provider 
is preventing the lawful termination or obstructing access to a facility for the 
termination of pregnancy under the CTOP Act. This should not be construed 
as an infringement of the freedom of conscience provision in the Constitution. 
However, given that this has not had the effect of preventing the exercise 
of conscientious objection to the detriment of women’s rights to access legal 
abortion, laws, policies and codes of ethics must clearly provide that healthcare 
professionals must refer their patients to other appropriate providers for termi-
nation of pregnancy services that the practitioners cannot or will not deliver. 
Healthcare providers cannot just legally abandon their patients. 
(b) Who can object? 
There is need for clear guidance on who can exercise conscientious objection 
to abortion services. Dickens and Cook note that the right to conscientious 
objection protects the personal convictions of personnel who actually perform 
an abortion procedure rather than those assisting or facilitating the procedure.69 
Given that the South African courts have not yet had an opportunity to deal 
with the right to conscientious objection within the context of abortion, it can 
borrow from the approach of courts from other jurisdictions. For example, the 
Colombian Court in the case of Case T-388/09 reiterated the principle that 
the right to conscientious objection can only be exercised by health care pro-
viders ‘directly involved in performing a procedure necessary to terminate the 
pregnancy’.70 In determining whether a judicial officer could invoke the right 
to conscientious objection to recluse himself from an application for injunc-
tion to compel a health facility to provide legal abortion under Colombian law, 











to personnel directly involved in the procedure for termination of the preg-
nancy.71 Thus, the right to conscientious objection is not applicable to a judi-
cial officer hearing a case on abortion, as it undermines the very essence of 
the legal system of the state. While conceding that judicial officers can hold 
personal convictions, the Court notes that this does not mean the abdication of 
their primary duty to apply the Constitution.72 
This approach was previously laid down in the T-209/08 case dealing with 
the right to conscientious objection by healthcare professionals. In this case, as 
a result of rape, a 13-year-old girl became pregnant. She was refused abortion 
by her healthcare company based on conscientious objection by its physicians. 
She was then referred to Erasmo Meoz de Cúcuta University Hospital which 
also invoked conscientious objection to the abortion procedure on behalf of 
its entire medical staff. 
In delimiting the scope of the conscientious objection, the Court held follow-
ing: 1) women’s fundamental rights including timely access to abortion should be
guaranteed and respected; 2) conscientious objection is not a right to which insti-
tutions or the State are entitled and that only natural persons can exercise that right;
3) the existence of a professional obligation on the part of the healthcare provider
who refuses to perform abortion, to immediately refer to another health profes-
sional equipped to provide abortion services; and 4) the justification for invoking
conscientious objection by a healthcare provider must be made in writing. The
Court further held that the state is obligated to guarantee an adequate number of
providers who are equipped to provide abortion services. The European Court of
Human Rights echoes this in R.R v Poland, when it notes that: 
States are obliged to organise the health services system in such a way as 
to ensure that an effective exercise of freedom of conscience of health 
professionals in the professional context does not prevent patients from 
obtaining access to services to which they are entitled under the applicable 
legislation.73 
Thus, despite the possibility for individual healthcare providers to refuse to 
provide abortion services on the grounds of conscience, this does not absolve 
the state from its obligation to provide services (including information and 
materials resources) arising from the fulfilment of an abortion right. 
The court decisions mentioned above are important juridical resources for 
interpretation for South Africa in ensuring the efficacy of the CTOP Act to 
ensure women’s right to prompt and effective access to abortion. This also 
speaks to South Africa’s constitutional goal of substantive equality that addresses 
inequalities in reproductive health.74 
(c) Register of conscientious objectors 
It is particularly crucial that a register of abortion services be kept in each facil-
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the personnel objecting. This will ensure that the state fulfils its obligation of 
ensuring that there are enough healthcare providers in hospitals and clinics to 
protect women’s right to autonomy. The draft guidelines note that the follow-
ing standards must be in place: 
• Health professionals who are not willing to provide abortion services must 
inform their Facility Manager in writing when applying for a position in 
the facility. 
• Facility Managers need to confirm whether a staff member is fit for pur-
pose in terms of providing abortion services when appointing staff. 
• Each objecting staff member must be dealt with individually. Abortion 
provision should never be dealt with in a group, or as a group action. 
• Refusal only applies to trained health professionals and not to groups or 
an institution. Likewise, it does not apply to support personnel or com-
plementary services. 
• In non-emergency cases, professional health providers who believe that 
their religious or moral beliefs may affect the treatment or the advice that 
they provide may refuse to participate in an abortion, but must: 
1. Explain their refusal to the client in a manner that does not stigmatise 
or judge the client 
2. Explain to the client their right to request a safe abortion 
3. Make the necessary arrangements to enable the client to be seen by a 
provider who will conduct the abortion 
4. Update the facility register to note the refusal to treat. 
Thus, it is critical that there are clear guidelines as to who can object, how they 
object and what they can object to. 
6 Conclusion 
In order to ensure women’s right to exercise reproductive autonomy and access 
to timely legal abortion services in South Africa, domestic laws must effectively 
regulate and oversee the practices of healthcare professionals in relation to their 
implied right to conscientious objection. As noted above, numerous studies 
have shown that the failure to effectively regulate and monitor such refusals 
have served as a barrier to women’s ability to obtain safe and legal abortion 
in South Africa. Such failure contravenes international human rights obliga-
tions of the South African government, which require that where states allow 
healthcare professionals to refuse to provide abortion care on grounds of con-
science or religion, they must establish effective legal and oversight framework 
to ensure that such refusals do not hinder women’s access to legal abortion in 
practice. 
Thus, the South African state should design and implement a comprehen-
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to govern the practice of conscientious objection by healthcare providers to 
ensure that they do not trample on women’s access to safe, legal abortion. 
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Nigeria’s abortion laws make it one of the most restrictive countries regarding 
abortion.1 The geometric rise in maternal mortality rate is because of the crimi-
nalization of abortion in Nigeria. This approach to abortion in Nigeria calls for 
immediate action in a variety of ways to ultimately put an end to this horrible 
and oppressive practice. Most jurisdictions have liberalized abortion laws and 
are further making reforms aimed at addressing the existing inadequacies in 
the laws, in manners that redress the oppression of women. The United States 
Supreme Court’s approach and jurisprudence to the self-determination rights 
relating to abortion is notable. It has contributed a lot in asking the woman 
question, handing down cases such as Roe v Wade, Doe v. Bolton, Gonzales v 
Carhart. While acknowledging their contributions, they are not the focus of 
this paper. Despite advancements in abortion jurisprudence, statutes in Nigeria 
affecting abortion are yet to recognize a woman’s right to decide whether 
to carry a pregnancy to term as a matter of her autonomy, equality, or self-
determination. To achieve transformative change and to recognize women as 
autonomous rights-bearers and effectively tackle the menace of maternal mor-
tality resulting from the restriction on abortion in Nigeria, law makers must 
confront the regulation and politics of abortion from a feminist perspective. 
This means reflecting the experiences of women and addressing the gendered 
implications of abortion restrictions or, simply put, to be effective in addressing 
the scourge of maternal mortality resulting from unsafe abortion, the statutes 
must reflect the realities of Nigerian women in their provisions and applica-
tions by ‘asking the woman question’, as this research will show.2
The restriction has had a negative impact on women in Nigeria and con-
tributes to the alarming increase in the proportion of maternal death in the 
country due to unsafe abortion. Although there are various causative factors for 
maternal mortality in Nigeria, unsafe abortion constitutes the highest percent-
age of all the factors. This paper critically examines the legal framework for 
abortion in Nigeria, with a view to making suggestion for reforms to reduce 
the incidence of maternal mortality by suggesting the expansion of the grounds 
for abortion and decriminalization in line with international standards.
Ibrahim Obadina Addressing maternal mortality in Nigeria
Addressing maternal mortality 
through decriminalizing 
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The paper calls for a rethinking of the lifesaving requirement as the sole 
basis for abortion under the Criminal and Penal Codes operative in the coun-
try, by calling for an amendment of the provision or repeal to incorporate 
experiences and realities of women. It suggests a rights-based approach and the 
domestication of human rights instruments that Nigeria is signatory to, i.e. the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, which entered into force in 2005 (the ‘Maputo 
Protocol’). It examines whether the provisions of the Maputo Protocol ask 
the woman question. It considers what lessons the African Commission, the 
monitoring body for the African Charter and its Protocols can learn from inter-
pretations and jurisprudence of similar provisions on reproductive rights from 
other regional and international human rights bodies, such as CEDAW and the 
European Union on how to interpret provisions dealing with women’s rights. 
2 Abortion and maternal death in Nigeria 
Any discussion of abortion in Nigeria logically begins with the conception of a
person under Nigerian law. Section 307 of the Criminal Code provides that a
child becomes a person capable of being killed when it has completely proceeded
in a living state from the body of its mother, whether it has breathed or not, and
whether it has an independent circulation or not, and whether the navel string
is severed or not. Thus, any other termination of the life in a pregnancy short
of this is an abortion. The only permissible ground for performing abortion is
to save the life of the mother. Consequently, many women resort to unsafe
abortion methods. This leads to abortion-related complications and increasing
mortality rate in the country. Unsafe abortions remain a major reproductive
health concern in Nigeria since most abortions are carried out illegally and are, as
a result, performed by unskilled and semi-skilled physicians.3 
Criminalizing abortion drives women from hospitals where they could get 
better medical attention, and make them resort to the use of quacks and crude 
means in a bid to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. Abortions are a major 
contributor to maternal mortality, accounting for as many as 30–40% of mater-
nal deaths in Nigeria and one in eight maternal deaths in the West African 
sub-region.4 The estimated abortion rate was 33 abortions per 1,000 women 
aged 15 to 49 in 2012.5 Abortions account for up to 40% of maternal deaths 
in Nigeria, making it the second leading cause of maternal mortality in the 
country.6 
According to a research, an estimated 456,000 unsafe abortions are done 
in Nigeria every year.7 A similar study estimates the number of women who 
engage in unsafe abortions to be at about 20,000 each year.8 Research has 
revealed that only 40% of abortions are performed by physicians in regular
health facilities, while the remaining percentage are performed by non-phy-
sicians.9 Unwanted pregnancy can and does occur among women from every 
social, demographic and economic background in Nigeria. Economic, socio-
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rights of women are also responsible for the high rate of abortions in Nigeria.10 
Thus, whether an abortion is carried out through qualified medical practition-
ers or quacks, has implications for the rate of abortions. In the face of high 
pregnancy rates due to lack of contraceptives, poverty, cultural reasons and 
family planning, the legal restrictions have no doubt failed to take into consid-
eration the different situations of women. 
One of most compelling arguments against restrictive abortion laws is that 
they are the reason why millions of women have recourse to unsafe abortion 
and as a consequence lose their lives. Hence, the link between unsafe abor-
tion and restrictive laws is well established.11 Indeed, it forms the main premise 
upon which international treaty bodies have recommended the liberalization 
and decriminalization of abortion laws to reflect the experiences of women. 
Abortion-related mortality and morbidity are highest in those countries where 
the law is most restrictive of abortion. It is against this backdrop, that the 
Maputo Protocol for example, envisages liberalization of restrictive abortion 
laws across the continent in a manner that guarantees the realization of substan-
tive right to reproductive health of women in Africa. It provides governments 
with a human rights edifice for taking a lead in reforming laws that impede 
access to safe abortion. 
3 What is the woman question? 
Feminist researchers adopt different methods of analysis to address different 
legal questions to bring the values and experience of women to bare on social 
and legal problems.12 Popular perspectives in this regard include rational empir-
icism, standpoint epistemology, postmodernism and positionality.13 Bartlett’s 
article titled ‘Feminist Legal Methods’,14 discusses such topics as feminist prac-
tical reasoning, feminist consciousness raising and asking the woman ques-
tion.15 Hence, the approach of this research is to ask the woman question, and 
determine the implications of asking the question for the provision of abortion 
law in Nigeria.16 Drawing on the provsions of the Maputo Protocol, on liber-
alization of abortion in Africa, this chapter discusses lessons that can be learned 
from the approach of the Protocol in advancement of the reproductive health 
and rights of women. . 
The research draws experience from feminist as well as legal and judicial 
jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, where the woman question has been 
asked. This approach is designed to identify the gender implications of rules 
and practices which might otherwise appear to be neutral or objective.17 The 
method is designed to expose how the substance of law may silently and with-
out justification submerge the perspectives of women, and further entrench the 
patriarchal tradition.18 Examining the extant codes through the lenses of the 
Protocol’s interpretive guide and jurisprudence of the African Commission, 
will, it is argued, promote the legitimacy of liberalizing abortion laws and pro-
vide an impetus for the reform of Nigerian abortion law and practice with a 





Asking the woman question means ‘examining how the law fails to reflect 
the experiences and values that seem more typical of women than of men’.19 
It is on this sense that women in the regulation of society are discriminated 
against and oppressed and are disadvantaged and require bespoke approaches 
to issues concerning them. In cases like abortion, it presumes that the law on 
abortion has ignored and omitted to reflect the realities and experiences and 
values of women and has put on masculine lenses to look at issues affecting 
women20 to redress existing inequality.21 
4 Abortion rights and feminist standards 
Unsafe abortion has been linked to criminalization of abortion in most coun-
tries in Africa, and remains a major public health and human rights challenge 
especially for women in the African region.22 It has been argued that the reform 
of abortion laws in African can go a long way in transforming reproductive 
rights of women, and has the consequential positive effect of developing the 
jurisprudence around such rights within domestic legal regimes.23 
Criminalizing abortion has a social impact which can be damaging to the 
health of women in the society, though this is contested.24 It is a much-con-
troversial area of study, especially as the state has power to determine what is 
criminal, impose different punishments; exceptions include the circumstances 
surrounding individual case.25 Thus, it is highly affected by a number of factors 
such as political will, economic status, cultural factors and most importantly 
for this purpose, the plural nature of the legal system in the country.26 Scholars 
have expressed the opinion that the nature of non-enforcement and imple-
mentation of international laws have a lot to contribute to the poor state of 
reproductive health of women.27 Others have also expressed that beyond the 
existence of international human rights framework, there is also the inherent 
and internal limits that laws have to secure effective transformation of women’s 
rights in such a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and religious society.28 While the 
criminalization of abortion is not an end in itself, it serves as a means to hold 
states accountable for the implementation of laws affecting women especially 
international and regional human rights provisions. This to scholars, will trans-
form the abortion laws in these jurisdictions from a crime-punishment model 
to a reproductive health model.29 
Four ethical principles have provided the foundation for reproductive and 
sexual rights for women: bodily integrity, personhood, equality and diversity. 
They form the basis of what provisions on abortion should reflect for it to 
reflect women’s experiences. By incorporating these in the liberalization pro-
cess, it will not only recognize the associated human rights in accordance with 
international human rights instruments, it would have the effect of incorporat-
ing the immediate experiences of women. For example, bodily integrity has 
been construed as an individual and a social right with the implication of enti-
tlement to health, procreation and sexuality. As a ground for abortion, threat 
to the health of a pregnant woman can be particularly enabling when health is 
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understood in a holistic sense as envisaged by the WHO, permitting medical 
abortion when the pregnancy poses threat to health and life of a mother. 
More so, treatment of women, as not merely objects and as a means of 
achieving social goals such as population control, must be assured through 
decision making autonomy.30 The sexual autonomy of women and girls must 
be given adequate attention. The most prominent basis for the support and 
criticism of abortion rights is the need to guarantee and protect the right to 
life, which is the basis of the existence of rights.31 Some arguments for permit-
ting a right to abortion depend on denying rights to the foetus. Only persons 
have rights, and foetuses it is argued, are not yet persons.32 Thomson argue that 
even if the foetus is a person with a right to life, there are limits to what the 
state can compel women who carry foetuses in their bodies to do.33 To ask the 
woman question in this regard, one may argue that abortion provisions must 
recognize and give priority to the autonomy of a woman to determine whether 
she carries a pregnancy or not. This argument is even more compelling espe-
cially where the pregnancy poses a threat to her psychological and physical 
health, life, or because of illicit sexual acts not within her control such as assault 
or rape. Although some feminists endorse the right to abortion, the issue of 
abortion cannot easily be reduced to the interests of men versus women.34 To 
some, the perspective of thinking of the foetus and the mother as distinct per-
sons emphasizes their intertwined relationship and therefore unfounded.35 The 
perspective of abortion as a right, having to do with ownership and control of 
one’s body would open the floodgates for abortion on other seemingly imper-
missible circumstances or trivial grounds.36 
To view abortion only in terms of individual choice or even as a clash of 
rights, neglects a range of other relevant considerations including the fact that 
women and only women get pregnant and bear children; women earn less 
than men; they are subjected to sexual violence, and they have less familial or 
political decision-making power than men. This is what led Cook and Howard 
to argue that the law should focus on accommodating the differences in biol-
ogy and experience rather than reinforcing the patriarchal stereotype of the 
role of women,37 and that such a law must be sensitive and all-embracing and 
transformative to value different sexes and their significance.38 These concepts 
and rights are the ideals of a liberalized and gender-sensitive and equality-
based abortion provision; they are recognized as shaping modern laws affecting 
reproductive rights of women. Thus, for an abortion law to incorporate these 
standards is to reflect the sensitivity, reality and experiences of women, and 
would be seen to have asked the ultimate woman question. 
The Human Rights Committee in interpreting Art 3 ICCPR submitts that 
granting abortion rights for rape victims raises questions on the compliance and 
implementation of Articles 7 and 24 of the ICCPR. i.e. the right not to be sub-
jected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and the right of minors to 
special treatment. Similarly, the CEDAW Committee has interpreted Article 
12 of CEDAW on the right to health with discrimination on the basis of gender 




guarantee the rights to life, non-discrimination and dignity of human persons, 
and that these rights are inviolable. In a similar vein, the CEDAW Committee 
in its concluding observation for instance urges Chile to amend abortion laws 
to permit abortion on the grounds of health, including mental health in com-
pliance with its international human rights obligations. The Committee also 
urges Zimbabwe to liberalize and decriminalize abortion considering its con-
tribution to maternal mortality, as they violate the right to life of a majority of 
the victims. Similarly, the treaty monitoring body that supervises government 
compliance with the ICCPR has also interpreted existing global human rights 
standards to guarantee a women’s right to safe and legal abortion, under certain 
circumstances as implicating guaranteed rights to equality, non-discrimination, 
life, liberty, security of the person and the highest attainable standard of health. 
The CEDAW Committee has also framed the issue of maternal mortality due 
to unsafe abortion as a violation of women’s right to life. 
Moreover, Article 2 of the African Charter which is domesticated in Nigeria 
provides that everyone is equal before the law and that no one should be dis-
criminated against on grounds such as gender, religion, political beliefs or other 
status. Article 3 similarly guarantees to every individual the right to equality 
and equal protection of the law. Specifically relating to women, Articles 1 and 
2 of the African Women’s Protocol prohibit discriminatory practices against 
women. The African Commission in ruling on the provisions of Articles 2 and 
3 in Legal Resource Foundation v Zambia relating to non-discrimination and 
equality rights emphasizes the importance of fair treatment and just treatment 
within every legal system for all citizens, and the effect of such treatment on 
the enjoyment of other rights. 
Do the abortion provisions in Nigeria ask the woman question? Admittedly, 
most countries have had to rely on international human rights law to grant 
these rights without direct local legislation, In Africa, the African Charter and 
the Maputo Protocol represent the guiding principle for a liberalized abortion 
regime. More importantly, the interpretative guide provided by the African 
Commission in General Comment 2 on the provision on abortion and other 
rights, offers useful guidance to addressing these concerns, although there is yet 
to be a direct submission for interpretation on the provisions of Article 14 (2) 
(c). There are lessons to be drawn from other regional or human rights bodies. 
For instance, the Commission may draw lessons from CEDAW Committee in 
the Alyne da Silva Pimentel v. Brazil or other related cases, on how to ask the 
woman question when addressing a communication affecting the sexual and 
reproductive health and rights of women.39 
5 Nigerian criminal codes and the woman question 
The colonial antecedent of Nigeria created the foundation for the criminaliza-
tion of abortion. The Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, section 58 remains 
the foundation of the abortion prohibition in many former British colony juris-
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is necessary to save the life of the mother as in the case of the southern part of 
the country. Although most colonial jurisdictions have reformed their abortion 
laws, abortion-related offences in Nigeria remain of three kinds. They include 
attempts to procure abortion, killing of an unborn child, and child destruction. 
The Criminal Code and the Penal Code make it an offence to cause miscar-
riage and induce self-miscarriage, pursuant to the provisions of section 228 and 
229, as a felony with 14 years’ imprisonment. 
Similar provisions exist in the code applicable in the northern region under 
sections 232, 233 and 234 of the Penal Code. Section 232 criminalizes causing 
miscarriage in the absence of good faith, with up to 14 years’ imprisonment, 
or a fine. The offence of killing an unborn child in Nigeria is created under 
section 328 and 236 of the Criminal and Penal Codes respectively. The Codes 
provide for the punishment of life imprisonment for any persons who by an act 
of omission or commission, prevents a child from being born alive by a woman 
about to be delivered of a child. Allowance is made under sections 297 and 
235 of the Codes, respectively, for a situation where the unborn child may be 
aborted for the preservation of the life of the mother. This is the only statutory 
expression of the preservation of the life of a mother as a lawful justification for 
‘abortion’ under Nigerian Law. 
To attract the application of the codes, the miscarriage should have been 
caused voluntarily, and should not have been caused in the process of saving 
the life of the mother. Any other ground attracts a penal sanction. The English 
abortion precedent-setting case, R v. Bourne, construes section 58, the founda-
tion for the sections of the Nigerian Codes under review in giving interpreta-
tion to the meaning of the phrase ‘for the purpose of saving the life of the mother’. 
the court opines: 
…The law does not require the doctor to wait until the unfortunate
woman is in peril of immediate death… if the doctor is of opinion,
on reasonable grounds and with adequate knowledge, that the probable
consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the
woman a physical or mental wreck, the jury are quite entitled to take the
view that the doctor who, under those circumstances and in that honest
belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of preserving the life of the
mother. 
The case expands the lifesaving requirement to include situations where the 
physical and mental health of the mother is threatened. This is in recognition 
of the right to dignity and health recognized under English human rights. 
This has been argued to be the important approach required in dealing with 
abortion cases in common law and several other jurisdictions post Bourne, 
and premised on this judicial intervention majority of former colonial powers 
have repealed formerly restrictive positions and liberalized their abortion laws, 
largely to combat unsafe abortion-related mortality and morbidity.40 Although 
















they are only applicable in saving the life of the mother as a matter of necessity 
and ineffective in practice. 
The failure of the codes to specify the measures required to preserve the 
mother’s life or what it means to save the woman’s life is fundamental and 
profound for the rights and experiences of women. The Nigerian courts have 
also failed to thread the path of Bourne by recognizing grounds which have the 
focus of the guaranteed rights of women as evident in the case of R v. Edgal, 
involving a woman seeking abortion on health grounds. The West African 
Court of Appeal refuses abortion on health grounds and reiterates the life-
saving exception as sole grounds. This case represents, to date, the substantive 
judicial precedent in Nigeria on abortion. This omission or inability to pre-
scribe such tangible criteria leaves so much at the discretion of the physician, 
and ignores the rights and liberty of a woman to determine whether to abort 
even when her health and mental being are at risk.41 It gives wide discretion 
to a physician to address a pregnant woman’s circumstances based on his or 
her personal interpretation of the situation, or where she has been sexually 
assaulted, raped, or would suffer psychological harm as a result of a pregnancy. 
The language of the provisions seems to suggest that it is a question of fact to 
be determined by the physician, and a subjective interpretation without tak-
ing the realities and everyday experiences of women into consideration. It is 
argued that the Codes in this light failed to ask the woman question, thereby 
contributing to the incidence of clandestine abortions. It is for this reason that 
most global public health and human rights experts advocate promoting wom-
en’s reproductive health.42 Preventing unsafe abortion related mortality and 
morbidity includes canvasing for the broadening of the grounds for abortion 
and decriminalization, with the aim of creating an enabling legal environment 
recognizing the rights and experiences of women.43 
To guarantee women’s reproductive rights in the context of abortion requires
more than merely repealing laws that criminalize abortion.44 This would entail
aspiring towards a comprehensive reproductive health framework.45 The state
should not merely decriminalize abortion but must also recognize reproductive
health rights, services and implementation mechanisms in order to cater for the
needs of women.46 Rather than reducing the incidence of unsafe abortions, the
restriction has compelled women and girls to resort to clandestine abortion,
thereby risking their health and lives.47 One out of every seven Nigerian woman
or girls aged between 15 and 49, have at some point in time attempted to obtain
abortion through unsafe means or through unlicensed means, especially through
‘unqualified practitioners or qualified ones working under substandard medical
conditions’.48 The implication of the restrictive abortion provisions dictates that
most services are unregulated and mostly ‘very frequently unsafe’.49 
6 The Protocol and the woman question 
In the last two decades, most countries have witnessed a gradual change 
towards liberal abortion laws. Admittedly, most countries have had to rely on 
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international human rights law to grant these rights without direct local legisla-
tion. A similar approach of liberalization of substantive abortion law that is not 
accompanied by concrete implementation also exists at the African regional 
level. In 2003, liberalization in the region received a significant boost through 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), when 
the African Union adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. Article 14(2) of the 
Protocol has significantly augmented the trend towards liberalization by recog-
nizing abortion as a human right in given circumstances. However, states like 
Nigeria are failing to implement a legal and administrative framework aimed 
at liberalizing effectively abortion laws domestically, in a manner that takes the 
lived experiences of women into consideration. The African Commission in 
its General Comment 2 on the provision on abortion and other rights in the 
Protocol, offers useful guidance to addressing these concerns. Drawing lessons 
from emerging jurisprudence from the CEDAW Committee, the European 
Court of Human Rights and United Nations treaty bodies are an important 
step that can be used to mirror the commissions interpretation and render 
African governments accountable for failure to implement domestic abortion 
laws. This inter-jurisprudential approach will enable courts, policy makers and 
legislatures in African countries to pinpoint needed interventions by way of 
law reforms to abortion in Africa. 
Specifically, the CEDAW Committee and Committee on the Rights of the 
Child have expressed concerns on the state of abortion in Nigeria and the need 
to repeal, reform, and modify its restrictive laws. Despite these recommenda-
tions and advisory opinions, abortion is still criminalized in the country. 
The significance and potential of the Protocol lies in its affirmation of repro-
ductive choice and autonomy as a key human right, and contains an unprec-
edented and explicit woman’s right to abortion when pregnancy results from 
sexual assault, rape or incest; when continuation of the pregnancy endangers 
the life or health of the pregnant woman and in cases of grave foetal defects 
that are incompatible with life. These grounds are the focus of the failure of 
the criminal codes in Nigeria, and which may now be realized by women 
through enforcing their human rights under the Protocol alongside the domes-
ticated African Charter. In the light of the high rate of maternal death due to 
unsafe abortion, the adoption of the Protocol seeks to improve these indica-
tors by putting pressure on governments, including addressing the underlying 
socio-political and healthcare issues that contribute to the depressing state of 
women’s health across the continent.50 
Article 14(2)(c) of the Protocol provides that: 
states parties shall take all appropriate measures to: protect the reproductive 
rights of women by authorizing medical abortion in cases of sexual assault, 
rape, incest, and where continued pregnancy endangers the mental and 




The Protocol broadens the grounds for abortion in Africa towards liberaliza-
tion of abortion laws. It recognizes the reproductive rights of women in line 
with the experience of women and the consequence of the restrictive laws.51 
While it is not in doubt that decriminalization is a veritable tool in the woman 
question quest, this is only a part of the story. A combination of repeal of 
restrictive abortion laws as well as a comprehensive framework is more effec-
tive in addressing maternal mortality. A framework where reproductive rights 
are recognized considering the experiences of women, production of timely 
healthcare services and adequate mechanisms for the implementation of the 
various laws including establishing effective monitoring and remedial process, 
must be put in place. To complement the Protocol, there is a comprehen-
sive framework for the recognition and enforcement of reproductive rights 
of women. Obstacles in the way of access to healthcare for women such as 
the criminalization of abortion have been held to violate the provisions of 
CEDAW, and the Committee has urged state parties to remove the obsta-
cles and amend such laws. According to Ngwena, unless decriminalization of 
abortion goes in tandem with state provision of substantive access to abortion 
services based on need rather than means, the plight of women who need abor-
tion, but have little or no income, is unlikely to change.52 
It is imperative to examine how the Protocol addresses the woman question 
differently from the approach by national legislations and in the absence of a 
direct health right precedent. The African Commission in Doebbler v Sudan and 
Egyptian Rights Initiative v Egypt, offers guidance relating to women’s rights, 
but not abortion. These cases have affected the development of the jurispru-
dence and interpretation of the Protocol provisions for guidance by states. The 
African Commission issues GC No. 2 on Article 14.1 (a), (b), (c) and (f) and 
Article 14. 2 (a) and (c) of the Protocol, recognizing the persistent rate of abor-
tion on the continent and the fact that many countries are yet to undertake the 
necessary legislative reforms towards domesticating the relevant provisions of 
the Protocol with the objective of reversing the maternal mortality trend. The 
GC 2 provides interpretive guidance on the overall and specific obligations of 
States Parties towards promoting the effective domestication and implementa-
tion of Article 14 of the Protocol. 
The GC is also to guide in drafting and presenting State periodic reports, 
on the legislative and other measures taken to promote and protect the sexual 
and reproductive health of women and girls. It thus imposes an obligation on 
states for effective evaluation of steps taken to guarantee reproductive rights. 
In an important decision in the Alyne case, the CEDAW Committee affirms 
the violation of Art 2 and 12 of CEDAW when it holds that a state party is 
directly responsible for the actions of private institutions when it outsources 
its medical services and that it fails to regulate and monitor such institutions. It 
also affirms that failure to provide affordable access for all women to adequate 
abortion care, and effective judicial remedies in line with international stand-
ards to address the high rate of maternal mortality, amounts to a violation of the 
socio-economic and cultural rights. The Committee examines factors such as 
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poverty and race and intersectional discrimination in arriving at its decision.53 
The ruling offers a sample direction to the interpretation of the provisions 
of the Protocol by the African Commission in handling communication on 
abortion considering the rate of maternal mortality and challenges of access to 
abortion services prevalent in Nigeria. 
Similarly, in L.C v Peru involving a 13-year-old rape victim who was denied 
abortion. It establishes obligations on the state to allow abortion when the 
physical and mental health of women is at stake, especially where the preg-
nancy results from sexual assault or rape. It calls for decriminalization of abor-
tion on these grounds and affirm states’ obligation to provide adequate facilities 
and effective mechanisms for accountability in protecting women’s reproduc-
tive rights. It is argued that the provisions of the GC resonate with the stand-
ards and ideals of abortion law; section 46 of the GC mandates government to 
remove laws against abortion, and provides both a legal and social environment 
conducive for the exercise of women’s sexual and reproductive rights. 
This guidance in the jurisprudence of the Protocol is aimed at changing the 
negative experiences women face in the various countries in the application 
of the substantive, administrative laws, judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. The 
Protocol imposes on state parties the obligation to protect women’s reproduc-
tive rights, particularly by authorizing safe abortion on recognized grounds. In 
addition, the Maputo Plan of Action urges governments to adopt legal policies 
and frameworks to reduce cases of unsafe abortion, and to develop and imple-
ment national action plans to mitigate the prevalence of unintended pregnan-
cies and unsafe abortions. Section 53 of the GC further expresses the obligation 
imposed on state parties aimed at a comprehensive and reflective of approaches 
of the woman question, by imposing obligation to ensure availability, acces-
sibility, acceptability and good quality reproductive health care, including fam-
ily planning, contraception and safe abortion for women. State parties should 
ensure services are comprehensive, integrated, rights-based, sensitive to the 
reality of women in all contexts, and free from any coercion, discrimination 
and violence. This will undoubtedly elevate the abortion provisions beyond 
a neutral set of regulations, to a more gender and women focused legislation. 
It has been argued that the Protocol has contributed significantly to the 
regime of abortion in Africa. First, is its giving abortion rights an enumerated 
status at a regional level, furthering the consensus on combating unsafe abortion 
as a major public peril, promoting the legitimacy of liberalizing abortion laws, 
and providing an impetus for reform.54 This has the effect of reforming most 
abortion laws in Africa from the criminal outlook for a more holistic human 
rights outlook. The Nigerian restrictive criminal-codes have been criticized, 
as they fail to recognize other grounds aimed at the autonomy for women. 
However, the Protocol has also been criticized as being restrictive for failure to 
concretely recognize other grounds aimed at a deeper autonomy for women, 
such as abortion by request and socio-economic grounds. The Protocol is only 




those recognized by the Protocol. Moreover, it does not apply to states who 
have already recognized these grounds in their laws, such as South Africa. 
In comparison with the Criminal Code, the Penal Code sections are much 
circumscribed for abortion rights, and gives so much room for discretion to 
the judges against women, who are the subjects of the provisions. They lack 
required human rights jurisprudence of the various international instruments, 
especially the innovative approach that Art. 14(2) (c) of the Maputo protocol 
offers. Since states have duty to respect, protect and fulfil the equality and 
dignity of women, legislations limiting rights of women such as in the case of 
criminalized abortion, are void and a violation of international law. If states 
interpret the refusal of grounds of abortion due to rape without consider-
ing that rape and even assault is a violation of the dignity and security of the 
woman, such a statute has failed to reflect women’s experience. 
Unfortunately, there is a lack of regional enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure compliance and implementation of the Protocol to be supervised by the 
African Commission. The Protocol may also encounter difficulty in achiev-
ing its purpose if left for countries to simply ratify without domestication, or 
transformation into a domestic law. This has been argued as the major chal-
lenge for abortion reform in Nigeria.55 The pluralistic nature of the legal sys-
tem has made it difficult for international human rights to be effective.56 In 
Nigeria, section 12 of the Constitution provides that such a treaty will have to 
be enacted into a domestic statute either by way of amendment of provisions, 
repeal, or adoption as an act of parliament. This will give power to women 
seeking abortion to rely on such provision in the domestic legal regime, for 
effective enforcement. While Nigeria has domesticated the African Charter, 
and ratified the Protocol, it is yet to domesticate the Protocol. The implica-
tion is that the lofty goals of the Protocol are far from achievable without 
domestication. 
7 Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that the restrictive abortion provisions in Nigeria 
are the reason for the practice of unsafe abortion and a major contributor to 
the high rate of maternal mortality. The Criminal and Penal Codes only rec-
ognize lifesaving as the sole ground for abortion. While this is a colonial herit-
age, various countries have moved beyond the lifesaving exception to include 
grounds that reflect the realities of modern times and experiences of women. 
The research argues that using feminist reasoning, the Codes on abortion fail 
to ask the woman question. 
Against this backdrop, the Maputo Protocol significantly advances human 
rights protections in Africa to better reflect and incorporate women’s experi-
ences. Its significance lies in its affirmation of women’s reproductive rights as 
human rights, and its articulation of women’s rights within an African regional 
context. The legal and moral pressure it exerts over the governments and poli-
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presents a tremendous opportunity for women’s rights advocates in Africa, and 
could herald a new age of sexual and reproductive health for women through-
out the continent. The restrictive provisions in the Nigerian codes ought to be 
reformed, as they are unsustainable and not reflective of the rights of women. 
They are also contrary to international human rights obligations that Nigeria is 
signatory to. Most importantly, the restriction is responsible for the high rate of 
unsafe abortion in the country and the consequential maternal mortality. It is 
suggested that Nigeria domesticate the Protocol and transform same into local 
legislation. Judicial and quasi-judicial bodies adopt the interpretive guidelines 
from the Africa Charter, General Comments 2 and jurisprudence developed 
by other international bodies, especially CEDAW Committee, EU, and other 
regional bodies, in implementing abortion provisions. They constitute impor-
tant sources of norms and standards for national courts. This will significantly 
improve the experiences of women seeking to assert their autonomy and right 
to equality. 
The recommendations offered by this chapter is that an effective way to
redress and control the rate of maternal mortality through abortion is to con-
sider the disadvantageous position of women and give women a voice in the
provisions, application, and implementation of laws dealing with reproductive
rights of women. Several international bodies have consistently found these
restrictive provisions clearly result in a high rate of unsafe abortions, which
often result in loss of lives. Finally, to ask the woman question, laws seeking
to overcome the restrictive abortion legislations must clearly be seen from a
health rights and feminist perspective. Institutional mechanisms leading to the
implementation and application of the laws, which are presently absent, are
being addressed. These safeguards must ensure that women’s rights are given
priority with clear remedial guidelines to challenge such institutional process,
which must also be less costly, timely and safe, in order(fine) not to defeat its
purpose. 
Notes 
1 I Irehobhude Comparative health law and policy: Critical perspectives on Nigerian and global 
health law (2015) 5. 
2 B Oye-Adeniran et al ‘Advocacy for reform of the abortion law in Nigeria’ (2004) 12 
Reproductive Health Matters 210; see also B Oye-Adeniran et al ‘Complications of unsafe 
abortion: A case study and the need for abortion law reform in Nigeria’ (2002) 10 
Reproductive Health Matters 201–217. 
3 As above. 
4 Guttmacher Institute ‘Abortion worldwide:A decade of uneven progress’ (2009) 25–29: 
M Berer ‘National laws and unsafe abortion: The parameters of change’ (2004) 12
Reproductive Health Matters 1. 
5 Guttmacher Institute (2015) https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/abortion-nigeria 
(accessed on 24 October 2020). 
6 O Friday ‘Preventing unsafe abortion in Nigeria’ (1997) African Journal of Reproductive 
Health 25–36. 





    
 


















   
  
  





   
  
  




8 R Abiodun ‘Unsafe abortions cause 20000 deaths a year in Nigeria’ (2002) 325 British 
Medical Journal 7371, 988. 
9 S Henshaw et al ‘The incidence of induced abortion in Nigeria’ (1998) 24(4) International 
Family Planning Perspectives 156–164. 
10 L Bartlett et al ‘Risk factors for legal induced abortion-related mortality in the United 
States’ (2004) 103(4) Obstetrics and Gynecology 4, 729–737. 
11 C Ngwena ‘Reforming African abortion laws and practice:The place of transparency’ 
in R Cook et al (eds) Abortion law in transnational perspective: Cases and controversies (2014) 
166; Guttmacher Institute (n. 5) 29; Berer ‘National laws and unsafe abortion: The 
parameters of change’ (2004) 12 Reproductive: Health Matters 1. 
12 S Andermah et al ‘A concise glossary of feminist theory’ (1997);A Saulnier Feminist theo-
ries and social work:Approaches and application (1996); also E Keller ‘Feminism and science 
signs’ (1982) 7 Journal of Women in Culture and Society 588–602. 
13 K Bartlett ‘Feminist legal methods’ (1989–1990) 103 Harvard: Law Review 829. 
14 As above. 
15 As above. 
16 Bartlett (n. 13) 104. 
17 E Durojaye & O Oluduro ‘The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights and 
the woman question’ (2016) 24 Feminist Legal Studies 323. 
18 As above 323–325. 
19 J Christopher United Nations and International Law (1997). 
20 Durojaye & Oluduro, (n 17) 324; R Cooks ‘Human rights and reproductive self-deter-
mination’ (1995) 44 The American University Law Review 4, 975–1016. 
21 E Durojaye & O Oluduro, (n 17) 324. 
22 C Ngwena (n 11) 166. 
23 As above. 
24 R Cook ‘Stigmatised meanings of criminal abortion law’ in R Cook et al (eds) Abortion 
law in transnational perspective: Cases and controversies (2014) 347–348. 
25 R Cook (n 24) 348. 
26 B Odunsi & O Adewole ‘Domestication and reception of international reproduc-
tive health law and the limits of law; Perspectives from Nigeria and South Africa’ in I 
Irehobhude (ed) Women’s health and the limits of law-domestic and international perspectives
(2020) 235. 
27 R Cook (n 24) 347–348. 
28 I Irehobhude (ed) Women’s health and the limits of law-domestic and international perspectives
(2020) 235. 
29 C Ngwena (n 11) 168. 
30 I Irehobhude (n 28) 24. 
31 D Satz ‘Feminist perspectives on reproduction and the family’ (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy. 
32 T Michael ‘Abortion and infanticide’ (1972) 2(1) Philosophy and Public Affairs 37–65. 
33 J Thomson ‘A defence of abortion’ (1971) 1 Philosophy & Public Affairs 1. 
34 Satz (n 31) 35. 
35 As above. 
36 S Correa & R Petchesky Population policies reconsidered: Health, empowerment, and rights
(1994) 107–123. 
37 R Cook & S Howard ‘Accommodating women’s differences under the women’s anti-
discrimination convention’ (2007) 56 Emory Law Journal 1039, 1052–1056. 
38 As above. 
39 R Cook ‘Human rights and maternal health: Exploring the effectiveness of the Alyne
decision’ (2013) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Global Health and the Law 104. 
40 C Ngwena ‘Inscribing abortion as a human right: Significance of the protocol on the 
rights of women in Africa’ (2010) 32 Human Rights Quarterly 4, 783–864. Among Africa’s 
 Addressing maternal mortality in Nigeria 49
former colonizers, Portugal has been the most hesitant in implementing liberal reform. 
D Vilar ‘Abortion: The Portuguese case’ (2002) 10 Reproductive Health Matters 1, 156, It 
was only in 2007 that Portugal passed a law permitting abortion on request in the first 
ten weeks of pregnancy. Associated Press (AP), Portugal Law Liberalizes Abortion (2007).
41  F Londras & M Enright ‘A rights-based approach to abortion’ in F Londras & M Enright 
(eds) Repealing the 8th Reforming Irish abortion law (2018) 3.
42  Cook (n 39) 348; Londras & Enright (n 41) 2.
43  Center for Reproductive Rights ‘The world’s abortion laws map’ (2011) http://repro-
ductiverights .org /en /document /the-worlds-abortion-laws-map-2011 (accessed 20 
October 2019).
44  Ngwena (n 40) 783.
45  R Cook and Dickens ‘Human rights dynamics of law reform’ (2003) 25 Human Rights 
Quarterly 1, 12–14.
46  C Ngwena ‘Access to legal abortion: Developments in Africa from a reproductive and 
sexual health rights perspective’ (2007) Health and Human Rights 315.
47  Alan Guttmacher Institute ‘Abortion in Nigeria’ factsheet October (2015) https://www 
.guttmacher .org /fact -sheet /abortion -nigeria (accessed 20 April 2020).
48  A Bankole et al ‘Barriers to safe motherhood’ 9 (2009) www .guttmacher .org /pubs /2009 
/05 /28 /MotherhoodNigeria .pdf (accessed 20 April 2020).
49  S Henshaw et al ‘Severity and cost of unsafe abortion complication treated in Nigerian 
hospitals’ (2008) International Family Planning Perspective 48, 34.
50  Ngwena (n 40) 783–864.
51  As above.
52  As above.
53  Cook (n 39) 106.
54  Ngwena (n 46) 783–864.
55  Odunsi & Adewole (n 26) 235.
56  As above.
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Mainstreaming the ‘abortion 
question’ into the right 
to health in Uganda
Robert D Nanima
1  Introduction
Uganda has an estimated 775,000 unintended pregnancies per annum, of which 
25% are among adolescents.1 It is estimated that 297,000 (38.3%) mothers have 
abortions carried out, usually in dangerous health conditions.2 These include 
lack of qualified health practitioners and medication.3 This still does not engage 
the reasons that inform the woman’s decision to undergo an abortion in dan-
gerous health conditions.4 This is without regard to the influence of religion 
and culture concerning abortion.5 These polarities between the woman and 
other societal players continue to contribute to the 8% rate of maternal deaths 
due to unsafe abortion.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 47,000 women die 
from having unsafe abortions carried out.6 In Uganda, a total of 128,682 women 
were hospitalized for complications from induced abortions.7 Disaggregated 
results show that 93,265 had induced abortions. The methodology of this study 
shows that the data was obtained from 418 health centres across the country. 
This data is based on the fact that it is only the women who went for treat-
ment or who had no option but to go to a health centre. The women who 
procured abortions in other places other than health centres are not reported, 
and as such the figures would be higher than this. This is fortified by the fact 
that some women opt for abortions under dangerous conditions due to fear 
of legal repercussions like imprisonment, societal stereotyping and stigma.8 As 
such, first, the research does not question the reasons that lead women to have 
an abortion. Secondly, it does not contextualize the eminent probability of 
possible prosecution of the women who have the abortion carried out, or the 
individuals who procure it. Prosecution of the latter category is based on the 
use of common purpose through aiding and abetting as principles of criminal 
liability. What this restrictive regime does to the woman who considers an 
abortion needs to be evaluated. 
In some cultures, the preference for children of a particular sex as a patriar-
chal element coupled with the scientific prenatal sex identification techniques 
may inform the reason for an abortion.9 Other reasons include the existence of 
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advances.10 Non-consensual sex is evident in instances where women or girls
are not willing to have their first sexual experience.11 This is worsened where
they are unable to negotiate the use of contraceptives that leads to increased risk
of unwanted pregnancies.12 Further research shows that the prevailing socio-
cultural norms and values in Uganda, influenced by religion and the law, are
against abortion.13 On the other hand, men seem to support abortion where it
serves their interest.14 This still posits the control of a girl or woman’s sexuality.
In effect, the continued protection of the perspectives of the community other
than the realities of the girl or woman points to a protection that conflates the
meaning of a right to life of the foetus and the mother. There is a need to balance
reasons for state action that protects the rights of women along with the default
emphasis on the protection of unborn human life as a constitutional value.15 
The foregoing statistics call for introspection into the position of interna-
tional, regional and national law on abortion. The chapter evaluates the posi-
tion of international law on abortion followed by an evaluation of regional 
initiatives under the African human rights system. This is followed by an exam-
ination of Uganda’s reservation to the Maputo Protocol. This chapter draws 
on Uganda’s restrictive legislative position to inform the subsequent analysis. 
Conclusions and recommendations follow. 
2 International law on abortion 
The right to safe, legal and effective abortion is provided for in international 
law in the context of other rights. Concerning the right to life, Article 6 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states in 
part that every human being has the inherent right to life. In its General 
Comment, the Human Rights Committee argues that deprivation of life 
involves an intentional or otherwise foreseeable and preventable life-termi-
nating harm or injury, caused by an act or omission. The failure by any state 
to take on deliberate pro-active steps to ensure that abortion does not lead 
to maternal death is a violation of the right to life. This right is buttressed by 
the provision of the right to the highest attainable standard of health in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
The women’s right to health extends to their sexual and reproductive health.16 
States have an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil rights related to women’s 
sexual and reproductive health. This obligation extends to the use of necessary 
steps to reduce the stillbirth and infant mortality rate and to provide for the 
healthy development of the child. In its General Comment 14 on the Right to 
Health, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
underscores the need for state parties to implement measures to 
[I]mprove child and maternal health, sexual and reproductive health ser-
vices, including access to family planning, pre- and post-natal care, emer-
gency obstetric services and access to information, as well as to resources 
necessary to act on that information. 
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Barriers that would otherwise affect the women’s enjoyment of the highest 
level of care need to be removed to ensure that the right to health is enjoyed 
without any form of discrimination. The CECSR has recommended to State 
Parties to ensure that these barriers are removed. A complete discussion of the 
international law on abortion is beyond the scope of this chapter. What can be 
shown in the interim is that despite the lack of a direct provision that speaks to 
the right to abortion, an engagement of various rights indicates that the right is 
recognized in international law. 
In the regional human rights system, the African normative framework 
presents the first human rights instrument that expressly articulates a wom-
an’s right to an abortion in specified circumstances. The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) provides for the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health. It establishes the African Commission on Human 
and People’s Rights (African Commission) to promote and protect the rights 
of the people. In Africa pursuant to the need to engage women’s rights, the 
African Commission adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol). 
Under the Maputo Protocol, the relevant article provides: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to … protect the repro-
ductive rights of women by authorising medical abortion in cases of sexual 
assault, rape, incest, and where the continued pregnancy endangers the 
mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or the 
foetus. 
According to the drafting history of this article, the intent was to cover all 
aspects that affect the reproductive rights of women that needed the engage-
ment by state parties. It was after a subsequent meeting of experts that the draft 
was amended to state as follows: to ‘protect the reproductive rights of women 
particularly by authorizing medical abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape and 
incest’.17 At a subsequent preparatory meeting in Addis in January 2003, both 
national and regional women rights organizations proposed that the grounds 
of danger to life, physical or mental health of the mother had to be included 
as abortion grounds.18 This led to the final wording in Article 14(2) (c). The 
article in this review was not imposed upon the state parties. Conversely, its 
development was through engaged dialogue with stakeholders such as civil 
society organizations, experts and state parties. 
According to the African Commission’s General Comment 2 on the Maputo 
Protocol, three points underscore the application of Article 14(2) (c). First, 
the conduct of unsafe abortions in Africa contributes to preventable maternal 
mortality and disabilities. This is due to restrictive legal regimes that make it 
hard for women to seek a safe abortion. Secondly, discrimination is embod-
ied in the state’s parties’ use of impediments to the health services reserved 
for women and the use of the conscientious objections by health personnel. 
The African Commission reiterates the non-application of the conscientious 
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objection where a woman’s health is compromized, and one requires emer-
gency care or treatment. Other discriminatory practices include bureaucratic 
challenges in administrative laws, policies, procedures, practices and socio-cul-
tural attitudes that violate the woman’s right to life, non-discrimination and 
health through the deprivation of decision-making power on her sexual and 
reproductive rights. This discrimination extends to the subjection of women 
to criminal proceedings, prosecution or disciplinary action for benefiting from 
health services like abortion and post-abortion care. Thirdly, the categories of 
women who should benefit from abortion and post-abortion care ought to 
include those who conceive due to sexual assault, rape and incest. It highlights 
the possible trauma that a woman may suffer where she is forced to keep the 
pregnancy to its full term. As such, the Maputo Protocol promotes women’s 
control of their sexual and reproductive health and rights. However, Uganda 
entered a reservation on the application of Article 14.19 As will be shown, 
the recommendations on Uganda’s reservations to these articles impede the 
full enjoyment of women’s health and reproductive rights concerning medical 
abortion. 
The African Union has policies like the Maputo Plan of Action for the 
Operationalization of the Continental Policy Framework for Sexual and 
Reproductive Health. Adopted in 2006, this Plan of Action requires states to 
adopt administrative and legal frameworks aimed at reducing unsafe abortions, 
including providing comprehensive safe abortion services under the law and 
educating communities on the services provided under the laws. 
As a socio-economic right, it is expected that states progressively realize 
this right through the creation of a conducive environment for the enjoyment 
of good health including the ability to control one’s body in the sexual and 
reproductive form. Any barriers that affect the enjoyment of this right like lack 
of access to health services and education in the sexual and reproductive rights 
are a violation of the right to health. As such the application of restrictive abor-
tion laws and their undue regard to the consequences of unsafe abortion on 
women’s health have to be placed into perspective. A practitioner who is not 
willing to carry out an abortion should refer the woman to another practitioner 
who may be consulted. This approach envisages abortion as a measure that 
offers a woman the ability to make a decision that in the long run accords her 
the attainment of a high standard of health. This autonomy enables her to make 
informed decisions about her sexual and reproductive rights. 
Another principle that underscores the right to health is the requirement 
for progressive realization by states.20 The state has to take steps to ensure 
the maximum utilization of its available resources, to progressively achieve 
the full realization of the rights recognized in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.21 The state uses the principles of availa-
bility, accessibility, acceptability and quality. The failure to progressively realize 
this duty within a state’s financial resources eludes the incremental enjoyment 
of economic, social and cultural rights.22 Where resources are insufficient, states 
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these rights.23 Two points are evident. First, in international law, the right to 
abortion can be engaged through the enjoyment of other rights. Secondly, as 
a point of departure, Africa’s Maputo Protocol expressly articulates a woman’s 
right to an abortion in specified circumstances. Thirdly, the right to health can 
be progressively realized. The author now considers Uganda’s reservation to 
the Maputo Protocol. 
3 An examination of Uganda’s reservation 
to the Maputo Protocol 
Uganda entered a reservation to Article 14 (2) (c), to the effect that the article 
would be interpreted subject to domestic legislation on abortion. Although it 
has been suggested that this reservation is limited to the application of Article 
14 of the Maputo Protocol without rendering abortion illegal,24 this position is 
not reflected in the wording of the reservation. 
It is argued instead that Uganda seeks to maintain the domestic regulation 
of abortion to override the notion that a woman’s right to abort forms part of 
the sexual and reproductive rights. This presents a dangerous predicament; 
first, the reservation defeats the purpose of the Maputo Protocol. Secondly, 
it does not consider the polarities that misinform the abortion question in the 
Ugandan society.25 The cumulative effect of this reservation is a restriction on 
the ability of the Protocol to address the question of abortion. This reservation 
should be subject to the Limburg Principles, which require that state parties 
begin the immediate implementation of the obligations under the ICESCR.26 
The Limburg Principles state that: 
Some obligations under the Covenant require immediate implementation 
in full by all States parties, such as the prohibition of discrimination in 
article 2(2) of the Covenant. 
This provision applies to Uganda by virtue of its stand on the position of 
international law. Although the applicability of international law is not clearly 
indicated in the Constitution, this is solved by the requirement that its applica-
tion in Ugandan Courts is conditioned on the ratification of a treaty under the 
Ratification of Treaties Act and then domesticated by an Act of the Ugandan 
parliament. The continued application of the reservation is a violation of the 
requirement for the immediate implementation of the non-violation of the 
right against discrimination. An evaluation of the right to health in the context 
of abortion needs to be placed into perspective. 
4 An evaluation of the right to health in Uganda 
4.1 The position of the right under the Constitution 
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda does not provide for the right to 
health. However, various principles and provisions on how the woman may 
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enjoy this right are evident. According to the national objectives and principles 
of state policy, 
[t]he State shall endeavour to fulfil the fundamental rights of all Ugandans 
to social justice and economic development and shall, in particular, ensure 
that … all Ugandans enjoy rights and opportunities and access to … health 
services… 
Policies developed by the government should be used to improve the welfare 
of all persons including the woman to have and enjoy health services. The goal 
of the health policy is to protect and promote the health of individuals and the 
community.27 The drafting of any policy on health starts from the recognition 
of the foundation under the National Objectives. All policies on health require 
that 
[t]he State shall provide the facilities and opportunities necessary to 
enhance the welfare of women to enable them to realise their full poten-
tial and advancement. 
In addition, the state is mandated to protect women and their rights, tak-
ing into account their unique status and natural maternal functions in society. 
These policy directives should guide the state in enhancing the welfare of 
women, to the position of achieving their potential with due regard to their 
maternal function. 
The Constitution recognizes equality between women and men, which 
underscores freedom from discrimination, for affirmative action in favour 
of women and for outlawing practices that undermine the welfare, dignity 
and interests of women. Provisions that undermine the welfare and dignity 
of women affect her attempt to secure a livelihood. In Salvatori Abuki v the 
Attorney General, the court held that the right to life encompasses the enjoy-
ment of other rights which lead to the ability to have a livelihood. These 
provisions have to be reconciled and used as a guide in ‘mainstreaming’ the 
abortion question. 
Also, Uganda is a signatory to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples, 
Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, as well as being a member of the United Nation’s World 
Health Organization. All these bodies interpret the right to health as the right 
to the highest attainable standard of health. In this regard, the state has a duty 
to ensure the progressive realization of this right by respecting, protecting, 
fulfilling and promoting it.28 As such, Uganda’s status concerning these various 
human rights instruments enables it to apply them. In addition, the Supreme 
Court ruled that International Customary Law is applicable in Uganda. 
The judgements from the courts speak to the enjoyment of the right to 
health. For instance in The Centre For Health, Human Rights & Development & 
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2 Others v The Executive Director, Mulago Referral Hospital & Another, the Court 
acknowledged various duties of the state with regard to the provision of the 
right to health. It referred to General Comment 14 and stated, 
The right to health contains both freedoms and entitlements. The free-
doms include the right to control one’s health and body, including sexual 
and reproductive health, and the right to be free from interference, such 
as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual medical treatment 
and experimentation. By contrast, the entitlements include the right to a 
system of health protection, which provides equality of opportunity for 
people to enjoy the highest attainable level of health. 
This position reads the existence of the right to health into Uganda’s 
Constitution, lays out the nature of the right, recognizes Uganda obligations 
under international law about the right to health, and requires that whoever 
seeks to enjoy that right has to do so in a manner that envisages his or her free-
dom in making such decisions. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the lack of the right to 
health in the Constitution is not a justifiable reason to the provision of an ena-
bling environment for its subsequent enjoyment by the woman. Various hypo-
theticals question the context of abortion: is the government doing enough 
to enhance the plight of the woman on issues relating to her maternal health? 
Do the policies progressively enhance the woman’s enjoyment of the right to 
health? A look at the subsidiary legislation and national policies may give some 
guidance. 
4.2 Subsidiary legislation and national policies 
The Penal Code Act (PCA) has various provisions that speak to the position of 
abortion in Uganda. It provides, 
[a]ny person who, with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman ... 
unlawfully administers to her or causes her to take any poison or other 
noxious thing ... or uses any other means, commits a felony and is liable to 
imprisonment for fourteen years.29 
This section of the Act makes several dangerous assumptions about abortion. 
First, it does not qualify the type of person referred to. In so doing, it fails to 
recognize persons with professional qualifications and experience, such as doc-
tors and other medical officers. It conflates professionals with all other persons. 
Secondly, based on this conflation, it implies that such persons, regardless of 
their professional qualifications or experience, have the intention of procuring 
an abortion – an act which is portrayed in a false negative light. The intention, 
indeed, may be to save the mother’s life or to uphold the rights of the mother, 
among other things, an intention which is then put into practice by procuring 
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an abortion. Thirdly, the section assumes that abortion is a mode of family 
planning that is outlawed by the section. It is argued that abortion should not 
be seen as a form of family planning but as a mode of promoting the sexual 
health and reproductive rights of the woman. Therefore, this provision is based 
on assumptions that do not take into account the various circumstances that 
may inform a Ugandan woman’s decision to procure an abortion.30 
A similar section provides: 
Any person who unlawfully supplies to or procures for any person any-
thing, knowing that it is intended to be unlawfully used to procure the 
miscarriage of a woman, whether she is or is not with child, commits a 
felony and is liable to imprisonment for three years.31 
Section 141 adds to the previous section by criminalizing the actions of the 
person referred to therein. To reiterate, the two sections fail to capture the 
reasons that may lead a woman to procure an abortion. The cumulative effect 
of these two provisions is to discriminate against the woman on account of her 
sex and her need to decide when to have a child. This discrimination is further 
evident in the failure of the penal laws to appreciate the sexual and reproduc-
tive health and rights of a woman, because of the community misconceptions 
about abortion. 
Furthermore, the PCA provides that 
[a]ny woman who, being with child, with intent to procure her own 
miscarriage, unlawfully administers to herself any poison or other noxious 
thing, or uses any force of any kind, or uses any other means, or permits 
any such things or means to be administered to or used on her, commits a 
felony and is liable to imprisonment for seven years.32 
This provision criminalizes a woman’s attempt to procure an abortion on her-
self. While this is a good provision insofar as it criminalizes abortion where 
a woman performs it herself, it fails to engage with the circumstances of the 
woman who has done so: there is a need to focus on the ‘why’ question. 
The final provision in the Penal Code that deals with abortion states as 
follows: 
A person is not criminally responsible for performing in good faith and 
with reasonable care and skill a surgical operation upon any person for his 
or her benefit, or upon an unborn child for the preservation of the moth-
er’s life, if the performance of the operation is reasonable, having regard 
to the patient’s state at the time, and to all the circumstances of the case.33 
One may raise the defence that he or she acted in good faith and with reason-
able care in performing the operation to save a mother’s life. However, this a 




The ‘abortion Question’ in Uganda 59 
The persons who have acted in good faith and with reasonable care are still 
subjected to the same process as those who have not exercised good faith. This 
defence may not necessarily lead to an acquittal but rather may be used to miti-
gate the sentence in terms of the length of imprisonment or the amount of the 
fine payable. The application of the penal provisions results in criminal justice 
procedures that undermine the welfare and dignity of women. Consequently, 
the provisions fail to reflect the constitutional values that are ascribed to a 
woman. 
Apart from the legal framework, the policy framework needs to be addressed 
as well. The National Gender Policy (NGP) recognizes gender as a useful 
concept in understanding the social roles and relations of women and men of 
all ages and how these impact on development.34 With regard to sexual and 
reproductive health and rights, the NGP, at its core, has a specific strategy to 
develop and implement sexual and reproductive health rights programmes.35 It 
follows that reduction of the high teenage pregnancy rate, which addresses the 
discriminatory tendencies that the penal laws present, is part of this agenda. On 
a positive note, the NGP recognizes the high incidence of teenage pregnan-
cies and the risks that arise concerning the health of the mother and child.36 
Since Uganda is a signatory to the International Conference on Development 
and Population (ICDP), the policy reiterates the government’s commitment 
to the promotion of sexual and reproductive health rights by putting gender 
relations at the centre of health and population interventions.37 The position 
consequently raises questions about Uganda’s reservation about the implemen-
tation of the Maputo Protocol.38 Furthermore, it raises questions on the abil-
ity of the Penal Code Act to promote the sexual and reproductive health and 
rights of women given the restrictive regime coming to the fore. While the 
NGP recognizes the woman and the peculiar realities she faces, the penal laws 
criminalize abortion. The policy and the laws present a parallel engagement in 
dealing with abortion in Uganda. 
In addition, the Uganda National Policy Guidelines and Service Standards 
for Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights (GSS) were adopted to address 
all aspects of SRR.39 This was a broad-based approach that moved beyond a 
narrow engagement with family planning and maternal health.40 The GSS rec-
ognize that the prevention and management of unsafe abortion is a component 
of sexual and reproductive health.41 While this is a welcome development, it 
should be recalled that the Penal Code Act does not provide for safe abortion. 
It criminalizes the acts of the person and the woman without clarifying what 
constitutes safe or unsafe abortions and generalizes all acts of abortion as illegal. 
The GSS provides for comprehensive abortion care services for a woman or 
a couple seeking advice or services for termination of a pregnancy on grounds 
like life-threatening maternal illness, severe foetal abnormalities, cervical can-
cer or HIV, or rape, incest and defilement.42 This is a radical departure from 
the general provisions of the PCA, insofar as they acknowledge the various 
situations that may require a woman to terminate a pregnancy. In addition, 




60 Robert D Nanima
the NGP, the GSS embrace the constitutional values of non-discrimination, 
affirmative action and equality. 
However, the implementation of these values is curtailed by the general 
criminal provisions of the PCA. The simultaneous application of the legal and 
policy regimes presents a parallel application of the policy and the restrictive 
regime. This position does little to harmonize the contradictory position of the 
abortion question. This position is similar to that in other policy documents, 
such as the National Policy on Post Abortion Care (NPPAC) and the Africa 
Plan of Action for Abortion (APAA).43 These contribute to the lack of medical 
infrastructure to conduct safe abortions. 
4.3 The marginalization of women in Uganda 
The Ugandan woman forms the backbone of Uganda’s economy. She has been 
able to engage in activities that have the potential to create lucrative livelihoods 
and lift thousands of Ugandans out of poverty, especially with the adoption 
of modern techniques and better quality inputs.44 While women control only 
27% of plots and 20% of all cultivated land, 73% of the plots and 80% of cul-
tivated land are either controlled by men or managed jointly with women.45 
The bigger picture indicates that 77% of women are involved in agriculture, 
compared to 62% of men. While women’s engagement in economic activities 
would mitigate poverty, it is hindered by discrimination in various aspects of 
their lives. A notable concern is discrimination in the realization of their socio-
economic right to reproductive health.46 
As earlier indicated, Uganda has an estimated 775,000 unintended pregnan-
cies per annum, of which 25% are among adolescents.47 A total of 297,000 
(38.3%) result in abortions.48 The continued recourse to abortion under dan-
gerous conditions due to the restrictive regime negatively affects women’s eco-
nomic productivity.49 
Uganda has reported great strides towards the realization of Sustainable 
Development Goal 5 on Gender Equality. At the presentation of its Report 
on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) of gender equality, it reported 
progress in the reduction of the rate of discrimination and marginalization by 
4%.50 Uganda reported progress in the mainstreaming of gender and rights in 
policies, plans and programs in all sectors.51 It also reported strides in the for-
mulation of gender-sensitive regulatory frameworks, promotion of women’s 
economic empowerment initiatives and protection of the rights of vulnerable 
groups.52 The report made no mention of the rights of the reservation to the 
Maputo Protocol as a step towards gender equality. This marked a missed 
opportunity that Uganda would have used to withdraw its reservation to the 
Maputo Protocol. 
The marginalization extends to the failure to correct the disconnect 
between the Ugandan woman’s hard work and the failure to recognize her 
right to sexual and reproductive health in totality.53 While she contributes to 
the economy, she is hampered by the lack of adequate protection under the 
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law concerning abortion.54 Her inability to make decisions about her sexual 
and reproductive health and rights hinders her enjoyment of the highest attain-
able standard of health.55 This marginalization violates the right to equality and 
freedom from discrimination as provided for in Uganda’s Constitution and its 
international law obligations. 
5 Conclusion 
While abortion can be read into international law as a result of evolving juris-
prudence, the Maputo Protocol expressly articulates a woman’s right to an 
abortion in specified circumstances. Both regional and international law point 
uphold progressive realization of the right to health. The lack of an express 
provision to the right to health in the Constitution does not oust Uganda’s 
obligation to the ratified human rights instruments. The existence of a reserva-
tion to the provision of abortion in the Maputo Protocol makes it an uphill 
task to contextualize any progressive realization of the right to abortion. This 
is exacerbated by the restrictive laws on abortion in the country. While the 
policies seem to progressively enhance the woman’s enjoyment of the right to 
health, the law provides otherwise. As such, there is a parallel regime, where 
the executive policies seem to contradict the legislation. Until the policies 
and legislation speak to each other to the benefit of the woman, the parallel 
engagement is far from over. 
The research has identified a silence that does not interrogate the position 
of the woman. This is contrary to the various voices in the legislation, in the 
community, from religious and cultural circles that all point to the shunning of 
abortion. A model that engages all the competing voices needs to be adopted. 
Durojaye and Oluduro use an interesting principle to evaluate the African 
Commission’s jurisprudence on the rights of women.56 They argue that the 
African Commission’s development of jurisprudence on the rights of women 
requires that it not only ask the ‘woman question’ but the question that affects 
the ‘African woman’.57 When one asks the right question, the African woman 
has to be placed at the centre of any decision in the light of her realities. A 
hybrid approach needs to be added to this model. The realities of the Ugandan 
woman should inform the conversation, other than the assumptions that are 
held by society. An evaluation of the various polarities needs to be done. It is 
clear that there are competing polarities. On one hand, the society controls the 
sexuality of the woman, through various restrictive laws, cultural, religious and 
economic undertones. On the other hand, there is a woman whose realities 
inform her decision to have an abortion. The competition arises in the need 
for each party or entity to control the decision of the woman without having 
an informed evaluation of her realities. The control of a woman’s reality at the 
expense of misunderstood notions needs to be stopped. There is a need to rec-
ognize that there is no need for competition but conversations that look at the 
various polarities and harmonize perspectives of the various voices. An empiri-
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position should be deliberately done. This should inculcate a similar study on 
other societal aspects like culture and religion. Following the hybrid approach, 
such findings should then be evaluated to make informed decisions. 
The restrictive regimes on abortion have to be lifted, as they are doing more 
harm in terms of unsafe abortion. Research in Africa points to a link between 
the criminalization of abortion and unsafe abortion as a major public health 
and human rights challenge.58 As required by the Maputo Protocol, abortions 
should be allowed in instances of ‘sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the 
continued pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health of the mother 
or the life of the mother or the foetus’. In the short run, education in sexual 
and reproductive rights has to remove discrimination and gender stereotypes 
against women. Central to this will be the correction of the misconception that 
the government seeks to use abortion as a family planning tool. This will be 
key to ensuring that societal, socio-cultural, religious stereotypes that inhibit 
discrimination are greatly reduced. These recommendations will go a long way 
to show that hybrid interventions that place the Ugandan woman at the centre 
of the abortion question are inevitable. 
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Approximately 214 million women in developing countries between ages 
15 and 49 have an unmet need for contraception.1 In Zimbabwe, 12% of unmar-
ried adolescent girls have an unmet need for contraception. Contraceptive 
use among adolescents is 46%, compared to the national average of 67%.2 
The World Health Organization (WHO) reports that 810 women die daily 
(295,650 per year) due to preventable pregnancy-related and child birth related 
causes, and this risk is worse for girls aged 10–14.3 Persons aged 15–24 consti-
tute 20% of Zimbabwe’s population. Moreover, 42% of women of reproduc-
tive age and 34% of maternal deaths in Zimbabwe are within this age-group, 
while HIV prevalence in ante-natal young women is 27%.4 However, young 
people are reluctant to obtain sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services 
due to systemic and legal barriers. If these barriers are not addressed, many rural 
adolescent girls will forfeit economic advancement and risk early pregnancies 
and child marriages, maternal mortality and morbidity, and sexually transmit-
ted infections (STIs), including human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).
This chapter examines the regulatory framework for sexual and reproduc-
tive health and rights (SRHR) in Zimbabwe, specifically access to contracep-
tion for adolescent girls in rural areas. It argues that the legislative framework 
is inadequate as it excludes rural adolescent girls from accessing information, 
education and services related to contraception. The chapter (1) has provided 
an introduction, and will define SRHR. Thereafter, the chapter will (2) iden-
tify barriers, (3) provide an analysis of the regulatory framework, followed by 
(4) an analysis of the implementation of this framework in Zimbabwe and (5) 
a conclusion and recommendations. The paper recommends reform of the 
Children’s Act and Public Health Act to advance rural adolescent girls’ access 
to contraception and family planning information, education and services.
Michelle Rufaro Maziwisa
Barriers to access to 
contraceptives for adolescent 
girls in rural Zimbabwe as 
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Understanding sexual and reproductive health 
The WHO meeting on education and treatment in sexuality in 1974 was the 
first to address sexual health,5 followed by the International Conference on 
Population and Development (ICPD)’s 1994 Programme of Action (POA). 
The ICPD defines reproductive health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental 
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all 
matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes’. 
‘Reproductive health’ is linked to sexual health, and includes the enhance-
ment of life and personal relations, and ‘a satisfying and safe sex life’, whereas 
‘sexual health’ is ‘a state of physical, emotional and social well-being in relation 
to sexuality’.6 It is the absence of disease, and also the possibility of safe, pleas-
urable and respectful sexual relationships. SRHR means inter alia that people 
can have a satisfying and safe sex life, and be able to reproduce and to decide 
if, when and how often.7 
2 Barriers to adolescent girls’ access to contraception 
and family planning in Zimbabwe 
Adolescent girls in rural Zimbabwe face a multitude of barriers to accessing 
SRHR because of social, traditional and legislative constructs that perceive 
adolescents as asexual and adolescents’ sexuality as taboo. With the erosion of 
traditional family structures that provided information on sexuality, adolescents 
are left to rely on local clinics and social media. However, they often have to 
walk long distances to reach the nearest clinic to access SRHR services, and 
access to digital devices and data is significantly limited in rural areas. 
The negative attitude of health workers is a major barrier to SRHR. A 
study in Masvingo found that adolescents do not attend clinics for SRH ser-
vices because they do not want their parents to find out that they are sexually 
active and they are afraid of how nurses will treat them. Nurses reportedly yell 
at adolescents when they seek contraception, refuse to provide contraception 
services, and mock adolescents if they contract STIs or fall pregnant. 
Consultations are conducted with open doors, such that other patients can 
hear and see the consultation, and condoms are placed in the lobby, making it 
uncomfortable for adolescents to collect free contraceptives in clinics, or obtain 
SRH information or services because of the heightened risk that someone will 
see them and inform their parents. 
There is a shortage of qualified doctors, specialists and nurses in rural areas.
In Matebeleland North, nurses conceded that they are trained in primary health
care, but only have basic training in family planning methods during their pre-
service training, and they sometimes do not know how to administer family
planning methods such as ‘Jadelle’ insertion and removal.8 The lack of knowl-
edge by health workers is passed on to the rural women they serve, who are
given inadequate or incomplete information. Healthcare workers do not explain
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Although Zimbabwe outlawed exclusion from school due to pregnancy,
social and cultural stigma force adolescent girls to rather walk 30 km to a clinic in
another village, than attend their own clinic, to avoid nurses or other patients gos-
siping about their condition or telling their parents. Nonetheless, nurses in those
distant villages inform the headmaster or headmistress, identifying the student and
her medical condition and/or treatment, compromising patient confidentiality.
As clinics open during school hours, adolescents have to request permission to
attend the clinic. Permission is granted, provide the student presents her medical
card, which shows the medical condition or reason for visiting the clinic, further
making it undesirable for adolescents to seek SRH information and services. 
Moreover, alarming 40% of health expenditure in Africa is out of pocket
which often results in the very poor being unable to access health care services,
especially in a struggling economy like Zimbabwe. User fees are restrictive for
rural adolescent girls, who are usually unemployed. Currently, this is exacer-
bated by declining economic conditions and the Covid-19 pandemic which has
forced government to reprioritise its limited resources to fight the pandemic. 
Finally, the process is time-consuming and may dissuade rural adolescent 
girls from obtaining SRH services because they are responsible for most house-
hold chores. The UN reports that women spend up to four times as much time 
as men in providing unpaid care work. 
Having identified barriers to SRHR, the following section explores the 
regulation of adolescent girls’ SRHR in legislative and policy frameworks. 
3 Access to family planning and contraception 
as a human rights issue 
Since time immemorial, women’s autonomy over their bodies has been con-
tested. Numerous cultures and religions deny women the freedom to choose 
whether, how and what to do with their bodies. Traditional morality feared 
giving women freedom to have sexual relations with no consequences of preg-
nancy or illness, and this paternalistic morality now forms part of legal systems 
through laws that seek to control women’s behaviour.10 
3.1 International norms and standards 
Since ICPD, various rights-based instruments have developed the concept 
of SRHR. First, according to Articles 2 and 12 in the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), states 
must eliminate discrimination against women in all its forms to enable women 
to exercise the full range of human rights. However discrimination is deeply 
rooted in patriarchal systems and traditional practices that undermine wom-
en’s sexual autonomy.11 Continuous education after pregnancy is one way to 
achieve this, as stipulated in General Comment 15 of the Committee of the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), because dropping out of school can worsen the 
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Secondly, the right to contraception is intricately linked to the right to life. 
States should provide adequate health care to prevent maternal mortality and 
morbidity, and reduce unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions.12 Access to 
‘safe, legal and effective’ abortion should be provided if continued pregnancy 
would be harmful or cause substantial pain and suffering such as rape or unvia-
ble pregnancies. Further, states should not criminalize abortion as this increases 
reliance on illegal abortions harmful to adolescent girls. 
Thirdly, Cook argues that the right to liberty and security of the person 
(Article 9 (1) ICCPR) is violated when fertility control is denied by the state’.13 
Criminalizing abortions encourages adolescent girls to seek unsafe abortions 
in the event of unwanted pregnancies or contraceptive failure.14 States should 
protect children from ‘all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, 
neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual 
abuse’. Article 9 (1) ICCPR read with Article 19 UNCRC, shows that lack of 
access to contraception-related information, education and services and denial 
of abortion violate adolescent girls’ rights to liberty and security of the person.15 
Fourthly, Durojaye argues that a strong correlation exists between adoles-
cent girls’ literacy and SRHR.16 Literacy facilitates access to SRHR informa-
tion and can help to reduce early pregnancies, STIs, HIV and early marriage, 
especially in rural areas where adolescent-friendly services are not easily acces-
sible. Adolescent girls require information about contraceptive methods and 
side effects to make informed decisions. States should provide or facilitate 
knowledge on the correct use and effects of contraceptive methods to enable 
adolescent girls to protect themselves as they start exploring their sexuality, and 
help adolescent girls develop healthy, safe and respectful sexual behaviour. In 
South Africa, for example, the incidence of HIV infection in young women 
between the ages of 15 and 24 is four times higher than that of men in the same 
age group, which brings to question whether adolescent girls know, under-
stand and use contraception.17 
Linked to information, is the right to education. Education about contra-
ceptives and family planning through properly trained persons, enables girls to
exercise bodily autonomy, and understand the impact of their choices. Failure
to access SRHR education increases the risk of early pregnancies and resultant
complications such as foetal loss, infant death, induced abortion and other health
risks such as vesicovaginal fistulas, and injuries to the bladder, urethra and bowel
causing incontinence, excretion of faeces through the vagina and infertility.18 
Fifthly, Zimbabwe committed to protect the right to the ‘highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health’, and to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress, which includes emergency contraception and abortion medication. 
This is important because carrying unwanted pregnancies can affect adolescent 
girls’ mental and social well-being.19 General Comment 24 of the CEDAW 
Committee requires states to take appropriate legislative and other measures 
within their maximum available resources to realize women’s right to health. 
Finally, states must take all appropriate measures to abolish harmful tradi-
tional practices and prioritize the best interests of the child. States must develop 
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treatment to children, including HIV/AIDS. States must improve SRHR 
accessibility, including physical accessibility, important in rural areas. 
In relation to soft law, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) aspire towards healthy lives, well-being and universal access to SRH 
services by 2030 and to reduce maternal mortality. Maternal mortality of ado-
lescent girls should be prioritized, as they constitute 34% of maternal deaths in 
Zimbabwe. African Union Agenda 2063 envisages the use of Africa’s resources 
to promote ‘sound health and well-being’. The SADC Strategy also encour-
ages interventions to reduce barriers to SRHR and ensure financial commit-
ment by the state. 
3.2 Regional norms and standards 
Regionally, Article 14 Maputo Protocol protects the rights of adolescent girls to
family planning education, control their fertility, decide whether to have chil-
dren, the number and spacing of children, and to choose any method of contra-
ception. Article 14 requires states to protect adolescent girls and ensure that they
can protect themselves from sexually transmitted infections (STIs) such as HIV/ 
AIDS, and be informed about their own or a partner’s health status, particularly
if infected with STIs. This enables adolescent girls to make informed decisions
about their health and can reduce the risk of STIs. Article 14 (f) read with Article
1(k) of the Maputo Protocol requires states to take measures to provide preven-
tive health care, including family planning education for adolescent girls.20 
Article 14 (2) requires states to ‘take appropriate measures to provide ade-
quate, affordable and accessible health services’, especially SRHR education in 
rural areas, and to authorize medical abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, 
incest and where the continued pregnancy endangers the mental and physical 
health or life of the mother or foetus. The Mapingure case below illustrates that 
this provision is not fully realized in Zimbabwe. 
Article 14 of the African Children’s Charter guarantees the right to ‘the best
attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health’ and requires states to
develop a national health plan with comprehensive SRHR services and guidelines. 
States should protect children from cultural practices that affect children’s 
health or are discriminatory, and should allocate adequate financial resources 
for the provision of comprehensive family planning, contraception and safe 
abortion care. Article 20 (2) (a) African Children’s Charter requires states to 
assist parents and care givers with material assistance and support programmes 
for children’s health. 
Article 16 and 26 SADC Protocol requires states to reduce maternal mortal-
ity, enact laws and policies and provide services that enhance gender-sensitive, 
safe, appropriate, effective, acceptable and affordable quality health care. 
3.3 Domestic laws and policies for access to contraception in Zimbabwe 
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3.3.1 Constitution 
Section 81 of the Constitution defines children as boys and girls under 18 years, 
in line with the Maputo Protocol, and entrenches their right to equality, includ-
ing the rights to be heard, to education and healthcare. The High Court is the 
upper guardian of children and the best interests of the child are recognized 
as paramount. Section 52 of the Constitution protects the right to personal 
security, which includes the right to bodily and psychological integrity, and 
freedom from all forms of violence and freedom to make reproductive choices. 
Section 62 (1) guarantees the right to access to information from anyone 
(including the state) for the exercise or protection of a right. SRHR informa-
tion affects the right to equality between men and women, and between unmar-
ried and married women. CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 
21 requires states to provide women with information about contraceptive 
methods to enable them to make informed decisions. However, section 62(3) 
of the Constitution claws-back on section 62(1) by stipulating limitations 
regarding defence, public security or professional confidentiality. 
Further, the Constitution provides for progressive realization of health rights,
including SRHR. Section 76 of the Constitution provides that ‘[e]very citizen
and permanent resident (emphasis mine) of Zimbabwe has the right to have access
to basic health-care services, including reproductive health-care services’ and
that ‘[n]o person may be refused emergency medical treatment’. Unlike Article
24 (3) UNCRC which requires the state to take ‘all effective and appropriate
measures’, section 76 of the Constitution vaguely requires ‘reasonable legisla-
tive and other measures, within the limits of the resources available to it, to
achieve the progressive realisation of the rights set out in this section’. 
Finally, cultural practices that violate women’s rights are void to the extent 
of the infringement. However, section 60(3) of the Constitution allows parents 
and guardians to determine morality and religion for their children, making 
adolescent girls’ SRHR dependent on their parents’ religious and moral con-
victions. Kangaude and Skelton explain that unlike colonial Western notions 
of adulthood based on the ownership of a minor girl by her ward, the tradi-
tional African conception of adulthood is determined by the individuals’ physi-
cal ability to undertake adult roles such as child-bearing for girls, and the ability 
to take care of a family, for boys, accompanied by rites of passage.21 However, 
as Tamale and Batisai, respectively, rightly note, girls have a heavier burden of 
chastity due to a conflation of colonially derived laws, patriarchal customary 
practices and religious morality.22 
3.3.2 Legislation 
The Public Health Act (PHA) requires the Minister to implement and monitor 
Zimbabwe’s international commitments and to prioritize and allocate resources 
for health services. It further requires health practitioners to observe patient 
confidentiality. Section 44 is interestingly phrased in constitutional language, 
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supposedly guaranteeing ‘the right’ to participate in decisions affecting one’s 
health and treatment, but immediately qualifying this by stipulating that per-
sons who lack capacity to consent must ‘if possible’ be consulted by persons 
having capacity to consent on their behalf. 
The Children’s Act aims to regulate the protection, welfare and supervi-
sion of children, yet it is silent on adolescents’ SRH, except regarding abuse, 
neglect and adoption, and it does not distinguish between children and ado-
lescents. Further, adolescent girls are prohibited from making decisions about 
their SRHR (including contraception) unless they have parental consent. 
Moreover, abortion is prohibited, except in strict listed circumstances, 
where there is risk to the mother or child’s life or physical health, risk of physi-
cal or mental defect of the child upon birth, and unlawful intercourse (rape or 
incest). While this aligns with Article 14 (2) (c), the reality shows some major 
legal gaps. In the Mapingure case for example, a woman was forced to carry a 
pregnancy resulting from rape to full term, and effectively denied access to 
justice. Zimbabwe thus in practice falls short of General Comment 2 of the 
African Commission requirement that adolescent girls must not incur legal or 
criminal sanctions for receiving abortion or post-abortion services. 
3.3.3 Domestic policies 
Zimbabwe’s National Family Planning policy acknowledges the importance of 
SRH information and services for adolescent girls, noting the high incidence 
of early and more frequent pregnancies than in the past, and importantly, that 
rural teens are ‘more than twice as likely’ as urban teens to fall pregnant. More 
than one in every five girls aged between 15 and 19 is pregnant. With increased 
fertility rate within the 15–19 age group, from 99 births per 1000 women 
between 2005 and 2006, to 110 births per 1000 women in 2015, contraceptive 
use among unmarried adolescents has remained low, while contraceptive use 
for married adolescents in both urban and rural areas has increased. 
In line with Article 14 (f) Maputo Protocol, the National Health Strategy 
aims to strengthen adolescent SRH by improving youth-friendly services, 
implementing comprehensive sexuality education and advocacy for legislation 
against child marriage. This is supported by the National Adolescent Sexual 
and Reproductive Health Strategy (ASRH Strategy), which envisages a pack-
age of SRH services for adolescents within health facilities, and education and 
counselling on pregnancy prevention in schools. 
In addition, ZNFPC launched the one-stop SRHR youth-centres which has 
improved access to SRHR for rural adolescent girls, for example, the Magunje 
Youth Centre in Mashonaland West (Magunje Growth Point caters for schools 
in rural areas).23 The youth centre has a health advisor, qualified youth friendly 
nurse counsellor and peer educators. The premises have a library, sporting 
facilities, a television room, SRHR medical supplies and counselling facilities 
for adolescents. However, these youth facilities are only in a few rural areas as 
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The following section analyzes the implementation of the SRHR legislative 
and policy framework in Zimbabwe. 
4 The implementation of the SRHR legislative 
and policy framework in Zimbabwe 
Although Zimbabwe has committed itself to SRHR obligations, there are legal 
gaps and implementation challenges. 
4.1 The conception of childhood and adulthood 
The first challenge is that legislation perceives adolescents as asexual and does 
not distinguish between children and adolescents. As early as 1987, feminist 
theorizing has been adult-centric, denying children autonomy and agency over 
their own bodies, and based not on children’s interests, but on adult’s percep-
tions of children’s interests.24 Kangaude and Skelton argue that the Western 
perception of childhood as ‘asexual, irrational, and unstable’ and being in a 
state of progression, until children reach adulthood, was imported into Africa 
through colonial laws.25 The fact that the Children’s Act is silent about ado-
lescent’s SRHR and that both the Children’s Act and PHA require parental 
consent for the provision of health services to children under 18 is indicative 
of this and is a major legal gap as almost 20% of girls between 10 and 19 have 
experienced pregnancy, and thus have a higher risk of HIV-infection. 
For a long time, consensual sexual intercourse between adolescents was 
regarded as a crime in Zimbabwe. State v B. Masuku provided clarity on the 
contrasting positions in the South African Teddy Bear case, and the Kenyan 
CKW case. In the Teddy Bear case, the South African Constitutional Court 
found sections 15 and 16 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related 
Matters) Amendment Act unconstitutional because it criminalized normative 
sexual intercourse between consenting minors and was harmful to the minors 
it sought to protect, and was therefore not in their best interests. In CKW, 
the Kenyan High Court took an opposite, and indeed regressive, approach by 
convicting a 16-year-old boy for consensual intercourse with a 16-year-old 
girl. The Zimbabwean Masuku case shared the reasoning of the South African 
Constitutional Court. Judge Tsanga noted that: 
Ignoring the reality of consensual sex among teenagers and adopting an 
overly formalistic approach to the crime can result not only in an unneces-
sarily punitive sentence, but also a criminal record and stigmatisation as a 
sex offender. 
A similar position was taken by an earlier court in State v. CF (A Juvenile), in 
which Judge Kudya noted that consensual sex between minors is not a criminal 
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Court, where Magistrates had convicted minor boys for sexual conduct with 
minor girls within the age of consent. 
4.2 Equality 
Section 60(3) of the Constitution could have protected children’s SRHR; 
however, the drafters undermined its potential by inserting a superior right 
to parents’ and guardians’ religious and moral choices. Preventing adolescent 
girls from accessing contraception and family planning information and services 
based on their age, gender or marital status undermines their right to equality 
and jeopardizes their capacity to enjoy other rights, including continued edu-
cation.26 Despite Articles 2 and 12 CEDAW, Zimbabwe has delayed to rectify 
the discrimination between married and unmarried adolescents’ in relation to 
access to contraception and family planning information and services, and has 
failed to make legislative reforms and allocate resources. This position is wors-
ened by the attitudes of health workers that undermine the attainment of SRH 
for adolescent girls in rural areas in Zimbabwe. 
4.3 Right to life 
The CEDAW Committee commends Zimbabwe’s progress towards SDG 3.1 
and 3.7 to reduce the global maternal mortality ratio and ensure universal access 
to SRH services. However, it has called on Zimbabwe to improve access to 
affordable healthcare especially in rural areas and to intensify the HIV/AIDS 
strategic plan and Adolescent SRH strategy (ASRH). The Committee also 
encourages Zimbabwe to improve adolescent girls’ access to SRHR informa-
tion, education and services by strengthening awareness on SRHR including 
contraceptive use, mandatory age-appropriate education on responsible sexual 
behaviour, access to confidential SRHR services, including safe abortion and 
post-abortion services, and to decriminalize abortion. Forty per cent of girls 
under 18 are sexually active and 51% buy contraceptives from private pharma-
cies, which are not prevalent in rural areas.27 Whereas the 2018 Zimbabwe 
Report to CEDAW acknowledges a legal gap in adolescent SRHR, this alone 
is not enough, the Children’s Act and Public Health Act must be amended 
to give effect to these human rights commitments, and resources should be 
allocated for adolescent girls’ SRHR, including contraception and family plan-
ning. Denying adolescent girls access to contraceptives based on their age vio-
lates their right to life as protected in Article 6 (1) ICCPR. 
4.4 Liberty and security of the person 
Parents, doctors, nurses, partners and even the government can make deci-
sions about rural adolescent girls’ sexuality, but the girls themselves cannot,
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section 76 of the Constitution and section 33 PHA stipulate that no person
may be refused emergency medical treatment, rural adolescent girls still strug-
gle to access emergency post-coital contraception. Further, section 64 of the
Criminal Law (Reform and Codification Act) allows children between the ages
of 12 and 16 to consent to sexual intercourse, but section 35 PHA prohibits them
from consenting to SRH services which means they cannot buy contraceptives
and cannot obtain SRHR-related medical treatment without parental consent.
Allowing consensual sex, while denying sexual protection, subordinates ado-
lescent girls in intimate relationships and makes them more vulnerable to early
pregnancy and STIs, including HIV.29 Moreover, limited access to female con-
doms disempowers adolescent girls from negotiating safe sex, preventing early
pregnancy and STIs.30 
Even in countries like South Africa which provide free condoms in public 
toilets, male condoms are more available than female condoms, which further 
disempowers adolescent girls from exercising agency over their own bodies.31 
Despite efforts made by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
in developing the FC2-latex female condom to replace the FC1-polyurethane 
female condom, the FC2 is still beyond reach of many urban and rural ado-
lescents in Zimbabwe due to its cost, distance and the prohibition of selling 
contraceptives to children under 16.32 
4.5 Information 
Section 62(1) of the Constitution provides the right to information but, in 
practice, adolescent girls’ access to information is limited on grounds, such as 
age, marital status, gender and the morality of the attendant health worker, 
yet, the unconstitutionality of this practice is still to be challenged. Despite 
Zimbabwe’s commitments in Articles 10 (h) and 16 (1) (e) of CEDAW to 
recognize women’s and by extension, adolescent girls’ right to SRH informa-
tion, health workers often refuse to give SRH information, or give incomplete 
or inaccurate information as noted in Matebeleland.33 Further, Durojaye notes 
that often adolescent girls are ignorant about contraceptives, are not allowed 
by their parents to use them or otherwise cannot afford to pay for them, and 
in my view this is more so in rural settings.34 Limiting adolescent girls’ access 
to information on SRH undermines their basic human rights. Without infor-
mation, adolescent girls are left to make life-changing and in some instances 
life-taking decisions in the blind. 
The 2018 State Report to CEDAW shows that Zimbabwe has made signifi-
cant efforts to remove barriers to accessing SRHR information for women in
rural areas by radio, television, newspaper and/or magazine, mobile phone, and
pamphlet and/or poster mediums. The state report further suggests that ‘women
in rural areas are more likely than those in urban areas to be exposed to family
planning messages’ (62.6% in rural areas and 34.2% in urban areas). However,
hearing about family planning is a long way from accessing these services, espe-
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without access to media, and who are orphaned or poor are more likely to have
early pregnancies due to the absence of adequate social safety nets. 
Whereas the African Commission observes that Zimbabwe protects the 
rights of young people to knowledge and life skills to prevent HIV infec-
tion, the reality is different as sexuality is not taught in schools, is denied by 
health workers, and is usually not taught in the home, and contraception is 
denied without parental consent. The Concluding Observations of the African 
Commission note importantly that Zimbabwe lacks resources to support its 
SRHR efforts, and has collaborated with development partners, but in the cur-
rent coronavirus pandemic, donors are likely to pull out as resources become 
re-prioritized. 
4.6 Education on SRHR 
In light of CEDAW’s recommendation to Zimbabwe to promote SRHR 
education for adolescents, the government expanded the Zimbabwe National 
HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan for 2015–2020 (ZNASP III) and the National 
Gender and HIV Implementation Plan (2017–2020) to every person. ZNASP 
III identifies negotiation of safe sex, limited access to HIV services, early mar-
riages, transactional sex and the inconsistent and incorrect use of condoms as 
challenges for adolescent girls. The government also introduced the ASRH 
Strategy II (2016–2020), and a ‘Start Free, Stay Free, AIDS Free’ campaign. 
The second pillar of the campaign is to be able to protect oneself to stay free 
from HIV infection and live without fear of sexual violence, abuse or exploi-
tation. It is therefore difficult to understand why government has failed to 
translate these policies into justiciable rights and binding law, despite its policies 
clearly showing that there is a need and a legal gap. 
Unfortunately, in an increasingly urbanized and modern world, the traditional
social fabric which acted as a safety net for girls no longer exists for the most part.
For example, traditionally, paternal aunts, ‘tete’ and maternal uncles, ‘sekuru’ played
an important role of providing basic sexual education by availing themselves to
assist adolescents with questions about sexuality. Like other African countries,
many adolescents are unable to ask their parents for guidance on sexual matters,
as it is perceived as offensive and culturally inappropriate.35 Together with the
hostility of health workers towards adolescent girls, there is an enormous void
when it comes to adolescent girls’ access to SRHR information and education. 
4.7 Health 
In addition to Article 24 (2) UNCRC and in line with Article 14 (f) Maputo 
Protocol, which requires states to develop preventive health care including 
family planning education and services, the Concluding Observations of the 
CRC to Zimbabwe have urged the government to introduce mandatory age-
appropriate HIV/AIDS and SRH education. This was also recommended by 
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is concerning that the African Commission’s last Concluding Observations to 
Zimbabwe (2007) do not mention adolescents, or SRHR at all. The closest 
comment is the recommendation for Zimbabwe to review the application of 
statutory and customary laws to ensure that there are adequate safeguards to 
protect the human rights of women and girls. 
Section 70 Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, prohibits sexual 
intercourse with a person under 18, and under strict circumstances provides 
reprieve for sexual intercourse with a person over 16 years. This provi-
sion has become an additional barrier to health workers who would other-
wise be inclined to provide contraceptive services to adolescents for fear that 
they may become complicit to the criminal act of rape.36 Section 5 TPA also 
makes it harder for doctors to help adolescents for fear of prosecution. While 
section 39 PHA requires confidentiality, it is evident from studies in Masvingo 
that health workers violate adolescents’ right to confidentiality of their SRH 
information. 
Feltoe argues that sections 33 and 35 PHA, which require parental consent 
for medical treatment, puts doctors in a difficult position especially in emergen-
cies where parental consent cannot be obtained. General Comment 4 CRC 
reinforces the principles in General Comment 3 CRC on the state’s duty to 
protect the rights of adolescents to medical treatment without parental consent 
and to ensure privacy of their information.37 He notes that should a medical 
doctor act without this consent, he or she could rely on the defence of neces-
sity, but in my view, it is difficult to imagine a doctor opting to risk breaking 
the law in order to help an adolescent, who is seen as a ‘child’ who has ‘mis-
behaved’.38 Feltoe notes that in reality health workers are not likely to provide 
contraception in the absence of parental consent. At the same time, adoles-
cent girls may fear telling their parents that they are sexually active, and may 
resort to unprotected sex, risking STIs and pregnancy, and eventually resorting 
to unlawful ‘back street’ abortions.39 The fact that global HIV-related deaths 
among adolescents between 10 and 19 years of age significantly increased from 
21,000 in 2000 to 60,000 in 2014, but has dropped among other age groups, 
illustrates that adolescents are falling through the cracks.40 
Other jurisdictions have dealt with this dilemma decisively. For example, in 
the English case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, the 
Department of Health issued a circular that allowed doctors to provide SRH 
services to minors without parental consent in limited circumstances. Mrs 
Gillick sought to have the circular declared unlawful. However, the House of 
Lords found it lawful, concluding that a medical doctor can provide contracep-
tion to a minor below the age of 16, provided the minor is sufficiently mature 
to understand the implications, and specifically that the doctor is satisfied that: 
• The girl who was under 16 would understand the medical advice; 
• The doctor cannot persuade her to inform her parents or to allow him to 
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• The girl is very likely to have sexual intercourse with or without contra-
ceptive treatment; 
• Unless the girl receives contraceptive advice or treatment her physical or 
mental health or both were likely to suffer; 
• Her best interests required the doctor to give her contraceptive advice or 
treatment or both without parental consent.41 
As Zimbabwe’s legal system is founded in English and Roman-Dutch law, it is 
likely that the Gillick case may be relied on in Zimbabwean courts should the 
matter arise. A definitive legal position would clarify the uncertainty of whether 
a nurse or doctor who provides contraception to an adolescent is guilty of con-
travening section 70 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act. 
This courts’ approach to apply the maturity test is a step forward in pro-
moting access to SRH information and services by adolescent girls, although 
even this is not sufficient. A more desirable approach is perhaps that taken by 
South Africa, which gives adolescent girls autonomy over their sexuality and 
reproductive choices. Section 134 of the South African Children’s Act protects 
the confidentiality of minors, and prohibits the refusal to sell condoms or give 
condoms (when provided free of charge) to children over 12 years old. For 
other contraceptives, children over 12 must be given proper medical advice 
and medical examination to determine whether there are any medical reasons 
to deny the specific method of contraception. 
Obtaining parental consent is problematic for some adolescents due to their 
parents’ religious convictions. For example, the CRC noted that members 
of apostolic churches in Zimbabwe bar their children from seeking medical 
attention, causing high maternal mortality among adolescents. The CRC also 
raised concerns about the high rate of sexual violence, early pregnancy, child 
marriages and resultant school dropout, restrictive abortion law and parental 
consent as posing major challenges for adolescent girls. The CRC has urged 
Zimbabwe to take immediate measures to stop sexual violence, reduce mater-
nal mortality resulting from teen abortions by ensuring children’s access to 
safe abortion and post-abortion care, provide SRHR education as part of the 
mandatory school curriculum and more importantly to ensure alignment of the 
Constitution and legislation. 
Finally, although sections 29 and 76 of the Constitution protect the right to 
health including SRHR and require the state to take ‘all practical measures’ to 
provide basic accessible and adequate health services’, it is my argument that 
the government has not taken ‘all practical measures’ as it has not amended 
legislation to reflect this constitutionally entrenched right. 
5 Conclusion and recommendations 
While Zimbabwe has done well to introduce SRH programmes through
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towards protecting, promoting and fulfilling adolescent girls’ right to access
SRH information, education and services, particularly contraception and fam-
ily planning, especially in rural areas. Moreover, as national policies such as
the National Health Strategy and the NFP expire in December 2020, the
state must evaluate the gains and losses under the current national strategies in
order to develop more beneficial strategies for the future, taking into account
the recommendations of the African Commission, CRC and CEDAW
Committees. 
The biggest drawback of the constitutional protections of the rights of ado-
lescents are first that adolescents are recognized only as children and as asexual 
and secondly, the SRHR-related protections have claw-back provisions. For 
example, section 52(1) of the Constitution, which protects every person’s right 
to security, including the right to make decisions about reproduction, is imme-
diately cancelled by s52(3) which subjects this provision to other provisions in 
the constitution. 
The fact that the PHA and Children’s Act are blind to the sexuality of ado-
lescent girls shows huge dissonance between the political rhetoric in the poli-
cies around SRHR such as the HIV and ASHR strategies on one hand, and 
the enforceable legislation, such as the PHA and Children’s Act on the other 
hand. It also shows that current legislation must be updated to comply with the 
2013 Constitution. 
The state must allocate adequate monetary and non-monetary resources to 
improve rural adolescent girls’ access to SRHR, including information, edu-
cation and services as required in Article 14 (2) of the Maputo Protocol and 
Article 21 CEDAW General Recommendation 21. 
The government must stop giving lip-service to the needs of adolescent 
girls and start re-writing the law. Guidance can be taken from the Gillick case 
and from the South African Children’s Act to guard rural adolescent girls’ 
autonomy and bodily integrity, and to protect their SRHR. Finally, govern-
ment must introduce age-appropriate sexuality education. 
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Sibusiso Mkwananzi Involving men in the realisation of SRHR
It takes two to tango!: The 
relevance and dilemma of 
involving men in the realization 
of sexual and reproductive 
health and rights in Africa
Sibusiso Mkwananzi
1  Introduction
Over the years, efforts have been made to ensure the inclusion of men in poli-
cies and programmes towards the realization of sexual and reproductive health 
and rights in Africa. While the road has been strewn with thorns, modest 
progress has been made. Experience has shown that the enjoyment by women 
and girls of their sexual and reproductive health and rights as enshrined in 
international, regional and national documents may not be possible unless men 
are viewed as partners in this effort. Often men are regarded as the culprits 
with regard to the violations of the sexual and reproductive health and rights of 
women and girls in the region. It is often argued that due to power imbalance 
and the patriarchal nature of most African societies, men have remained the 
privileged sex that continue to benefit from this lopsided structure. However, 
men can equally become important allies in transforming behaviours and advo-
cating for change in societal practices that can advance the sexual and repro-
ductive health and rights of women.
Against this background, this chapter examines the factors that continue 
to predispose women and girls to sexual and reproductive ill-health in Africa. 
Using South Africa as a case study, it discusses some of the benefits of involv-
ing men in policies and programmes towards the realization of the SRHR of 
women. In addition, the chapter identifies some of the challenges that may 
arise in attempting to involve men in programmes to realize SRHR of women. 
The chapter makes some useful suggestions on the way forward.
2  Normative framework on sexual and 
reproductive health and rights
Sexual and reproductive health and rights are not new sets of rights; rather 
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For instance, Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR) states that all individuals have ‘the right to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’. 
Sexual and reproductive health and rights refer to optimal wellbeing and inde-
pendence of your body’s reproductive system as well as timing, ability, condi-
tions and decision to reproduce.1 Specifically, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has developed General Comment 22 on 
sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) as part of Article 12 and 
recognizing these as fundamental human rights. Although these rights should 
have been enjoyed by women as well as men, historically this was not the case, 
as sexual and reproductive health focused on population control, and thus was 
linked largely to the policing of women’s bodies.2 
In response, several international norms and standards were developed to 
ensure women had rights to equality, bodily autonomy, decision making regard-
ing SRHR matters and safety with respect to gender-based violence.3 These 
progressive international norms included Articles 16 and 10 of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
that ensures women have equal rights to deciding ‘freely and responsibly on 
the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the informa-
tion, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights’ and the right 
to education should encompass ‘access to specific educational information to 
help to ensure the health and well-being of families, including information and 
advice on family planning’, respectively. Additionally, general recommenda-
tion 24 of CEDAW states that nations emphasize the ‘prevention of unwanted 
pregnancy through family planning and sex education’, general comment 14 of 
the CESCR highlights the inclusion of safe pregnancy and childbirth in ensur-
ing a right to health and the Beijing Platform for Action of 1995 concluded 
that ‘the human rights of women include their right to have control over and 
decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including 
sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence’.4 
To this end, a stark priority was placed on the specific rights pertaining to 
women as a marginalized group in most societies, with women dispropor-
tionately becoming the focus as well as bearing the responsibility of SRHR in 
homes and society.5 As a result, men seem to have been unintentionally and 
systematically excluded from this process. 
The 1994 Cairo ICPD Conference and Sustainable Development Goal
15 highlight the importance of including men in improving sexual and repro-
ductive health and right (SRHR) globally and this has led to this need being
widely accepted by advocates, educators and policy makers.6,7 Interventions
involving men and boys as crucial partners in improving SRHR across society
effectively have accordingly increased globally over the past decade.8 However,
rates of male partner involvement as well as health-seeking behaviour of men
and boys remain low worldwide.9 For example, in Southern Africa few men
accompany their partners to access sexual and reproductive health services, and











partner involvement and health-seeking behaviour among men and boys remain
some of the lowest in the country.11 Snow et al (2010)12 showed that in rural
South African settings, women went for HIV testing at three times higher levels
compared to their male counterparts. Additionally, the study by Mohlala et al.
(2011)13 demonstrated that these challenges occurred regardless of the rural-
urban divide, as even in South Africa’s urban Cape Town, none of the par-
ticipant men accompanied their partners to clinics for antenatal services before
the intervention. However, this rose to one in three men after the intervention
implementation. 
South Africa has an estimated population of 57.7 million people, with 49% 
of this composing of males.14 Although the country fares better developmen-
tally than its counterparts within the Southern African region, some social 
and reproductive health challenges still remain nationally.15 The unemploy-
ment rate has been found to range from 20% to 30% depending on geographic 
location.16,17 Additionally, although the country’s fertility levels have stead-
ily decreased to a total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.4 children per woman cur-
rently, this varies greatly by race, and adolescent fertility remains rather high at 
50 births per 1000 of 15–19-year-old women.18,19,20,21 
South Africa has the highest levels of HIV globally with 13 in every 
100 individuals (7.52 million) living with HIV.22 Correspondingly, there are 
1.4 million AIDS orphans nationally, 7% of who live in child-headed house-
holds, and only one in three children live in households with an employed 
adult.23 Many children in South Africa live without their biological father – a 
direct continued effect of apartheid. Levels of absent yet living fathers rose to 
48% in 2009.24 Research has shown that South Africa has one of the highest 
levels of gender-based violence in the world.25 Jewkes et al26 found that one 
in five young women had encountered more than one incident of physical or 
sexual intimate partner violence. 
In 1994 the reproductive health task force first discovered in their assessment 
of national sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services that such services do 
not include men.27 Subsequently, the South African government and non-
governmental organizations have created numerous policies and programmes 
to ensure the inclusion of men and boys in SRH services. For instance with 
specific reference to HIV services the South African National Strategic Plan on 
HIV, STIs and TB (NSP), National Action Framework (NAF) for ‘No Child 
Born with HIV by 2015 & Improving the Health and Wellbeing of Mothers, 
Partners and Babies in South Africa’ and 2010 South African national PMTCT 
guidelines all directly or indirectly refer to the inclusion of women’s partners. 
Nevertheless, much still needs to be done nationally, as South African studies 
have shown that women are still more likely than men to attend clinics and ini-
tiate treatment after being diagnosed with HIV.28,29 Therefore, it is important 
to explore the challenges that surround this important move. 
This chapter aimed to describe: 
1. What previous studies have found are the benefits and difficulties of 






Involving men in the realisation of SRHR 87 
2. The challenges that underlie men being ‘left behind’ in conversations and 
advancement of SRHR 
3. Ways in which men could be involved in SRHR work 
3 Effects of involving men in SRHR 
The first question becomes why does the inclusion of men in sexual and repro-
ductive health remain important? For the purpose of this chapter, involving 
men in SRHR is limited to the individual level. Also, the chapter only provides 
examples and implementation of involving men in SRH work that encom-
passes prevention of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) including HIV, pre-
vention of maternal mortality, anti-gender based violence (GBV) initiatives 
as well as contraceptive use. Previous studies from developing countries have 
shown large bodies of empirical evidence to suggest that involving men (i.e. 
individual partners) in SRHR work has advantages as well as disadvantages for 
the men in question, their partners, the couple as a unit and even subsequent 
offspring as will be discussed further below. 
3.1 The advantages of involving men 
Benefits for men incorporated in South African and Ugandan programmes 
aimed at engaging them on sexual and reproductive health matters include less 
risky sexual decisions that encompass increased condom use, delayed sexual 
debut as well as a decreasing likelihood of multiple concurrent sexual part-
ners.30,31,32 Additionally, Reddy et al (2014)33 established that involving men in 
reproductive health decisions led to the prevention of STI & HIV/AIDS and 
improved reproductive health of men in such programmes in South Africa. 
Nevertheless, the effects of including men go beyond the individual male 
included, having advantages for their partner as well. Such partner gains encom-
pass increased support of their partner’s needs and higher levels of escorting of 
partners to clinic to access SRH services including termination of pregnancy 
management as evidenced in Uganda and Asia.34,35 Overall increased levels of 
maternal health have also been shown to occur through men’s participation in 
Malawi resulting in increased uptake of antenatal and postnatal care, birth pre-
paredness, lower maternal workload while expecting and decreased maternal 
stress.36 Another dimension to partner benefits are the added advantages that 
come with changed attitudes amongst men that promote gender equality and 
decrease tolerance to gender based violence that can lead to increased enthu-
siasm and conscientiousness towards conducting domestic chores as shown in 
the East African study.37 Similarly, in Iran most studies testing the influence of 
men’s awareness and involvements have shown a positive effect on women’s 
SRH.38 Another evaluation of initiatives that included men in Sierra Leone, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) found 
reduced levels of gender based violence (both sexual and physical forms) as 
well as improved views on men’s use of violence.39 Although such an advan-







subsequently benefit from these changed attitudes. Therefore, it becomes par-
ticularly important in the context of South Africa where 20%–40% of women 
(depending on locality) have experienced some form of violence in their 
lifetime.40 
Gains for the couple have also been suggested as Zamawe et al. (2015)41 
showed that engagement of men was associated with increased use of family 
planning and contraceptives in Malawi. Similarly, a higher likelihood of open 
discussion with partners about reproductive planning and decision making 
were said to occur in Uganda after engaging men on SRHR matters.42 
Benefits for the children born include higher levels of child health with 
reduced likelihood of preterm births, low birth weight, foetal growth restric-
tion and infant mortality.43 This may be linked to the ability of male engage-
ment to increase access and uptake of new-born and child health services as 
shown in rural India.44 Additionally, Reddy et al (2016)45 in Asia showed that 
men who were involved in reproductive health decisions have a stronger bond 
with their offspring. This of course has been determined to have future benefits 
for the child regarding self-esteem, confidence and the ability to achieve better 
life outcomes in general.46,47 Thus, what can be deduced from the discussion 
here is that involving men in SRH issues can boost family bond and congeni-
ality thereby advancing the realization of women’s rights as well as enhancing 
their reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity. 
Despite the benefits of involving men in SRHR matters, it is important to 
ensure that this does not undermine women’s rights to choice and autonomy. 
In essence, while it is desirable for men to be involved in decision-making 
relating to SRH, women should still be accorded the autonomy to decide 
whether to involve their partners on this issue. Thus, questions may be asked: 
what should happen when women do not want their male partners involved? 
Where should the line be drawn to ensure that the rights and responsibilities of 
both parties engaged in sexual relations are honoured? Some of these issues are 
discussed in the next section. 
3.2 The difficulties of involving Men 
Despite the advantages of involving men in SRH matters as discussed above, 
there are some challenges associated with this. As scholars and programme 
implementers, it is evident that involving men in SRHR is important, yet this 
continues to be conducted in exceptional cases. Beyond the dilemma occur-
ring among scholars and programmers, previous work in different settings has 
also highlighted some difficulties to involving men in SRHR. These include: 
First and foremost traditional gender norms exist at the societal level.48 
These reveal themselves through men not being interested in their own SRH 
or that of their partners as the subject is generally regarded as a ‘woman’s 
issue’.49 Research in South Africa has reported that even when men want to 
be involved they may be scrutinized and giggled at by other female clients, 
reprimanded and chased out by health workers on site, as well as made to 
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feel uncomfortable by male-unfriendly clinic environments.50 The restrained 
contraceptive, health service delivery and reproductive health awareness cam-
paign options specifically designed for men in Uganda further exacerbate these 
problematic societal norms.51 Therefore, addressing this challenge will require 
community-wide education as well as more resources for the shifting of social 
and institutional gender norms.52 The examples from above highlight the need 
for institutional buy-in for the accommodation of men in SRH issues in order 
to decrease stigma. Additionally, clinic and hospital staff members exhibiting 
discriminatory practices and prejudices against male partners may invariably be 
infringing their rights to dignity, equality and freedom. 
Over and above societal norms are masculine-related convictions, beliefs 
and attitudes that prevent HIV testing, treatment and care among men, hinder 
the involvement of men in SRH services as well as promote negative views 
about family planning.53 Many of these views stem from cultural and traditional 
patriarchal paradigms that disallow men to show signs of weakness, uncer-
tainty, loss of confidence and vulnerability.54 This can even lead to an inability 
among some men to share their emotions in all-male environments making the 
creation of safe male dialogue platforms difficult.55,56 To address these gender 
biases, it is necessary to reform school curriculum on SRHR so that rights and 
responsibilities are assigned to both girls and boys at an early age. 
Over and above this, the reforming of societal and individual masculine-
related norms will require the focus of women in national policies and health 
systems across Africa to change. Mullick et al. (2005)57 suggest that success-
ful male involvement will occur as health infrastructure addresses questions of 
accommodating employed men, the unmet need of male contraceptive meth-
ods, men-friendly SRH services as well as designing comprehensive health 
packages that couples and families can attend simultaneously. Lack of access to 
SRHR services for men results in a systematic violation of the right to SRHR 
that is in breach of a state obligation under international law. Therefore, it is 
important that an enabling policy environment be created to encourage and 
support the presence and participation of men in SRH. This would also need 
to include a possible change in the language of SRH messaging in order to 
make it less centred on women. All individuals are accorded the right to infor-
mation, including information for correct decision making as regards SRH. 
4 Challenges that underlie not involving 
men in SRHR work 
The second question that arises is that in spite of the above advantages, why 
does a reluctance of including men in SRHR work still exist? The general 
notion seems to be that SRHR scholars and programme implementers want 
to include men, but do not want to end up regretting this stance. Numerous 
elements of this notion could answer the question stated for this section, and 
the next section unpacks a few of these as well as attempts to give solutions as 
a means of progressing forward. 
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The concern that comes to mind initially is the fear that involving men may 
change largely female-led and pro-partner SRHR current work into male-led, 
pro-man SRHR campaigns. This would lead to SRHR work losing its drive 
to promote women’s health and rights and the objectives for having started 
such programmes that involve men will no longer be achieved. For example 
a ten-year study evaluating programmes that engaged men in groups in Sierra 
Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC and Tanzania, showed a consistent straying from 
violence against women and girls to discussions on the struggles that men face. 
Facilitators also found it difficult to sway the focus back to its primary aim.58 
Slightly related to the point above is the notion that if SRHR work is to 
include male leaders and train them up to be advocates in this field, what if they 
are then found to be in violation of the very principles that they were advocat-
ing for? This concern is rather valid as seen in the recent case of a prominent 
advocate of women’s rights who was accused of sexual harassment, sexism, 
transphobia and homophobia.59 Similarly, this challenge occurred when trans-
formative gender programmes that aimed to involve men in West, East and 
Central Africa led to male domination of mixed-group discussions, silencing of 
women as well as facilitators struggling to address verbal and mental resistance 
from male participants. In response to these first fears, possibly the onus is on 
us as female advocates of SRHR to ensure not only that we lead programmes 
that involve men, but that we monitor and stay attached to such programmes 
for as long as possible so as they adhere to the original ethos of the programme’s 
spirit of being pro-partner if male advocates have been capacitated to lead such 
sessions. Additionally, we can never be completely sure of people’s character, 
be they male or female, and hence this is a risk we are going to have to take as 
we embark upon this journey. Knowing the risk in advance though may assist 
us to ensure that we catch any worrying signs earlier on, and it is comforting 
to know that such cases are rather the exception than the rule in the field of 
SRHR advocacy work. 
The hashtag movements of #metoo and #churchtoo, where over the past 
year there has been a rising level of women, men and boys coming forward 
and speaking against widespread outcry against sexual harassment and violence 
in the film industry as well as the church, has revealed how widespread the 
abuse of power is. The alleged perpetrators in the above scenarios occupying 
these positions of power have largely been men. However, maybe such pro-
grammes could be opportunities to change the mind-set of powerful men to 
see the importance of SRHR personally for themselves and to become actively 
engaged in the well-being of their partners and their reproductive health. This 
could possibly lead to a drop in gender-based violence and increase gender 
understanding. Additionally, as structural drivers have been repeatedly iden-
tified as the factors that hinder gender equality and SRHR health, men in 
positions of power could use the resources and influence available to them to 
ensure effective redress. An example of this having worked well is the train-
ing and education of traditional chiefs and municipal leaders in Zambia in 
child marriage, that has led to the criminalization of it and more cases of child 
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marriage being addressed at local traditional courts with subsequent reporting 
to and arrest by police.60,61 Hence, it becomes no surprise that child marriage is 
on the decline even in rural areas in Zambia.62,63 
Also, some male scholars and programme implementers may ask: to what 
extent would men be involved, as many feminist researchers have shown ten-
dencies of no longer wanting to engage with men in an attempt to deconstruct 
patriarchal systems and ideologies? The approach of including men is in fact a 
feminist stance due to it advocating for gender equality education and aware-
ness among men. Additionally, it is important to note that feminism has never 
been against men, but rather has advocated against the unfair treatment of 
women regardless of race, culture, age, etc.64 Additionally, the approach of 
educating on gender equality is not about emasculating men but rather dis-
couraging hegemonic and aggressive masculinities to decrease violence perpe-
tration as well as risky sexual behaviours. However, caution should be taken 
in order not to overemphasize this element in the pursuit of progressive and 
transformative masculinities. How do men and boys enter this SRHR debate? 
Is it our desire to label them as the problems or as part of the solution? As 
scholars and programme implementers, we will have to decide carefully how 
to frame men in the SRHR conversation in order to keep them as willing 
allies. It is imperative that we do not alienate men, particularly in African con-
texts through problematizing manhood and all aspects of masculinity. 
The same goes for problematizing culture too harshly. SIHA (2016)65 speak 
of ‘In many African societies, challenging masculinities and negative male 
norms can meet with resistance and taboo’. The secret statuses accorded to 
these rituals also ‘mystify’ masculinity and may contribute to the normalization 
of men’s violent behaviour towards women. Furthermore, there are incred-
ibly misogynistic ideologies attached to the defence of certain traditional rites 
(of passage) and rituals practiced by and on men. It is important not to throw 
out the baby with the bathwater in such cases as are mentioned here. Rituals 
associated with the rites of passage into adulthood are performed for men and 
women in African cultures.66,67 Additionally, the rituals themselves do not 
make men violent, but rather it is the teachings and messages that accompany 
the rituals which may promote misogyny, the performance of hegemonic mas-
culinities and subordination of women. Therefore, eliminating traditions com-
pletely is a rather colonial approach and should not be advocated, rather we 
need to remember that culture is forever evolving and therefore allows leeway 
to be adapted to be less harmful when the appropriate steps are taken. 
Finally, the question can be asked at what cost do we have to include men 
and is this the smartest approach to use? It is important to involve men without 
excluding other activities. In other words, this should be added as one of the 
strategies that we pursue to ensure SRHR for women without abandoning those 
already present. Particularly, the idea of replacing women-geared programmes 
with men-geared programmes is dangerous. Indeed it is the other side of the 
relationship; however, the approach may assist researchers to reach more rela-











a feedback mechanism where good and bad components of programmes are 
reported back to the implementers will be useful to determine where modifica-
tion of programmes is necessary. Consequently, despite the above numerous 
challenges being valid and making it understandable why female scholars and 
programme implementers may deliberately choose to exclude men in their 
work, a strong case can still be made for including men in SRHR. 
5 The way forward 
5.1 Ways in which men can be involved in SRHR work 
The last question then becomes in what ways could men be involved in SRHR 
work? There are three areas to consider as proposed by the male involvement 
model of Greene et al. (2006).68 
Men as clients: this component argues the need to increase the number of 
men accessing SRH services. Ensuring the presence of sexual and reproductive 
health infrastructure that targets men, including policies, services and opening 
hours is vital. Such services should incorporate: SRH knowledge, family plan-
ning, HIV and other STI testing, VMMC, urologist referral for complicated 
cases as well as prostate check-ups. 
Men as partners: this component argues the need to educate and increase 
awareness among men to ensure optimal SRHR for their partners. Although 
women remain the custodians of decision-making regarding their bodies since 
they enjoy autonomy, men can be empowered to take up supportive role. 
This involves advocacy and education via workshops, posters and commu-
nity dialogues to change gender inequitable attitudes and perceptions among 
men; this would eliminate the tolerance of violence against women and teach 
men the SRH rights that women have (external and internal to relationship). 
This aspect aims to increase: communication about sexual decision-making 
and choosing family planning options, supporting women’s initiation of con-
traception, escorting their partners to access SRHR services and antenatal care 
as well as postnatal care. In as much as men are partners in this process, the 
ultimate and final decision lies with the woman in accordance with the rights 
of women to equality, dignity, and respect for private life, without discrimina-
tion by the OHCHR.69 
Men as advocates of change: this element argues the need to educate 
and increase awareness among men that supports men to mobilize other men’s 
involvement in sexual and reproductive health. 
6 Conclusion 
The opportunity to include men in sexual and reproductive health and rights
advancement of women remains full of positive rewards. This article has
attempted to show the benefits and challenges, reasons for reluctance as well as
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still occur as shown in the paper. However, the benefits seem to far outweigh
these and hence programmes should be modified for contextual factors as they
are implemented in various African settings. Zusak (2018)70 states that ‘Like eve-
rything else worth fighting for in our lives, the idea of raising good men feels to
me like something that never ends. It will to and fro between triumphs and fail-
ures…’ This is the attitude that we need to have as we continue to include men
in SRH services. It is important to acknowledge and accept that things will not
happen rapidly, as attitudes and behaviour change are slow processes regardless of
gender.71 Nevertheless as the title of this chapter rightly states, it does take two to
tango. Heterosexual relationships do not involve women alone. Consequently, it
is when we include men consistently in SRH service conversations and work that
there will be strides in changing mind-sets and behaviour to achieve optimal sex-
ual and reproductive health and rights for women and men in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Positive approaches to 





Adolescence is a critical stage of human development. The decisions made, and 
behaviours formed at this stage, have a lasting impact on the life trajectory of an 
individual.1 Gender norms shape the experience of biological changes associ-
ated with puberty such as the development of secondary sexual characteristics 
and the social changes associated with new roles ascribed at the emergence 
of adolescence. These gender norms shape social behaviours of adolescents 
including how they form social relationships and engage in sexual practices, 
and later reproductive practices. The Global Early Adolescent Survey (GEAS), 
also implemented in Malawi, showed that gender norms begin to exert a strong 
influence on very young adolescents (VYAs) from the age of 10.2 Behaviours 
and practices appear during adolescence that differentially shape the develop-
mental trajectories of boys and girls. Girls experience mortality and morbidity 
related to reproductive health such as complications of early pregnancies and 
unsafe abortions. Boys, on the other hand, experience a different set of chal-
lenges such as road injuries and interpersonal violence.3 However, girls are 
more likely than boys to experience harmful practices such as child marriage, 
human trafficking, and all forms of gender-based violence including physical, 
sexual and emotional violence. Gender inequitable norms underlie this dis-
proportionate distribution of sexual and reproductive health burdens between 
boys and girls.
Most societies including in Malawi perceive children and VYAs as asexual 
or assume that sex and sexuality do not matter to children.4 When adoles-
cents begin to express sexual and romantic interests, parents react with anxi-
ety and fail to communicate openly with their child about sex and sexuality, 
or are mostly worried about the negative consequences of sexual activity for 
girls.5 Because gender and sexuality are inextricably linked, failure to posi-
tively and openly communicate with adolescents about sexuality also implies 
that gender inequitable norms that shape early relationships in adolescence are 
not addressed.6 For instance, the GEAS revealed that romantic relationships 
between VYAs in Malawi are common, but there is already a high prevalence 
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Inequitable gender norms consolidate when adolescents start to experience 
sexual feelings and engage in sexual relationships.8 Evidence suggests that early 
adolescence is an opportune time to encourage positive sexual practices and 
gender-equitable norms, and this has immediate benefits but also over the life 
course.9 An important prerequisite, therefore, is to recognize children and ado-
lescents as evolving sexual beings. A positive approach toward childhood sexu-
ality is critical to addressing gender inequality which would also contribute to 
improved sexual health and wellbeing beyond adolescence. 
The global agendas to address gender inequality and promote human and 
child rights motivate this chapter. The following highlight from paragraph 7.34 
of the Program of Action (PoA) of the 1994 International Conference on 
Population and Development (ICPD) is especially salient: 
Human sexuality and gender relations are closely interrelated and together 
affect the ability of men and women to achieve and maintain sexual health 
and manage their reproductive lives. Equal relationships between men 
and women in matters of sexual relations and reproduction, including 
full respect for the physical integrity of the human body, require mutual 
respect and willingness to accept responsibility for the consequences of 
sexual behaviour. Responsible sexual behaviour, sensitivity and equity 
in gender relations, particularly when instilled during the formative years
(emphasis supplied), enhance and promote respectful and harmonious 
partnerships between men and women. 
This exhortation of the ICPD PoA is read with aspirations articulated in 
Sustainable Development Goal 5 of United Nation’s (UN) Agenda 2030 which 
calls on states to achieve gender equality and to empower women and girls. 
It is also read with Goal 17 of African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063 to achieve 
gender equality in all spheres of life. The African Committee of Experts on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) published Africa’s Agenda 
for Children 2040, describing ten aspirations based on recognition of the role 
of children in shaping Africa’s development, and therefore, the importance of 
protecting and realizing the rights of children. 
Malawi has ratified human rights treaties including the United Nation’s 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women (CEDAW), and the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol). Malawi has also taken steps to address 
gender inequality by enacting laws such as the Gender Equality Act (GEA). 
Based on the evidence from the GEAS of the influence of gender norms 
on VYAs, Promundo and the College of Medicine (Malawi) developed a cur-
riculum aimed at transforming gender inequitable norms for VYAs including 
in interpersonal relationships.10 In a similar vein, this chapter draws upon evi-
dence and insights from the life course perspective of individual development, 
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law and regional and global agreements, to discuss positive approaches to child-
hood sexuality to address gender inequitable norms for children and VYAs. 
2 Understanding the sexual and gendered 
world of the child and adolescent 
2.1 Gender, sexuality and the life course 
A life course perspective conceptualizes individual life courses as composed 
of multiple and simultaneously occurring interdependent trajectories through 
various dimensions of life such as sexuality, family and work.11 A trajectory is a 
pathway through one’s life extending from birth to death, and is made up of a 
sequence of life events and transitions. An event is a relatively abrupt change or 
occurrence, for instance, first sexual intercourse, while a transition is a gradual 
change from one social role to another, for example, from childhood to ado-
lescence.12 The life course has contributed to understanding sexuality develop-
ment in the transition from childhood to adolescence. 
First, early sexual experiences influence sexual attitudes and behaviour at a later
stage in life, for example, it has been shown that coercive experiences at sexual
debut are associated with sexual risks in the life course.13 The period of adolescence
can cushion against or exacerbate childhood experiences, allowing for accumula-
tion of prior advantage or disadvantage, thereby launching the adolescent into a
sexual health trajectory that is on one hand unique for the individual, and on the
other hand shares common characteristics with the trajectories of peers.14 
Second, an individual’s sexual biography is shaped by social, cultural and 
historical forces. For instance, to appreciate the social attitudes toward sexuality 
of adolescent girls in Malawi, one should understand the complex interaction 
of colonial laws, religious beliefs and social norms.15 
A third insight is that life is not determined entirely by external forces. 
Individuals do exercise agency to determine their trajectory, because ‘young 
people select into personal experiences, interpersonal relationships, and 
social settings in ways that reflect their past and contribute to their futures’.16 
Individuals may be influenced by external forces, but they are also self-deter-
mining and responsible for shaping their sexual and gendered behaviours. 
Finally, gender and sexuality are mutually constitutive in the life course. As 
Carpenter and Delamater has stated: ‘Throughout the life course, transitions 
in an individual’s sexual and sexual identity trajectories will affect his gender 
trajectory, even as the gender-related transitions that he experiences help to 
construct his sexual and sexual identity trajectories’.17 A good example is that 
boys learn to associate masculinity with sexual prowess so that sexual aggression 
is perceived as a mark of manhood.18 
2.2 The invisible process of learning sexuality 
Most adults believe that sexuality (and gender) does not concern children until 
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children and adolescents about sex and sexuality.20 However, as shall be further 
explored later in the chapter, communication about sex and sexuality between 
parents and children also takes place invisibly. In fact, people invest in or legiti-
mize particular power relations without being conscious of or being aware of 
their actions.21 As Pierre Bourdieu has put it, ‘[i]t is because subjects do not, 
strictly speaking, know what they are doing that what they do has more mean-
ing than they know’.22 Parents and adults, both intentionally and unawares, 
instil in children norms and values that influence early sexual behaviours and 
practices, and relationships of power. 
This part of the chapter draws mostly from Simon and Gagnon’s Sexual 
conduct: The social sources of human sexuality in which they explain how this 
social learning takes place leading to the emergence of sexual identity at ado-
lescence.23 The authors make an important point that adolescence is linked to 
the preceding stage of infancy because ‘we do not become sexual all at once at 
puberty; there is a significant level of continuity with the past’.24 Experiences 
occur in infancy, even before the acquisition of language, that influence sexu-
ality development later in the life course. These experiences are not necessar-
ily sexual in character because they will influence other aspects of the infant’s 
development in addition to sexual development.25 
According to Simon and Gagnon, there are two important experiences in 
the years running up to puberty that influence development of sexual identity: 
The first of these is the pattern of naming the child’s behaviors in general 
and the specific adult reaction to behaviors that are conceived to be sexual. 
The second is the continued building of conventional gender identities 
based on preverbal social decision about the gender of the child.26 
In these experiences, parents and caregivers play a significant role in the
child’s learning process. Parents tend to be reactive when dealing with the
behaviour of a child interpreted by the parents as sexual. Parents react to
cues such as use of words or actions of the child which they read or define as
sexual. Parents employ several strategies as a response to what they perceive
is sexual behaviour. They may ‘describe the behavior as sexual and say that
it is wrong, may mislabel the behavior, describing it as something it may
not be, or may nonlabel the behavior by ignoring or providing a judgment
without a specific label’.27 So, for instance, a parent may tell their daughter
to ‘sit properly’ or reprimand her for showing interest in a boy, but would
rarely explain to the child the meaning of the parental concerns. When par-
ents take such action that is motivated by their belief about sexuality, they
rarely describe it in sexual terms but rather in moral terms using expressions
or commands such as ‘dirty’, ‘bad’, ‘stop’, ‘good girls don’t…’, and in so
doing endowing the behaviour with moral significance that indirectly shapes
its sexual meaning.28 It is also in the difference in how parents react to boys
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In most cases, the child does not understand or fully understand the meaning 
of the actions or reactions of adults, because adults perceive the sexual behav-
iour of the child in adult terms. The child is therefore exposed to ‘judgments 
and responses that follow from the application of a sexual vocabulary that they 
do not know’.30 Simon and Gagnon also describe the reverse situation, whereby 
the child is exposed to sexual vocabulary but without at first associating it with 
sexuality, for instance, a child might first learn to use the word ‘fuck’ but only 
later on learn its sexual meaning. In the process of becoming sexual, therefore, 
the child on the one hand learns from experiences that are judged in certain 
ways, but also learns words before experiences to which they refer. This cre-
ates a dilemma because ‘[t]he possession of words, experiences, and judgments, 
all unassembled, leaves the young child without a vocabulary with which to 
describe his emerging physical or psychic experiences’.31 Typically, therefore, 
information on sexuality during childhood is provided by adults through judg-
ing perceived sexual behaviour but without naming it, so that children under-
stand things largely in terms of what they ought not to do. Children adapt by 
piecing together fragments from these parental moral injunctions and actions 
which then become the basis for early learning experiences of children which 
shape children’s attitudes and values toward sexuality.32 
Therefore, parents communicate to children about sexuality and gender 
in two modes: expressly where the messages about sexuality are explicit, and 
invisibly through the parents’ action or nonaction, and reaction or nonreaction 
to what they perceive is sexual behaviour of the child. Failure of parents to 
talk about sexuality to the adolescent is itself communication about sexuality. 
In most cases, because of underlying beliefs and norms, parents communicate 
sexuality as negative, especially to girls, so that the child learns to associate 
sexuality with shame, guilt and secrecy.33 
2.3 An example of sexual conduct of adolescents shaped by gender norms 
Gender inequitable norms learned in the family find expression in school cul-
tures. This section briefly discusses gender discrimination using a study con-
ducted by Muhanguzi in Uganda, in which she interviewed girls and boys 
about sexual behaviours and practices. The study results revealed that gender 
norms influence societal expectations creating a double standard for girls. Boys 
expected that a ‘good’ girl would show modesty when a boy proposed to her. 
A girl should not say ‘yes’ too quickly or enthusiastically because the boys 
would consider her a slut.34 In other words, the girl should suppress her sexual 
desire. However, boys also expected girls to acquiesce to love or sex propos-
als from boys. Boys would respond with violence and abuse to those girls that 
resisted their advances. This created a double standard because of the expecta-
tion that a girl should simultaneously reject and accept the invitations of the 
boy.35 The double standard diminishes the power of girls to exercise choice 
about sexuality and to negotiate safe sex. It also justifies violence from boys 
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Girls learn sexual passivity early in life.37 The norm has wide implication, 
for instance, an evaluation of the Youth Friendly Health Services in Malawi 
showed that ‘many girls who would have requested condoms failed to do so for 
fear of being labelled sex workers’.38 Another study in Malawi also showed that 
parents are biased towards the education of girls because of the belief that girls 
are sexually weak and would end up being impregnated by boys.39 
Malawi has put in place various laws and policies to address gender inequal-
ity including the GEA. However, to tackle gender inequalities children learn 
in the parent/child relationship and to positively influence the sexual relation-
ships of adolescents requires that adults first recognize and accept the evolving 
sexual agency of children and adolescents. 
3 Transforming childhood sexuality and gender 
norms through the legal framework 
3.1 The Gender Equality Act and Section 19 rights 
Malawi’s enactment of the GEA in 2013 is an important expression of its com-
mitment to its obligations to address the negative impact of gender norms. The 
GEA aims to advance gender equality by prohibiting harmful practices, sex 
discrimination and sexual harassment, promoting gender non-discriminatory 
access to employment, education and training, and recognizing sexual and 
reproductive health rights. In this chapter, the discussion focuses on apply-
ing the concept of sexual and reproductive health rights to advance positive 
approaches to childhood and adolescent sexuality. To achieve this, it is neces-
sary to understand the genesis of Section 19 of the GEA. 
Section 19 (1) of the GEA provides that 
Every person has a right to adequate sexual and reproductive health which
includes (emphasis supplied) the right to 
(a) access to sexual and reproductive health services; 
(b) access to family planning services; 
(c) to be protected from sexually transmitted infection; 
(d) self-protection from sexually transmitted infection; 
(e) choose the number of children and when to bear those children; 
(f) control fertility; and 
(g) choose an appropriate method of contraception. 
However, the use of the term ‘includes’ suggests that the list is not exhaustive. 
But then, what is the expansive list? Further, what influenced the choice of 
the list? The answer to the first question is in the report on the development 
of the GEA by the Malawi Law Commission (MLC), the body responsible for 
developing the GEA. Drawing on various authoritative instruments, the MLC 
recognized that sexual and reproductive health ‘requires a positive and respect-
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having pleasurable and safe sexual experiences, free of coercion, discrimination 
and violence’. Further, ‘[f]or sexual and reproductive health to be attained and 
maintained, the sexual rights of all persons (emphasis supplied) must be respected, 
protected and fulfilled’. The MLC defined sexual rights as: 
[A] subset of human rights that are already recognized in national laws, 
international human rights law and other consensus statements. They 
include the right of all persons, free of coercion, discrimination and vio-
lence, to 
(a) the highest attainable standard of sexual health, including access to 
sexual and reproductive health care services; 
(b) seek, receive and impart information related to sexuality; 
(c) sexuality education; 
(d) respect for bodily integrity; 
(e) choose their sexual partner; 
(f) decide to be sexually active or not; 
(g) have consensual sexual relations; 
(h) enter into consensual marriage; 
(i) decide whether or not and when, to have children; and 
(j) pursue a satisfying, safe and pleasurable sexual life. 
Interestingly, when articulating the list of rights in Section 19 of the draft bill 
it proposed, the MLC did not use the list under the sexual rights concept it 
discussed in its report. Rather, it appears to have followed the list under the 
concept of sexual and reproductive health rights as stipulated in the ICPD PoA 
which emphasizes reproductive health rights. The challenge is that reproduc-
tion, and even ‘health’, are not the main concern for children and VYAs. 
Early experiences of sexuality are mostly to do with non-reproductive aspects, 
such as curiosity about their bodies, forming romantic partnerships and non-
penetrative sexual conduct. The list of sexual rights that the MLC did not 
explicitly include in Section 19 such as the right to sexuality education, the 
right to choose a sexual partner and the right to decide to be sexually active or 
not, are precisely the ones that are critically important for children and VYAs.40 
The MLC did not list these sexual rights, most likely to avoid controversy. 
Conservative and influential groups such as the Holy See adopt the position 
that sexual rights should not extend to children and unmarried adolescents.41 
Indeed, Malawi and other African countries, have previously rejected the 
notion of the right to sexuality education when it was proposed by the former 
UN Special Rapporteur on Education.42 
Nevertheless, Section 19 of the GEA is progressive for recognizing sexual 
and reproductive rights. This author argues that Section 19 rights should be 
interpreted to include the unlisted sexual rights on the basis that this is what the 
MLC, in proposing the bill that became enacted as the GEA, had intended in 
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passed the bill into law. The evidence is in the travaux préparatoires that include 
MLC’s report of the development of the GEA. Further, Section 19 deliberately 
uses the term ‘include’ to mean that the express list is not exhaustive. This 
author argues, therefore, that a court interpreting Section 19 could be per-
suaded to determine that sexual rights are applicable in Malawi and are recog-
nized for every person including children. 
Despite Section 19 being progressive, the invisibility of the unlisted rights
makes it difficult for them to be accessed and applied. The route to confirm
their application would be through the interpretation of a tribunal such as the
national courts or treaty monitoring bodies. This chapter will explore what
some of the UN and AU treaty monitoring bodies have said regarding child-
hood sexuality and gender to argue that state and intergovernmental institutions
should adopt positive approaches to addressing childhood sexuality and gender. 
3.2 Positive discourses on childhood and adolescent 
sexuality in treaty monitoring bodies 
The author reviewed general comments and recommendations issued by UN 
and AU treaty monitoring bodies, and especially looked for positive language 
about childhood sexuality, that is, language that recognizes the child as having 
sexual agency. 
Human rights instruments including the UNCRC and ACRWC do not 
expressly mention sexuality. However, the UN and AU Committees have 
interpreted and analyzed various provisions relating to childhood sexuality. 
The dominant discourses about sexuality construct children as powerless and 
victims.43 Undeniably, children and adolescents are more vulnerable to sexual 
harms than adults. However, to address these harms and the underlying norms 
that fuel these, children should be recognized as sexual beings with an evolving 
capacity for ethical sexual exploration, negotiation and pleasure.44 
The UN and AU treaty documents reflect the dominant constructions of 
child as lacking sexual agency. Few texts use language that acknowledges sexual 
agency of children and adolescents. Those texts that recognize sexual agency 
still draw on discourses of victimhood and vulnerability to sexual abuse, vio-
lence and HIV/AIDS.Table 7.1 presents some texts from the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child (CRoC), the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the ACERWC that are positive about child-
hood and adolescent sexuality. 
As the table shows, the CRoC has used language that recognizes sexual 
agency of children such as: ‘First sexual intercourse’; ‘sexual activity of girls’; 
sexual behaviours of children that do not conform to societal expectations; deal 
positively and responsibly with their sexuality; and ‘express their sexuality’. 
The CRoC also requests states to not criminalize adolescents for consensual 
and non-exploitative sexual conduct. 
The AU treaty monitoring bodies have also used some progressive lan-
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Child Marriage (JGC on Child Marriage) encourages states to implement com-
prehensive sexuality education (CSE) that includes sexuality and sexual and 
reproductive health rights. It recommends that CSE should include consent 
to sex and provide information about gender and sexuality and address the 
stereotypes that perpetuate gender inequalities. More of this language that con-
structs children and adolescents as having sexual agency should appear in such 
authoritative and interpretive documents, to guide states to create legal and 
policy environments in which children learn about sexuality as a positive aspect 
of their human development. 
4 The importance of decriminalizing 
adolescent sexual conduct 
In Malawi, sex between consenting adolescents is criminalized under Section 
138 of the Penal Code. Criminalizing adolescent consensual sexual conduct is 
an extreme form of denying that children and adolescents are sexual beings. 
Laws criminalizing child consensual sexual conduct are a form of violence. 
Social expectations supported by gender inequitable norms tend to influence 
the design and implementation of these laws. Criminalising adolescent consen-
sual sex has a negative impact on the sexual rights of adolescents. Such criminal 
laws also serve to maintain attitudes toward adolescents that are rooted in gen-
der inequitable norms. A case in point is Martin Charo v Republic decided by the 
High Court of Kenya, which is described below. 
Kenya, like most countries in sub-Saharan Africa including Malawi, adopted 
colonial sexual consent laws that restricted sexual conduct with children and 
adolescents of below a certain age. These so-called ‘age of consent’ laws were 
premised on gender stereotypes that regarded girls as sexually passive and in 
need of protection from men and boys whose active sexuality posed a threat 
to the virginity of girls.45 Even after Kenya transformed its sexual offences law 
to align it with the rights of the child and gender equality, gender inequitable 
norms still influence how legal institutions and actors perceive and respond to 
adolescent sexuality. 
In Charo, the appellant, a 23-year-old male, had sexual intercourse with 
a girl of 14. A magistrate’s court convicted him of the offence of defilement 
under section 8(1)(3) of the Sexual Offences Act 3 of 2006 (Sexual Offences 
Act) of Kenya and sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years. On appeal, the 
High Court quashed his conviction and sentence. The court’s decision hinged 
on the interpretation and application of sections 8(5) and 8(6) of the Sexual 
Offences Act. Under section 8(5) of the Sexual Offences Act, it is a defence if 
an accused person proves that the complainant deceived him or her into believ-
ing that he or she was over the age of 18, and if the accused person reasonably 
believed that the person was above the age of 18. According to section 8(6), 
the court should in determining the accused person’s belief envisaged under 
section 8(5), consider all circumstances including the steps the accused person 
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and going to the home of the appellant for the purposes of having sexual inter-
course with the appellant, the complainant behaved, deceptively, like an adult. 
The court allowed the defence to stand and quashed the conviction. 
What is interesting for this chapter is the judge’s belief about the sexual 
conduct of girls. The judge restated the aim of the defilement provisions in 
these terms: ‘It is the law that a child below the age of 18 years cannot consent 
to sex’. He went on to express the opinion that: ‘However, where the same 
child under 18 years who is protected by the law opts to go into men’s houses 
for sex … why should the court conclude that such a person was defiled’. The 
judge believed that the 14-year-old girl behaved like an adult. In the view of 
the judge, ‘although PW1 was a young lady aged 14 years; she was behaving 
like a full grown up woman who was already engaging and enjoying sex with 
men’. Further, the judge thought that: ‘Children are not meant to enjoy sex’, 
and that ‘where the child behaves like an adult and willingly sneaks into men’s 
houses for purposes of having sex, the court ought to treat such a child as a 
grown-up who knows what she is doing’. In the judge’s reasoning, the sexual 
behaviour of the girl was against social norms about how a girl is supposed to 
behave sexually. The wording of the law provided the opportunity for the 
judge to interpret the legal provisions to ascribe meanings that reflected societal 
gender norms and expectations about a girl’s sexual behaviour. 
Sexual offences laws that criminalize adolescent consensual sexual conduct 
are often vehicles for communicating negative and gendered messages about 
sexuality to children. It is difficult to imagine circumstances in which such laws 
would be compatible with the rights of the child. For instance, Section 138 
of Malawi’s Penal Code constructs the girl, but not the boy, as the object of 
protection from harmful sexual intercourse. This provision is more aligned to 
gender stereotypical and inequitable norms than it is to the GEA and consti-
tutional values. 
5 Conclusion 
Though Malawi has a robust legal framework to address gender inequality, 
the social environment does not support children to develop positive sexual 
behaviours and practices. However, Section 19 of the Gender Equality holds 
promise because, as has been argued in this chapter, it ought to be interpreted 
to promote sexual rights of children and adolescents, including the right to 
sexuality education, the right to decide to be sexuality active or not and the 
right to choose a sexual partner. 
To support creating a positive environment for sexuality development of
children, this author recommends that Malawi should include a section on
sexuality in the National Policy on Early Childhood Development (ECD)
to guide ECD practitioners to implement laws and policies in a manner that
recognizes the sexual agency of children. For instance, respect of the right
of the child to be heard means that ECD practitioners are obligated to take
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these are important for children, and they form the basis for sexual con-
duct that has a lasting impact on their sexual development and sexual health
trajectories. 
Another recommendation is that CSE should start early in pre-school. The 
design of CSE should be to address not only what adults believe children should 
learn, but to also enable children to critically engage with what they already 
learn, and to address gender discriminatory values about sexuality prevalent in 
society. It is, therefore, crucially important to build the capacity of educators 
to effectively engage with children and adolescents on sexuality and gender. 
There has been little guidance from treaty monitoring bodies especially
the ACERWC on how to implement the ACRWC to promote sexual rights
of children, beyond protecting them from harms of sexual conduct and early
marriage. The JGC on Child Marriage is, however, progressive because it
has called on African states to provide CSE that includes consent to sex and
information about sexuality. An important entry point for the ACERWC
to further promote child rights relating to sexuality would be to encourage
states to review age of consent laws that punish children and adolescents for
engaging in normative consensual sexual conduct. Such laws have a negative
impact on childhood sexuality development and gender equality in Africa,
for the reasons discussed in this chapter. It would be of tremendous signifi-
cance and impact if the ACERWC could analyze age of consent laws and
guide states to align their laws and policies with the rights of the child and
the advancement of gender equality in accordance with Africa’s Agenda for
Children 2040. 
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Addressing female genital 
cutting/mutilation 
(FGC/M) in The Gambia
Beyond Criminalization
Ebenezer Durojaye and Satang Nabaneh
1  Introduction
Female genital cutting (FGC) or sometimes referred to as female genital muti-
lation (FGM) or circumcision is a cultural practice in some parts of Africa that 
has become a subject of concern for many years. The term FGC and FGM 
are sometimes used interchangeably. Although human rights organizations and 
activists tend to prefer the use of FGM, it is often believed that this is stigma-
tizing and judgemental of the culture of the people. Thus, the use of FGC is 
believed to be non-judgemental. An estimated 200 million girls and women 
alive today have experienced FGC/M in 30 countries in Africa, the Middle 
East and Asia where this practice is concentrated.1 About 3 million girls are said 
to be at risk of FGC/M annually. Indeed, it has been noted that the practice 
and social acceptance of FGC/M persist in many countries.2
The WHO (2016) estimates that 100–140 million girls and women world-
wide are currently living with the consequences of the FGC/M.3 It is mostly 
carried out on young girls at some point between infancy and the age of 
15 years. In Africa, an estimated 92 million girls from ten years of age and 
above have undergone FGC/M.4 While recent evidence would seem to indi-
cate that this practice is declining in some countries, however, this is not the 
same in other countries as the practice would seem to remain prevalent.5
According to the 2013 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), FGM is 
a universal practice in The Gambia, with 75% of girls and women between 
15 and 49 undergoing the practice, and 76.3% for those between 15 and 19.6 
The practice is mainly performed by traditional practitioners. In 2015, the 
Gambian government took a giant step forward in addressing the menace of 
FGC/M in the country.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the various approaches that have 
been adopted to address FGC/M in some African countries. In particular, the 
chapter discusses the pros and cons of criminalization approach to FGC/M. 
It then focuses on the amendment to the 2010 Women’s Act in The Gambia 
which prohibits FGC/M. The paper evaluates the utility of the approach 
adopted by the Gambian government vis-a-vis its obligation under the Protocol 
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Maputo Protocol). The paper concludes by noting that while prohibition of 
FGC/M through sanction is important, such an approach will fail to achieve its 
desired aim of reducing incidence of this practice unless other complementary 
measures are adopted by states. 
2 FGC/M in The Gambia 
FGC/M refers to ‘all procedures involving partial or total removal of the exter-
nal female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medi-
cal reasons’.7 FGC/M is classified into four major types. These are: 
• Type 1: Often referred to as clitoridectomy, this is the partial or total 
removal of the clitoris (a small, sensitive and erectile part of the female 
genitals), and in very rare cases, only the prepuce (the fold of skin sur-
rounding the clitoris). 
• Type 2: Often referred to as excision, this is the partial or total removal 
of the clitoris and the labia minora (the inner folds of the vulva), with or 
without excision of the labia majora (the outer folds of skin of the vulva). 
• Type 3: Often referred to as infibulation, this is the narrowing of the 
vaginal opening through the creation of a covering seal. The seal is formed 
by cutting and repositioning the labia minora, or labia majora, sometimes 
through stitching, with or without removal of the clitoris (clitoridectomy). 
• Type 4: This includes all other harmful procedures to the female genitalia 
for non-medical purposes, e.g. pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and 
cauterizing the genital area. 
In The Gambia, FGC/M is carried out throughout childhood, with 55% of 
women reporting that they were circumcised before the age of five. Another 
28% of women were circumcised between the ages of 5 and 9, and 7% were 
circumcised between the ages of 10 and 14. Around 85% of women circum-
cised indicated that what they went through involved cutting and removal 
of flesh.8 According to the 2018 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICs), 
75.7% of women aged 15–49 years and 50.6% for those aged 0–14 years had 
undergone FGM.9 FGM is often performed by traditional practitioners com-
monly called circumcisers in The Gambia. The procedure is performed with-
out anaesthesia and using knives or razor blades. 
Kaplan et al., conducted a clinical study on the health consequences of 
FGM in The Gambia from 2008 to 2009.10 The study indicated that type 1 is 
most common in The Gambia accounting for the highest cases of FGC/M, 
followed by types 2 and 3, while type 4 is not evident. The study found that 
a substantial number of cases were observed with health complications arising 
directly from the practice of FGC/M. Complications, whether immediate or 
late, were present in 23.7% of the patients with type 1(137/ 577), 55.0% of 
patients with type 2 (126/229) and 55.4% of patients with type 3 (36/65). 
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Nevertheless, knowledge about the extent of health consequences of FGC/M 
in The Gambia remains scarce. 
FGC/M is a deeply rooted and widely supported practice that is sustained 
through many cultural justifications that reinforce its continuation in The 
Gambia. Common reasons for performing FGC/M include female purity/vir-
ginity, family honour, maintenance of cleanliness and health and assurance of 
women’s marriageability. Some also associate it with religious beliefs.11 
3 FGC/M as a human rights violation 
Given the nature of FGC/M, there is a consensus that this practice tends to under-
mine the human rights of girls as guaranteed under international human rights
law. This practice is a threat to the enjoyment of various rights of the girl-child,
including the rights to life, health equality and non-discrimination, liberty, free-
dom from inhumane degrading treatment, dignity and autonomy.12 These rights
are guaranteed in international and regional human right instruments such as the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Different UN treaty moni-
toring bodies have expressed concerns about FGM and its implications for the
rights of women and girls. For instance, the CEDAW Committee in General
Recommendation 24 has condemned this practice as gross violation of women’s
rights to health, non-discrimination and life. It urges states to adopt decisive
measures including imposition of sanctions on the perpetrators of this act. In its
General Recommendation 30, the Committee notes that states are obligated to
eliminate all forms of harmful practices that undermine the rights and dignity
of women as well as perpetuate the low status of women in society. Also, the
Human Rights Committee has stated that FGM is in breach of Article 7 of the
ICCPR and constitutes torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment and has also raised concerns regarding its persistence. 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child in its concluding observations 
recommended to The Gambia to adopt legal provisions fully criminalizing the 
practice of female genital mutilation. It also requires the state to provide physi-
cal and psychological recovery programmes for victims of FGM and establish 
reporting and complaints mechanisms accessible to girls who have been vic-
tims, or fear becoming victims of the practice. In addition, The Gambia should 
take measures to help practitioners of female genital mutilation finding alterna-
tive sources of income. 
At the regional level, provisions of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) and the Protocol to the African Charter on 
the Rights of Women in Africa (African Women’s Protocol) are important in 
addressing human rights violations occasioned by FGC/M. Indeed, Article 5 of 
the African Women’s Protocol specifically enjoins states to prohibit ‘all forms 
of female genital mutilation, scarification and para-medicalization of female 
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genital mutilation and all other practices in order to eradicate them’. The 
African Women’s Protocol is particularly concerned that, despite the ratifica-
tion of the African Charter and other international human rights instruments 
by the majority of African states, and their solemn commitment to eliminate all 
forms of discrimination and harmful practices against women, discrimination 
against women persists in Africa. The African Women’s Protocol, therefore, 
aims at holistically addressing this situation. The Protocol, highlighting the 
implications of such practices on women’s health, provides that any practice 
that hinders or endangers the normal growth and affects the physical and psy-
chological development of women and girls should be condemned and elimi-
nated. This is because such practices may hinder women from enjoying fully 
their fundamental rights and prevent the promotion, protection and realization 
of women’s rights. Failure on the part of African governments to address such 
harmful practices will result in violation of women’s inherent human rights, 
such as the rights to non-discrimination, equality and human dignity. As a 
result, the African Women’s Protocol enjoins states parties to prohibit and con-
demn all forms of harmful practices which negatively affect the human rights 
of women and which are contrary to recognized international standards.13 For 
example, it specifically urges state parties to take all necessary measures to elim-
inate FGC/M including: 
… prohibition, through legislative measures backed by sanctions, of all 
forms of female genital mutilation, scarification, medicalisation and para-
medicalisation of female genital mutilation and all other practices in order 
to eradicate them; … protection of women who are at risk of being 
subjected to harmful practices or all other forms of violence, abuse and 
intolerance. 
These provisions of the Women’s Protocol distinctively address the elimina-
tion of FGC/M which is prevalent in many African countries. This makes the 
Protocol unique in the eradication of FGC/M in Africa, unlike other existing 
international human rights instruments such as the CEDAW ratified by many 
African countries. Whereas the CEDAW generally condemns cultural prac-
tices against women in order to protect their human rights, it lacks a specific 
provision relating to FGC/M. 
It should be noted that Article 5 of the Protocol must be read together with 
Article 2 which relates to elimination of all discriminatory practices against 
women. Moreover, the Protocol in Article 3 on violence against women 
enjoins African governments to ensure that victims of all violence (including 
those perpetuated as a result of cultural practices) are rehabilitated. This is very 
important in that it will ensure that the dignity and well-being of women and 
girls that have undertone harmful practices are safeguarded. A combined read-
ing of these provisions would seem to show that the Protocol has adopted a 
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First, the Protocol proposes the use of sanctions to curb the spread of this 
practice. Second, the Protocol recommends education and awareness cam-
paign that will address behavioural change in societies. Third, the Protocol 
adopts a humanistic approach of rehabilitating victims of all forms of violence. 
This approach of the Protocol is not only pragmatic but also commendable. 
It should be noted that applying criminal law to public health issues has 
remained very contentious and experience has shown that this may, in the long 
run, become ineffective.14 Indeed, such an approach may become counter-
productive in the end. Therefore, the holistic approach of the Protocol will 
go a long way in ensuring the eradication of this practice in many African 
countries. This issue is explored further below. It should be noted that The 
Gambia has ratified virtually all these international and regional human rights 
instruments. The implication under international law is that the Gambian gov-
ernment is obligated to comply with the provisions of these internments.15 
In addition, to the binding instruments, there are consensus statements and 
declarations relevant to this discussion. For instance, the international com-
munity during the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, affirmed 
that if women and girls were to be free from violence and coercion, cultural 
and patriarchal practices will need to be addressed. 
The Special Rapporteur on violence against women stated that:16 
those cultural practices that involve ‘severe pain and suffering’ for the 
woman or the girl child, those that do not respect the physical integrity 
of the female body, must receive maximum international scrutiny and 
agitation. It is imperative that practices such as female genital mutilation, 
[…] or any other form of cultural practice that brutalizes the female body 
receive international attention, and international leverage should be used 
to ensure that these practices are curtailed and eliminated as quickly as 
possible. 
On 20 December 2012, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a his-
toric and unanimous resolution calling on the international community to 
eliminate FGC/M. The then UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki Moon, com-
menting on the historic resolution, urged countries ‘to condemn all harmful 
practices that affect women and girls, in particular female genital mutilation, 
and to take all necessary measures, including enforcing legislation, awareness-
raising and allocating sufficient resources to protect women and girls from this 
form of violence’.17 
Also in 2013, the 57th UN Commission on the Status of Women agreed
on a number of resolutions including a reference to the need for states to
develop policies and programmes to eliminate FGC/M as well as other forms
of violence against women.18 Similarly, on 25 September 2015, the global
community agreed to a new set of development goals – the Sustainable
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eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and
FGC/M, by the year 2030. 
From the foregoing, most of the human rights instruments recommend the 
use of sanction as a means of addressing FGC/M. This is further explored in 
the next section of this paper. 
4 Criminalization and FGC/M 
Over the years, different approaches have been adopted to address this serious 
challenge to human rights and freedom of the girl-child in the region. In their 
seminal article, Johansen et al., have discussed some of the approaches adopted 
by African countries to address FGC/M in the region. Some of these include 
health, criminalization and alternative/mock ceremony. These approaches 
have their pros and cons. In this chapter, focus will only be on use of criminali-
zation to address FGC/M. As noted above, most of the human rights bodies 
and instruments seem to recommend the use of sanctions to address FGC/M. 
4.1 Criminalization 
In many African countries, the use of sanctions to address FGC/M is by far the 
commonest response adopted by governments. Criminalization often involves 
the imposition of jail sentence or fines. The essence of enacting prohibitory 
laws in most countries is not just to punish the culprits, but also to serve as an 
act of correction or maintaining moral justice in society. 
One of the most popular justifications for the use of criminal sanction is the
deterrence theory. The major philosophical basis for deterrence is to discourage
individuals from committing a crime. The origin of this theory has been traced to
the works of classical philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Cesare Beccaria and
Jeremy Betham. In his seminal work the Levithans, Hobbes argues that human
beings are inherently good or bad.19 He further asserts that human beings tend to
pursue their self-interests such as material gain, personal safety and social reputa-
tion, and make enemies without caring if they harm others in the process. This
sometimes may be in conflict with the needs of the society they belong. Thus,
the need for what he calls ‘social contract’ where people agree to submit to the
state, which is expected to enforce the contract. According to Hobbes, even
where the state strives to enforce the contract, crimes are inevitable, therefore, it
is necessary that the state imposes punishment for crime higher than the benefits
an individual may derive from it. This will serve to deter future commission of a
crime and thus maintain the sanctity of the social contract. 
In addition, Beccaria in his highly influential work, On crimes and punish-
ments first published in 1764, has argued that human beings by nature are 
rationally centred and will not likely commit crimes if the costs of committing 
such crimes out-weight the benefits they will derive from engaging in undesir-
able acts.20 While he notes that the purpose of punishment should be to pre-
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exceed what is necessary to achieve deterrence.21 In other words, punishment 
should serve to deter others from committing crimes and to prevent the crimi-
nal from repeating his/her crime. He holds the view that excessive imposition 
of punishments will aggravate rather than prevent crimes in society. Following 
after Becaaria, Betham in his classical work An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation, has noted that human beings are generally under the 
control of two sovereign masters – pain and pleasure.22 He argues that moral-
ity in every society tends to promote ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number’. Consequently, he reasons that the major duty of the state is to pro-
mote the happiness of the society by punishing and rewarding. Like Beccaria, 
Betham cautions against arbitrary imposition of punishments but maintains that 
punishments should only be used to avert greater evil or control the action of 
the offender. 
In summary, the argument of these classical philosophers is that the more 
serious a punishment, the more likely a rational individual will desist from 
commission of a crime. Thus, to prevent crimes in society, punishment must 
be imposed to ensure that citizens obey the law. In essence, if individuals 
know that they will be punished for the crimes they commit, they will likely 
think twice before attempting to commit a crime. This reasoning has influ-
enced modern-day criminal justice systems in many societies. Thus, the idea 
that sanctions discourage commission of crimes has led to the imposition of 
the death penalty and other severe punishments for offenders. This thinking 
has influenced moves towards criminalization of FGC/M in many countries 
in the region. However, this reasoning has been criticized as misleading and 
unfounded. For instance, one of the justifications for the continued retention 
of the death penalty is that it serves as a deterrent for commission of serious 
crimes. However, a publication by the United Nations has noted that ‘research 
has failed to provide scientific proof that executions have a greater deterrent 
effect than life imprisonment. Such proof is unlikely to be forthcoming. The 
evidence gives no positive support to the deterrent hypothesis’.23 On the con-
trary, countries that have abolished the death sentence tend to witness fewer 
serious crimes.24 The publication further identifies other disadvantages of the 
death penalty as being too expensive and sometimes used to target certain 
groups in society. 
4.2 Limitation of criminal law in addressing FGC/M 
Indeed, commentators have noted that if truly sanctions serve as deterrence to
commission of crimes, the world would have been peaceful today. However, on
the contrary, the world has almost been turned to a jungle where the fittest tend
to survive. Despite the imposition of the death sentence and other severe punish-
ments for offenders, the crime rates in the world have not reduced. As discussed
below, similar situation plays out with regard to the criminalization of FGC/M. 
Egypt is one of the African countries where the prevalent rate of FGC/M is 
very high. It is believed that about 91% of women are mutilated.25 It practices 
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all the forms of FGC/M, subjecting women and girls to perpetual torture and 
health crisis. To curb this act of torture, a presidential decree was enacted in 
1958. It made the practice punishable by a fine and imprisonment. Also, a 
resolution was signed by Egypt’s Minister of Health in 1959 to medicalize the 
practice. This is based on the belief that carrying out this practice in a hospital 
under more sanitary conditions would eventually reduce some of the detri-
mental, physical and psychological risks associated with FGC/M.26 
Similarly, in Burkina Faso the high rates of death and health effects suf-
fered by victims of FGC/M have led to the enactment of a specific legislation 
prohibiting the practice. Article 380 of the Penal Code specifically punishes 
any person who violates or attempts to violate the physical integrity of the 
female genital organ. This may either be by total ablation, excision, infibula-
tion, desensitization or by any other means. It may result in a punishment 
of a fine or imprisonment, depending on its gravity. Other countries such as 
Ghana, Senegal and Ivory Coast have laws punishing the practice.27 
Most of these laws have not been effective in curbing the practice of FGC/M 
in affected countries. This might be due to the fact the communities where this 
practice is prevalent, have not been sensitized or provided with needed infor-
mation on what these laws entail before enacting them. They have not been 
sensitized on the health hazards that the practice was causing to women and 
girls. It might also be that the language of these laws was not well understood, 
especially as the wording of these laws may seem alien. Moreover, the fact that 
members of the affected communities were not always carried along before 
these laws were enacted has made it difficult for members of the communities 
where it is practised to understand or respect the laws. They have considered 
these laws as foreign and an affront to their culture.28 Therefore, this general 
lack of acceptance of the laws caused the practice to persist, especially in hid-
ing. In his seminal work, Why People Obey the Law, Tyler has noted that legiti-
macy and trust are crucial factors that determine whether a group of people 
will obey the law.29 He argues further that obedience to the law is easier where 
the people are carried among in its conceptualization and adoption rather that 
when laws are imposed on the people. According to him, people obey the law 
not for the fear of punishment but for legitimacy sake. He reasons that law 
makers and those responsible for implementing the law will do much better if 
they ensure that the legal system is worthy of respect rather than creating fear 
in the people. In sum, Tyler would seem to suggest that people are more likely 
to obey the law if they have confidence in the system. Conversely, people will 
disobey the law for lack of respect no matter how severe the punishment for 
such disobedience. He further reasons: 
To be authoritative, legal rules and decisions must affect the actions of 
those toward whom they are directed. A judge’s ruling means little if the 
parties to the dispute feel they can ignore it. Similarly, passing a law pro-
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He concludes by noting that the ‘regulation of behaviour through social con-
trol is inefficient and may not be effective enough to allow a complex demo-
cratic society to survive’.31 This could be true for many of the anti-FGC/FGM 
laws in many parts of the region. 
Harmful cultural practices such as FGC/M are sensitive cultural issues falling 
within the spheres of women and the family in that, if women are against the 
practice, they may be ostracized by the family. This is due to the cultural belief 
that a woman’s denial or rejection of the practice amounts to a cultural taboo. 
Thus, the total elimination of such a practice can only be effectively based on 
the full commitment and political will of the government. In addition to enact-
ment of laws, they have to put programmes, structures and resources in place to 
intensify sensitization against the practice especially as most perpetrators do not 
respect the laws nor understand the human rights implications of the practice.32 
5 An analysis of The Gambian law on FGC/M 
vis-a-vis obligations under international law 
As noted earlier, The Gambia is a party to a number of international and 
regional human rights instruments that protect the rights of women in the con-
text of cultural practices. In addition, the 1997 Constitution of The Gambia 
contains a catalogue of rights and freedoms under Chapter IV relevant to pro-
tecting the rights of women and girls in relation to harmful cultural practices. 
The rights and freedoms provided in the Constitution include the right to life 
and personal liberty, torture and inhuman treatment, the rights to privacy, 
property and fair trial, freedom of speech, conscience, assembly, association and 
movement, the right to political participation, and freedom from discrimina-
tion. The Constitution does not provide a specific provision against FGC/M. 
Given the various physical and psychological implications of FGC/M, it could 
arguably be considered a violation under these provisions. 
It is arguable that FGC/M can be considered a violation of sections 210 and 
212 of the Criminal Code of Chapter XXII (Offences Endangering life and 
health). Section 210 states that any person above 16, with responsibility for a 
child under the age of 14, found to have treated or exposed a child to unneces-
sary suffering or injury commits a misdemeanour. However, this provision is 
inconsistent with the definition of a child and it victimizes children. No case 
on FGC/M has ever been made on this provision. 
The Children’s Act was enacted in 2005. The Act was promulgated to 
ensure the effective enjoyment and enforcement of the CRC and the African 
Children’s Charter through the incorporation of their provisions into national 
law. The Act clearly provides various rights that children should enjoy as well 
as their responsibilities, reflecting the aspirations of the African Children’s 
Charter. Section 19 of the Children’s Act 2005 states that: 
no child shall be subjected to any social and cultural practices that affect
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particular, those customs and practices that are- a) prejudicial to the health of
the child, b) discriminatory to the child on the grounds of sex or other status. 
Section 19 of the Act does not specifically mention FGC/M as a form of harm-
ful traditional practice. This was a compromise as the 2003 Children’s Bill 
under Article 25 provided for the prohibition of harmful traditional practices. 
It stated that a person who subjects or causes a female child to be subjected to 
a harmful traditional practice commits an offence and liable on conviction to 
a fine of five thousand Dalasis. The definition of harmful traditional practice 
expressly includes FGC/M and its different forms. However, this was modified 
before the bill was passed. 
The Women’s Act was signed into law by the president Yahya Jammeh on 
28 May 2010. It is intended to provide for the protection of women’s rights 
in addition to the rights guaranteed under Chapter IV of the Constitution. A 
key deficiency of the Women’s Act is the absence of an equivalent provision 
of Article 5 of the Protocol, dealing with ‘Elimination of Harmful Traditional 
Practices’. 
Efforts have been made to address FGC/M since the mid-1980s when the 
first campaign group with a specific focus on harmful traditional practices 
(HTPs) including FGC/M, was established. Various groups work actively to 
mobilize public opinion against FGC/M and also to persuade circumcizers to 
engage in other alternative employment. These groups have also demanded 
that the Gambian Government adopt a law that criminalizes FGC/M which 
led to a draft FGC/M Bill which was never tabled before the National 
Assembly.33 However, on 24 November 2015, President Jammeh declared a 
ban on FGC/M stating that it was a cultural and not a religious practice. He 
stated that for 21 years, he conducted research on the Qur’an and consulted 
religious leaders whether female circumcision is mentioned in the Qur’an but 
he did not find it there. 34 
6 The Women’s Amendment Act 2015 
The presidential pronouncement against FGC/M was swiftly followed by the 
passing of the Women’s (Amendment) Bill 2015 by the National Assembly on 
2 December 2015 to prohibit female circumcision. The amendment addresses 
one of the key deficiencies of the Women’s Act 2010 which was the absence 
of a provision eliminating harmful traditional practices. The Amendment Act 
added sections 32A and 32B in the Women’s Act. 
The reasons for the amendment were premised on The Gambia’s interna-
tional and regional human rights obligations such as Article 5 of the African 
Women’s Protocol. Thus, it was geared towards ensuring the compliance of 
The Gambia with its international obligation ‘to prohibit female circumcision 
due to the proven harmful nature of the practice’. However, as will be dis-
cussed below, the drafters of the law did not wholly incorporate the provisions 
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Section 32A makes it an offence for any person to engage in female circum-
cision. and whoever contravenes it is liable on conviction to an imprisonment 
for a term of three years or a fine of fifty thousand Dalasis (approximately 
$1250) or both. The Act also stipulates a life sentence in prison when the cir-
cumcision results in death. 
The Act also addresses those who commission the procedure in section 32B 
(1). It states that ‘a person who requests, incites or promotes female circumci-
sion by providing tools or by any other means commits an offence and is liable 
on conviction to imprisonment for a term of three years or a fine of fifty thou-
sand Dalasis or both’. In addition, a fine of ten thousand Dalasis (approximately 
$250) as provided in section 32B (2) of the Act is levied against anyone know-
ing about the practice and failing to report. In addition, although there have 
been concerns about the ban leading to medicalization of FGC/M, however, 
there has been no evidence of such happening in The Gambia. Countries such 
as Senegal which amended its Penal Code to prohibit FGC/M in 1999, calls 
for imprisonment from six months to five years, the maximum punishment 
which applies when FGC/M has been practised or facilitated by a member of 
the medical or paramedical profession.35 
Generally, people would rarely come forward to report gender-based vio-
lence cases unless there is a scandal such as the death of a child. Recently,
two suspects were indicted and remanded in custody for allegedly practis-
ing FGC/M. Two people were charged with conspiracy to commit felony,
prohibition of female circumcision and accomplices to female circumcision.
Sunkaru Darboe (grandfather) was accused on several counts of taking, inciting
and promoting female circumcision which led to the child’s death. Saffiatou
Darboe was charged with having knowledge about the circumcision taking
place but failing to inform authorities concerned about it. The facts of the
case are that on 27 February 2016 in Sakandi Village in Kiang West, the two
accused persons conspired and took one Aminata Drammeh, a five-month-old
baby to the circumciser for the purposes of conducting FGC/M which later
resulted in her death. The accused persons denied the charges and applied for
bail to which the state objected stating that another accused person was still
at large, and it would not help the investigation if the accused persons were
granted bail. The case was then adjourned for ruling on bail while the accused
were remanded in prison. The case is still pending and no one has been con-
victed yet.36 
There is no gainsaying that indeed the abolition of FGC/M in the Gambia is 
a welcoming legal and policy achievement, but the case involving the Sankandi 
girl was the first litmus test to determine the intentions and capacity of the state 
to enforce the law and fulfil its international obligations. A comprehensive and 
coordinated approach is crucial to accelerating the abandonment of FGC/M. 
A comprehensive national movement that involves all public and private stake-
holders, including government institutions, community and religious leaders, 
educational institutions, the media, NGOs, civil society, girls and boys, and 
women and men can eliminate this harmful practice. 
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The Gambia is known to enact laws that address specific issues such as the 
2013 Domestic Violence Act and the Sexual Offences Act. It is thus surpris-
ing that an anti-FGM law was not enacted but rather was subsumed in the 
Women’s Act 2010. However, one reason for this may be the fact that cul-
tural practices such as FGC/M tend to evoke emotions and sentiments, thus 
the need to avoid singling them out for prohibition through specific laws and 
potential backlash. This approach is not peculiar to The Gambia, as Nigeria 
recently prohibits FGC/M through the enactment of the Violence against the 
Persons Act of 2015. 
Generally, the enforcement of the Women’s Act is weak. To ensure 
sections 32A and 32B do not become ‘paper promises’, it will be necessary 
to put in place detailed plan for implementation and monitoring as well as 
establishment of enforcement mechanisms such as an Anti-FGM Prosecution 
Unit and the Anti-FGM Board. The existence of such ‘tools’ may bring about 
accountability in terms of reporting, investigating and prosecuting FGM cases. 
The challenges faced with the recent passing of legislation discouraging 
harmful traditional practices include lack of well-equipped local police stations 
with the required legislation for charging of offences and a better understand-
ing of the law. In addition, various communities believe that some of these 
laws especially the laws criminalizing FGC/M and child marriage was imposed 
on the citizenry by the former regime and thus believe that with the new 
change of government, the laws no longer exist. This has therefore led to low 
rate of report of cases of FGC/M and child marriage. 
Nevertheless, the Act constitutes a major step forward in terms of promot-
ing and protecting the rights of women to bodily integrity and dignity. Like 
most other laws in other African countries prohibiting FGC/M, the Gambian 
Women’s Act fails to incorporate the need for education and awareness pro-
grammes as an essential part of addressing this cultural practice. As noted ear-
lier, the African Women’s Protocol enjoins African governments to embark on 
educations and awareness programmes to supplement the efforts in combating 
harmful cultural practices including FGC/M. This is a missed opportunity on 
the part of the drafters of Women’s Act. Nabaneh and Muula have argued 
that the use of criminal sanction to address FGC/M is not sufficient and must 
be complemented with other strategies including mobilization and awareness 
campaign programmes.37 
Although female circumcision is now banned in the country, there is need 
for continuous intensive education of practicing communities. This would 
seem to be consistent with the approach adopted by the African Women’s 
Protocol. A long-standing and cherished traditional practice may not easily go 
away with the enactment of a law. It could, on the contrary, drive the practice 
underground and make it more harmful and dangerous for the children. For 
instance, Egypt is among those countries where efforts are underway towards 
the reduction and eventual eradication of FGC/M. The country has employed 
strategies such as a strong media campaign, a fatwa against FGC/M by the grand 
mufti of Egypt and the amendment of the decrees. Nevertheless, many people 
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still consider FGC/M part of their culture or religion and identity. Appiah has 
argued that deep-rooted cultural practices such as FGC/M would need to be 
made less ‘honourific’ before it can be totally eradicated among the people.38 
He notes further that deep-rooted cultural practices cannot be easily eradicated 
through mere appeals to reason, morality, law or persuasion. Appiah’s argu-
ment would seem to sum up the point that the mere imposition of criminal 
sanction on FGC/M will not necessarily lead to the eradication of the practice. 
This would seem to reinforce the argument by Tyler that criminal sanction 
alone will not deter people from disobeying the law unless there is general 
acceptance and legitimacy of the process leading to its enactment.39 
It is therefore vital that in The Gambia, there is continuous engagement and 
dialogue with the practicing communities, including circumcisers, religious 
leaders and traditional gate keepers, popularization of the law to every nook 
and cranny of the country, enhancing coordination among relevant sectors and 
empowerment of children and young people are necessary conditions to bring 
about lasting change. 
The CEDAW Committee in its General Recommendation 31 has empha-
sized the need for states to embark on awareness and education programmes 
with a view to eradicating harmful practices that may impair women and girls 
from enjoying their fundamental rights and freedoms. One of the advantages 
of education and awareness programmes is that it may lead to behavioural 
change in the communities where FGC/M is practiced. This will be consistent 
with the aim of the African Women’s Protocol in preventing violence against 
women and girls. 
The Human Rights Committee in 2018 recommended that The Gambia 
strengthen the Women’s (Amendment) Act of 2015, which criminalizes 
FGC/M, and enhance public awareness, particularly among traditional and reli-
gious leaders, of the lifelong negative consequences of such practices. In addi-
tion, more than 15 recommendations from the recently concluded Universal 
Periodic Review were on FGC/M focusing on the need for government to 
raise awareness and enforce the legislation, as well as strengthen and accelerate 
mechanisms aimed at eradicating the practice.40 
Another important omission in the Women’s Act is the fact that it fails 
to address the situation of victims of FGC/M. Unlike the African Women’s 
Protocol, which urges states to ensure that victims of violence are rehabili-
tated, the Women’s Act seems ominously silent on this. While it is important 
to go after those that perpetrate this act, it is equally important to provide for 
the needs of those that have undergone the practice and suffered some health 
consequences. This is consistent with a human rights-based approach, which 
is often centred on respect for human dignity. It is believed this will go a long 
way in further cementing the fundamental rights of women and girls who are 
victims of this harmful cultural practice. A substantive approach to equality 
requires that the historical disadvantaged position of women is taken into con-
sideration in responding to gender inequality. Given that FGC/M is a manifes-
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practice alone will not suffice to assuage the injustice it portends for women. A 
more pragmatic and holistic approach is needed which reflects the lived experi-
ences of women and girls that have undergone this practice. 
There is no doubt that the abolition of FGC/M in the Gambia is a welcome 
legal and policy development. A comprehensive and coordinated approach is 
crucial to accelerating the abandonment of FGC/M. Such a movement must 
include all public and private stakeholders, including government institu-
tions, community and religious leaders, educational institutions, the media, 
NGOs, civil society, girls and boys, and women and men. Examples from 
some countries in the region have shown that a combination of different strate-
gies is imperative to addressing the challenge posed by FGC/M. In Egypt for 
instance, the Positive Deviance Approach, which include, one-on-one educa-
tion talk, community awareness campaigns, involvement of local communities 
on discussions relating to FGC/M, collaboration between NGOs working on 
FGC/M and community members and training and empowerment of people 
to realize the negative effects of FGC/M, has recorded modest success.41 This 
project has elicited open discussions among community members on the cul-
tural relevance of FGC/M and whether it should still be retained. Moreover, a 
considerable reduction in the number of girls circumcised was observed during 
the execution of the project.42 
7 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed some of the approaches to addressing FGC/M 
in African countries. Also, it has argued that FGC/M violates international 
norms espoused by international human rights instruments most of which The 
Gambia is a party. It has been contended that this practice is discriminatory and 
undermines the rights to sexual autonomy of women since it seeks to control 
women’s sexuality. It examines the provisions of the Women’s Amendment 
Act of 2015 of The Gambia which prohibits FGC/M in the country. It is 
argued that the Act misses a great opportunity to incorporate some of the 
important provisions of the African Women’s Protocol. 
It should be noted that a legal prohibition is not necessarily a guarantee
that girls and women would be protected against FGC/M. The law would
need to be effectively enforced and implemented. This requires political will
from the state. One can draw lesson from Burkina Faso’s experience, which
is being recognized as one of the few countries where the government has
been able to effectively implement laws on FGC/M. Other strategies such
as awareness creation, capacity building of law enforcers, participation of
children and young people, livelihood skills for ex-circumcizers, dialogue
with religious and traditional leaders, engagement with men and boys should
be enhanced to complement the legal reform. Time will therefore tell how
far well the government mean in what can only be described yet as a legal
and policy success against FGC/M. This is in line with the UN General
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Assembly Declaration 2012, which enjoins states to adopt a holistic approach 
to addressing FGC/M.
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In search of a middle ground
Addressing cultural and religious 
influences on the criminalization 
of homosexuality in Nigeria
Adetoun T Adebanjo
Criminalization of homosexuality in Nigeria
1  Introduction
Nigeria is a largely homophobic nation. Cultural and religious beliefs have a 
major role to play in this stance. The disposition to same-sex relationships is 
rooted in the belief that same-sex relationships are alien to African culture, and 
to Christianity and Islam, the two major religions practised in Nigeria.
Prior to the introduction of the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act 2013, 
the Criminal Code Act (applicable in the South),1 the Penal Code Act (appli-
cable in the North) and Shariah Law (applicable in 12 Northern states) had 
already criminalized homosexuality.2
Homosexuality is a felony under section 214 of the Criminal Code and is 
punishable by up to 14 years imprisonment. The Penal Code has adopted an 
even stricter stance. In terms of section 284, an offender is liable to a fine and 
imprisonment of up to 14 years, while section 405(2)(e) defines a vagabond to 
include ‘any male person who dresses or is attired in the fashion of a woman 
in a public place or who practices sodomy as a means of livelihood’, and an 
offender could be liable to two years imprisonment and a fine.
Shari’a Law is also notorious for prohibiting same-sex relationships.3 The 
provisions vary from state to state. Punishments range from receiving hundred 
lashes of the cane to being stoned to death. For instance, in Kano and Zamfara,4 
unmarried offenders receive hundred lashes of the cane and one-year jail terms, 
while for married offenders, the law prescribes stoning to death. In Bauchi 
state, the law prescribes the death sentence ‘or any other means decided by the 
state’.5 In Kebbi State, all offenders are to be stoned to death.6
The combination of all these laws was already lethal for gay people in Nigeria. 
The 2013 Act was therefore unnecessary. It merely goes further to specifically 
ban same-sex marriages, and impose liabilities on anyone seen as aiding and 
abetting these unions. However, since no court in Nigeria would have solem-
nized a marriage involving gay people, the Act is practically redundant.
This chapter will argue that Nigeria’s anti-gay laws violate several funda-
mental human rights principles and must therefore be addressed. The chapter 
will suggest amendments to Nigeria’s Constitution to better protect sexual 
minorities. Drawing on specific examples of victimization experienced by gay 
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situation. It will draw on the inspirational story of an Australian Catholic priest 
who championed the fight to end the violence against gay people in Australia, 
to show that religious or cultural beliefs should not preclude tolerance and 
respect for sexual minorities. 
2 Cultural and religious influences on 
same-sex relationships in Nigeria 
In Nigerian culture, religion and morality are often so intertwined that sep-
arating them can prove difficult. For example, the two major religions i.e. 
Christianity and Islam have expectations of high morality and modesty on 
their followers. Homosexuality is believed to be against African culture and 
morality.7 In a 2013 survey by the Pew Research Centre, ninety-eight percent 
of Nigerians were polled to be against homosexuality as they believed it was 
incompatible with cultural and moral values.8 Mujuzi believes this mindset 
stems in part from the belief that everyone was born straight, and that homo-
sexuality is a practice to which people are lured.9 
The above survey report notes the existence of a strong relationship between 
a country’s religiosity and opinions about homosexuality, with usually far less 
acceptance being recorded in countries where religion was central to peo-
ple’s lives, and conversely more widespread acceptance of homosexuality in 
countries where religion was less central to people’s lives.10 Hence, religious 
bodies are vocal in the attack on homosexuality in Nigeria.11 Former President 
Olusegun Obasanjo had said of homosexuality during his presidency ‘Such 
a tendency is clearly un-Biblical, unnatural and definitely un-African’ and 
was therefore ‘totally unacceptable’.12 Statements like these have the effect of 
endorsing criminalization and abuse. 
Understanding sexuality as an innate thing in the individual will aid a better 
understanding of homosexuality and encourage tolerance for gay people. In the 
words of Adebanjo, taking time to understand gay people will sow the seeds 
necessary for change.13 It is therefore important to correct the above mindset. 
In a society such as Nigeria where the law, religion, culture and morality are 
so deeply intertwined, it may be necessary to pull at the layers of each of these 
components, to unravel the way society’s mind works. Baxter postulates that 
in determining how the law affects morality, it is expedient to ask if we have 
a moral obligation to follow the law, and conversely that in determining how 
morality affects the law, the question then becomes how relevant morality is 
in fixing the law.14 
Nigerian culture is such that seeks a spiritual angle to explain any sexual 
orientation which does not conform to the norm. Some ethnicities have been 
known to perform ‘cleansing rituals’ on homosexuals, while religious houses 
also perform exorcisms to rid people of ‘the gay spirit’.15 
Nigeria is not alone in its criminalization of same-sex relationships. Many 
African countries have held on to the belief that homosexuality is incom-
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Anti-Homosexuality Act in 2014,16 but it was declared invalid by the 
Constitutional Court of Uganda in August of the same year, on the basis 
that the required quorum was not formed before the law was passed.17 Other 
African countries which criminalized same-sex relationships include Malawi18 
and Kenya19 to mention just a few. South Africa therefore stands out for 
decriminalizing same-sex relationships on a continent where same-sex rela-
tionships are being demonized and vilified.20 
3 The Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act 2013 
The Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act 2013 is a harsh law which stifles the 
rights of Nigeria’s gay community. The UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights rightly sums up the Act in the following words:21 
Rarely have I seen a piece of legislation that in so few paragraphs directly 
violates so many basic, universal human rights. Rights to privacy and non-
discrimination, rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly, 
rights to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention: this law under-
mines all of them. In addition, the law risks reinforcing existing prejudices 
towards members of the LGBT community, and may provoke an upsurge 
in violence and discrimination. 
Comprising eight sections, the Act goes for the jugular. To clear any ambigu-
ity, the Act defines marriage and sets out parties to a valid marriage in Nigeria 
thus ‘“marriage” means a legal union entered into between persons of opposite 
sex in accordance with the Marriage Act, Islamic Law or Customary Law’.22 
As pointed out by Barnard and De Vos, refusal to let go of this ingrained idea 
could be borne out of the thought that to change the definition of marriage 
will be unnatural or even impossible.23 
Section 1 prohibits marriages or civil unions between persons of the same sex 
in Nigeria irrespective of the jurisdiction they were contracted in. Under the 
section, such unions were not entitled to benefits accruing to valid marriages.24 
The impact of this section is that valid same-sex marriages/unions of foreign 
nationals were invalid in Nigeria. Likewise, same-sex marriages of Nigerians 
conducted in foreign jurisdictions which recognize same-sex unions would not 
be recognized in Nigeria. This provision creates problems for gay foreigners 
living in Nigeria who have contracted valid unions elsewhere. Section 5(1) 
prescribes a term of 14 years imprisonment for offenders. 
Section 2 prohibits places of worship from solemnizing same-sex unions. 
No certificate issued in respect of a same-sex marriage/union will be valid in 
Nigeria.25 Section 3 goes ahead to emphasize that only a marriage contracted 
between a man and a woman shall be valid in Nigeria. 
The Act arbitrarily bans the registration of gay clubs and associations,26 and 
attaches a ten-year jail term for those found to be operating or participating in 
such.27 It also seeks to punish persons who administer or witness the solemniza-
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effectively means loved ones of the couple could be penalized just for showing 
support. 
Public shows of affection between same-sex couples are prohibited, and 
offenders are liable to ten years imprisonment.28 The use of the words ‘directly 
or indirectly’ under section 5(2) makes the interpretation of what constitutes 
‘public show’ subjective and therefore difficult. For instance, two long-lost 
friends who are genuinely happy to see each other and expressing that happi-
ness can be misconstrued to be ‘directly or indirectly’ making a public show of 
a homosexual relationship. 
While the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act has been mostly welcomed
in Nigeria, it has been greeted with disdain in the international community,
with several countries calling for its withdrawal or review.29 Noting the nega-
tive impact of the passage of the Act, Dorothy Aken’Ova, executive direc-
tor of the International Centre for Reproductive Health and Sexual Rights
observed that the Act had reawakened interest in communities to rid the
country of gay people and gay tendencies, and had driven many gay peo-
ple ‘into the closet’.30 Arrests of suspected gay people multiplied, with rights
activists having to go underground and several gay people seeking asylum in
foreign countries.31 
Juxtaposed with the South African regime, inadequacies in the Nigerian 
system become glaring. Not only has South Africa decriminalized homosexual-
ity, it has actively tried to protect the rights of its gay population. In addition 
to expressly legislating to protect their fundamental rights, the introduction 
of the Civil Union Act is another step towards this aim. It must be pointed 
out however that even though the South African Civil Union Act confers 
full marriage rights on qualifying same-sex couples, it has been criticized for 
a number of reasons, a major one being that it is perceived to have unneces-
sarily complicated South Africa’s family law system by favouring heterosexual 
couples to marry under both the Marriage Act and the Civil Union Act, but 
presenting same-sex couples with only the option of a civil union under the 
Civil Union Act.32 
Nigeria needs to urgently review its anti-gay law and decriminalize same-
sex relationships. This would be a good place to start showing tolerance and 
acceptance of its gay population and to recognize their struggles. 
4 The non-conformity of Nigeria’s anti-gay 
stance with Human Rights principles. 
The protection of the right of sexual minorities has been of paramount interest 
for international and regional bodies in recent times. The rationale for this has 
been eloquently set out by the UN thus: 
The case for extending the same rights to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
transgender (LGBT) persons as those enjoyed by everyone else is neither 
radical nor complicated. It rests on two fundamental principles that under-
pin international human rights law: equality and non-discrimination33 
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The UN Human Rights Council adopted resolution 17/19,34 which was the 
first of its kind from the UN on issues pertaining to human rights, sexual ori-
entation and gender identity. It mandated the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights to commission a study documenting discriminatory law and 
practices and acts of violence against people based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity, and how international human rights law could aid in put-
ting an end to violence and other HR violations in this regard. In September 
2016, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 32/2, which also sought, 
among other things, to protect sexual minorities from violence and discrimina-
tion, and to appoint an independent expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity. This shows a commitment at the international level to enforce the 
protection of the rights of sexual minorities. Also, General Comments such 
as General Comment No 22 of 2016 which will be discussed in further detail 
below support this assertion. Attempts at regional level will also be examined 
further into the chapter. 
As a State Party to numerous international human rights instruments, 
Nigeria has an obligation to comply and ensure compliance with the provisions 
of these instruments. The 2013 Act violates regional and international princi-
ples of fundamental human rights. these include the right to privacy, dignity, 
health, equality and non-discrimination, and the right to found a family. 
4.1 The right to privacy and family life 
Section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution guarantees the right to privacy and 
family life to all citizens.35 It provides ‘The privacy of citizens, their homes, 
correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is 
hereby guaranteed and protected’. 
This right is guaranteed to every individual, and everyone should be able 
to enjoy it, irrespective of their sexual orientation. The Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights (Universal Declaration)36 and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also guarantee this right.37 Hence, the 
constant harassment of gay people and the compulsion to ‘out’ them is an inva-
sion of this right. 
The right to privacy has been argued successfully in cases such as Toonen 
v Australia,38 and Norris v Ireland.39 In the Toonen case, Nicholas Toonen was 
a homosexual living in Tasmania, Australia who challenged the criminaliza-
tion of homosexuality in Tasmania.40 Toonen sent a communication to the 
Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR arguing that section 122(a) and (c) 
and section 123 of the Criminal Code of Tasmania which criminalized sexual 
contact between men violated his rights to privacy (Article 17 of the ICCPR) 
and non-discrimination (Article 26).41 He lost his job during the pendency of 
the case. 
Tasmania alleged that issues of morality should be regarded as being domes-
tic decisions for individual governments, and that the provisions in ques-
tion could help prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS.42 On the first issue, the 
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Committee noted that there was danger in allowing such an argument to stand, 
because doing so would cause several laws which interfered with privacy to be 
withdrawn from the Committee’s jurisdiction.43 It observed that the Australian 
government had on its part already conceded that criminalizing homosexuality 
had the opposite effect i.e. it caused gay people, who were most vulnerable to 
HIV/AIDS to go into hiding for fear of discrimination.44 The Committee also 
stated that Tasmania had failed to show any connection between continued 
criminalization of homosexuality and the effective control of the spread of 
HIV/AIDS.45 
Agreeing with Toonen, the Committee found sections 122 and 123 of 
Tasmania’s Criminal Code to be in violation of the complainant’s right to 
privacy.46 As a result of this case, Tasmania overhauled its discriminatory law 
while the whole country was forced to commence a review of its laws. 
Similarly, in Norris v Ireland which was brought before the European Court 
of Human Rights, the ECHR held that the Irish law criminalizing same-sex 
relationships between consenting adults was in violation of the right to private 
and family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention. 
The right to family life is an offshoot of the right to privacy. It is guaranteed 
under Article 16 of the Universal Declaration and Article 23 of the ICCPR. In 
Valianatos and others v Greece,47 the ECHR held that the legal recognition given 
to civil partnerships of different-sex couples to the exclusion of same sex cou-
ples was incompatible with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The requirement is that the contracting parties must be of full age and 
must have given their free and full consent. 
4.2 The right to dignity 
Section 34 of the Nigerian Constitution recognizes the right to dignity for 
every individual. Section 34(1)(a) provides 
Every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person, and 
accordingly – 
(a) No person shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment 
The right to dignity is also preserved under the Universal Declaration (Articles 
1 and 5), the ICCPR (Article 7) and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights (the Banjul Charter) (article 5). 
Resolution 275 adopted at the 55th Ordinary Session of the African 
Commission in Luanda, Angola in 2014 specifically emphasizes the right to 
dignity for sexual minorities in Africa.48 Re-emphasizing the relevant provi-
sions of the African Charter,49 the Commission condemned the spike in vio-
lence against sexual minorities, and called on State Parties to put an end to all 
acts of violence and abuse against sexual minorities, ensure proper investiga-
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working judicial procedures while providing an enabling environment for 
activists to work in. 
The decisions of the African Commission in Curtis Doebbler v Sudan50 and 
Abdel Hadi, Ali Radi and ors v Repubic of Sudan51 are instructive on the right 
to dignity and freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment as pre-
served under Article 5 of the Banjul Charter. The complainants in the Doebbler
case were university students on a picnic in Buri, Khartoum.52 While the picnic 
was ongoing, the police and other security agents swooped in on them, alleging 
that their dressing and actions were in violation of ‘public order’ under Sudan’s 
Criminal Law.53 In addition to paying fines, they were sentenced to between 
25 and 40 lashes using a wire and plastic whip which leaves permanent scars.54 
This whipping was carried out in public, with the women receiving theirs on 
their bare backs.55 At its 33rd Ordinary Session in Niamey, Niger in May 2003, 
the African Commission held that the provision on torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment must be interpreted as widely as possible to encompass the 
widest array of physical and mental abuses possible.56 Finding Sudan to be in 
violation of Article 5, the Commission requested that the Sudanese govern-
ment amend the offending provisions of its Criminal Law, that it abolish the 
penalty of lashes, and compensate the complainants. In Abdel Hadi Ali Radi and 
ors, a case involving the alleged torture of Sudanese IDPs by the police, the 
Commission found that the actions of the police were of such a serious nature 
that it attained the threshold of severity as to amount to torture.57 
There has been flagrant disregard for the right to dignity of gay people in 
Nigeria. They are regularly harassed, tortured and publicly shamed. Michael 
Ighodaro is just one of the many victims of homophobic attacks. Michael told 
his story in a 2017 interview with a reporter from the Independent Newspapers 
UK.58 He had been attacked by anti-gay vigilantes while waiting for a taxi out-
side his friend’s home in the city of Abuja. This attack was predicated on his 
being featured in an article about an AIDS conference he had attended and 
facilitated in 2012. On that fateful day, Michael’s attackers beat him blue-black 
and burnt his house and property. Worse still, he chose not to seek proper 
medical treatment, as he did not want anyone to know the cause of the attack. 
The sad story of Olumide Olubunmi Akinnifesi is another which reflects 
the horrors that gay people go through in Nigeria. Akinnifesi was attacked 
in broad daylight by a mob in Ondo State, South West Nigeria in February 
2016 for being gay.59 Sadly, he succumbed to his injuries the following day, 
and to date his attackers have not been brought to book. His case will be 
reviewed in further detail below. 
In its 2016 publication ‘Tell Me Where I Can Be Safe’ – The Impact of Nigeria’s 
Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, Human Rights Watch (HRW)60 docu-
mented several cases of harassment and torture of gay people. HRW conducted 
both face-to-face and telephonic interviews with many victims. One of such 
victims was George who described the humiliation he and others were put 
through following their arrest at a gathering thus:61 
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… We were all squeezed into the van, sitting on each other’s laps. 
Immediately when we arrived at Apata police station [Ibadan], the police 
told us to take our clothes off. We had only underwear – boxer shorts – 
on. The police ... told us to stand in front of the condoms, and gave one 
of the guys a board written: ‘21 gay men suspected’. Pictures were taken, 
the police had called a commercial photographer to take the pictures, but 
this is normal practice in Nigeria. 
Another gay man who was also a victim of police brutality told HRW a sor-
did tale of humiliation, degradation and extortion. Oscar and his friends were 
beaten up at the police station, forced to strip and photographed. Before their 
release, they were loaded onto the back of an open police jeep and paraded 
around the city.62 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa weighed in on the right to dig-
nity of gay people in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Min. of 
Justice and others, where it held that criminalization of same-sex relationships 
violates the right to dignity,63 and noted that the constitutional protection of 
human dignity required that the value and worth of all individuals as members 
of the society be acknowledged.64 In 2014, the African Commission adopted 
a resolution condemning all forms of violence based on sexual orientation, 
deeming them to be human rights violations, most especially the right to life 
and dignity as guaranteed under the Banjul Charter.65 The Commission also 
condemned the persecution of persons based on their sexual orientation or 
gender identity.66 
4.3 The right to equality and non-discrimination 
The provisions of the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act is in direct contra-
diction to the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution and other human right 
instruments on the right to equality and non-discrimination. Section 42 of 
Nigeria’s Constitution protects the right to equal treatment and non-discrimi-
nation. Section 42(1)(a) states as follows: 
A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of 
origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he 
is such a person 
(a) Be subjected…to disabilities or restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria 
of other communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex, religion or 
political opinions are not made subject; 
The above section does not expressly prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, like the South African Constitution does. Nigeria has however 
ratified the Banjul Charter,67 article 2 of which prohibits discrimination on 
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enjoyment of rights which are found in the ICESCR, the Committee on 
ESCR has held that these grounds include HIV status and sexual orientation. 
It is suggested that Nigeria update its constitution to reflect the right to non-
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Section 9(3) and (4) of the South
African Constitution – which is the non-discrimination provision – can be used
as a guide in this regard. Section 9(3) of the South African Constitution provides: 
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against any-
one on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, dis-
ability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
Section 9(3) is all encompassing. By expressly including sexual orientation in its 
provision on non-discrimination, South Africa sends out a clear statement on 
its position on the individual’s right to their sexuality. 
A change can be effected in the Nigerian Constitution by inserting the term 
‘sexual orientation’ as one of the grounds listed in section 42(1). An example 
would be: 
A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of ori-
gin, sex, sexual orientation, religion or political opinion shall not, by reason 
only that he is such a person … 
Yet still, if the idea of expressly providing for the protection of people’s fun-
damental rights with regards to sexual orientation is too inconceivable, Nigeria 
could borrow a leaf from the wordings of Article 2 of the Banjul Charter which 
includes the phrase ‘or other status’. As reiterated by Murray and Viljoen, the 
inclusion of ‘such as’ and other status clearly shows that the list in article 2 is 
not exhaustive.68 This phrase has been stated to include sexual orientation.69 
Taking such action will be in line with the directive of the African Commission 
in Resolution 275 that all States enact and apply appropriate laws prohibiting 
and punishing all forms of violence, including violence against sexual minori-
ties, and that of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Committee on ESCR) in General Comment 22 to the effect that to real-
ize the right to sexual and reproductive health, states must first address laws, 
institutional arrangements and social practices which prevent individuals from 
effectively enjoying their sexual and reproductive health.70 As noted by the 
Committee, the right to sexual and reproductive health is indivisible from and 
interdependent with other rights,71 hence it must be provided for. 
The all-encompassing phrase ‘or other status’ mentioned above could be 
applied in redrafting section 42(1). Section 42(1)(a) would then read like this: 
A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, Place of 
origin, sex, religion, political opinion or other status shall not by reason only 
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This way, the fundamental rights of sexual minorities to equality and non-dis-
crimination could be guaranteed by the Nigerian Constitution without assault-
ing the sensibilities of core traditional, moral or religious anti-gay adherents i.e. 
the rights of homosexuals to non-discrimination can be preserved without the 
words ‘sexual orientation’ being expressly incorporated into the Constitution. 
This is one of the ways that the elusive ‘middle ground’ could be achieved in 
Nigeria. For this to be achievable though, same-sex relationships first have 
to be decriminalized. It is important to stress that this is by no means a call 
to outrightly legalize same-sex relationships. Rather, it is a way of reaching a 
compromise between both extremes. 
In addition to Article 2, Articles 3, 18 and 19 of the Banjul Charter pro-
vide for the right to equality and non-discrimination for all persons. Murray 
and Viljoen are of the opinion that the use of the inclusive phrases ‘such as’ 
and ‘other status’ in article 2 suggests that the drafters foresaw and indeed left 
room for an expansion of grounds under the article.72 They also put forward 
another interesting argument that ‘sex’ as used in article 2 of the Banjul Charter 
could be understood to include sexual orientation as well, but were quick to 
concede that such an expansive definition could militate against the more com-
mon understanding of the term ‘sex’.73 Be that as it may, the position of the 
Commission on the right to equality and non-discrimination is clear. 
Article 28 also imposes a duty on the individual to respect others without
discrimination and to promote, safeguard and reinforce mutual respect and
tolerance of all others. In the same vein, articles 1 and 2 of the Universal
Declaration in upholding the right to equality and non-discrimination,
reiterate that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights. Article 7 of the Universal Declaration provides further for equality
before the law and equal protection without any discrimination. Likewise,
Articles 2, 3 and 26 of the ICCPR also guarantee the right to equality and
non-discrimination. 
Resolution 275 strongly condemned the persistence of discrimination and
violence against sexual minorities, noting the failure of law enforcement agen-
cies and states generally to address these issues. It has also been lauded for
addressing the worsening incidence of discrimination and attacks on sexual
minorities and activists and for negating the pervading notion that homo-
sexuality is ‘un-African’.74 In its Concluding Observations to Nigeria, the
Commission condemned Nigeria’s Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act for
its potential to engender violence against sexual minorities in the country,
and to drive underground this group which is particularly vulnerable to HIV/ 
AIDS.75 
In Young v Australia,76 where the applicant had brought a complaint before 
the Human Rights Committee with regards to Australia’s veterans’ entitle-
ments law wherein homosexual veterans were not entitled to the same pension 
as other veterans, the Committee found Australia to be in violation of Article 
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4.4 The right to health 
The right to health is another fundamental right which criminalization of same-
sex relationships continues to undermine. Criminalization leads to discrimina-
tion and stigmatization, driving sexual minorities underground and making it 
difficult for them to access HIV prevention programmes or treatment, with 
devastating consequences.77 
Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration provides that ‘everyone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and
of his family including … medical care and other social services…’. Likewise,
article 16(1) of the Banjul Charter guarantees the right for every individual to
enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health, while Article 16(2)
enjoins state parties to take necessary measures to protect the health of their citi-
zens and to ensure that they receive medical attention when needed. 
The Human Rights Committee has noted the connection between crimi-
nalization of homosexuality and the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS among 
homosexuals.78 As noted in its Concluding Observations to Nigeria above, 
criminalizing homosexuality drives the very people who are most vulnerable 
to HIV/AIDs underground, making it even more difficult to effectively tackle 
the pandemic.79 Gay men and other men who have sex with men have been 
recognized as one of the three major groups driving up the country’s HIV/ 
AIDS numbers, with an HIV prevalence of 23%.80 A study on the impact of 
the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act on the healthcare-seeking behaviour 
of men who have sex with men in Abuja showed that the introduction of the 
Act negatively affected the healthcare-seeking behaviour of participants, due to 
the fear of discrimination and stigmatization.81 
4.5 Freedom of assembly 
This is another fundamental right that has been trampled upon by Nigeria’s 
anti-gay law. Section 4(1) of the 2013 Act prohibits the registration of gay 
clubs, societies and organizations, while section 5(2) prescribes a jail term of ten 
years for anyone who registers, operates or participates in gay clubs, societies or 
organizations. This means sexual minorities are banned from forming associa-
tions to fight for their cause or advance their rights. 
Shockingly, the Act goes further to impose liability on individuals who 
administer, witness or support the joining of same sex couples, or who support 
the ‘registration, operation and sustenance of gay clubs, societies, organiza-
tions, processions or meetings’ in Nigeria.82 Under the section, a jail term of 
ten years awaits such people on conviction. This is a mindless erosion of fun-
damental rights. In effect, families and friends who show support for gay people 
can be arrested and jailed for doing so. The same fate awaits licenced marriage 
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This freedom is guaranteed under section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. 
Section 40 entitles every person to ‘assemble freely and associate with other 
persons’, and to form or belong to any association for the protection of his 
interests. Thus, in terms of the section, gay people are entitled to form associa-
tions if they so wish to protect or advance their interests. To take this right away 
is to undermine their constitutional rights. The provisions of the Constitution 
are superior to any other law, and where there is a clash between the provisions 
of the Constitution and any other law, the Constitution will prevail.83 
In addition to the Nigerian Constitution, the freedom of association and 
assembly is also guaranteed under Article 20(1) of the Universal Declaration, 
Articles 21 and 22 of ICCPR and Articles 10 and 11 of the Banjul Charter. 
Nigeria’s stance under the 2013 Act is incompatible with its very own 
Constitution as well as its obligations as a state party to the above human rights 
instruments. In its Concluding Observations on Nigeria’s 5th periodic Report 
on the implementation of the African Charter,84 the Commission called on 
Nigeria to review its Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, put an end to 
discrimination against sexual minorities, ensure the protection of their rights,85 
and put in place measures to ensure freedom of expression.86 
5 Case studies from Nigeria 
Several examples abound of Nigerians who have suffered injustice for no other 
reason than being gay. Two of such cases will be considered briefly under this 
heading. 
5.1 Olumide Olubunmi Akinnifesi 
One of the most heartrending of all is that of Olumide Olubunmi Akinnifesi, 
who was viciously attacked by a mob in Ondo State on 17 February 2016, 
and who died as a result of that attack.87 Olumide was allegedly caught pants 
down with another man. Badly beaten and left for dead, he died the following 
day from internal bleeding. Fearing for his life, Olumide’s alleged lover went 
into hiding. There were reports of harassment, and vandalism experienced by 
the families of the two men, and of people leaving offensive comments on 
Olumide’s Facebook page. Even in death, Olumide was targeted by the anti-
gay brigade. 
5.2 Michael Ighodaro 
Michael’s story has been briefly discussed above.88 In a sit-down with The 
Independent Newspapers, Michael detailed how he was kicked out of his fam-
ily home at the age of 17, dropped out of school and forced to survive on 
the streets, for no other reason than because he was gay. He was attacked and 
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Nigeria, and his house and property burnt. He was forced to flee the country 
and seek asylum in the United States. 
These are just two of the many gay men who have experienced the full force
of the homophobic wrath of Nigerians. Some like Michael, have lived to tell their
stories. Sadly, others like Olumide have not been so lucky. The introduction of
the 2013 Act further exacerbated the problem. In its 2016 publication discussed
above, Human Rights Watch documented several instances of persecution expe-
rienced by gay people in Nigeria. No individual should be treated in the manner
in which Nigeria’s sexual minorities are being treated. The 2013 Act would seem
to have put the seal of approval on their degradation and dehumanization. 
6 Lessons in tolerance – The Father Paul Kelly example. 
It has previously been argued that in the absence of an immediate acceptance 
of same-sex relationships, Nigeria as a country can shift ground to the extent 
that same-sex relationships are decriminalized, and fundamental rights of gay 
people in the country are not being violated.89 
There is no better guidance on the possibility of finding a middle ground in 
the clash between religion and gay rights than the story of Father Paul Kelly. 
Father Paul is an Australian Catholic priest who gained national popularity for 
his role in the movement to abolish the homosexual advance defence (also 
known as the ‘gay panic’ defence or the partial defence) in Queensland.90 The 
bill to remove the gay panic defence was passed on 20 March 2017. 
The background story was that following an altercation on 3 July 2008 in 
Maryborough, Queensland, Wayne Ruks, an alleged gay man had been beaten 
and left to die by two men on the grounds of St Mary’s Catholic Church.91 The 
attack had been caught on the church’s CCTV cameras. At their trial, the men 
alluded to the homosexual advance defence to show provocation in terms of 
section 304 of the Queensland Criminal Code, thereby getting manslaughter 
convictions as opposed to murder. The partial defence of provocation found 
in section 304 reduces criminal responsibility for murder to manslaughter, and 
had created a loophole whereby people accused of murder could claim provo-
cation due to an unwanted sexual advance.92 This defence was used for the first 
time in Australia in R v Murley,93 and had been controversially entrenched in
Green v the Queen where the court had found, on appeal, that sexual advances 
of a non-violent nature were sufficient to establish provocation.94 
A month after the attack on Ruks, another man, Stephen Ward, who 
was a hitchhiker was also bashed to death and his body dumped close to 
Maryborough.95 Ward’s attacker also relied on the ‘gay panic’ defence, claim-
ing that Ward had made a sexual advance at him.96 At the time of these two 
murders, the defence had been abolished in all jurisdictions in Australia, except 
Queensland and South Australia. 
To Father Paul, these two incidents occurring so close to each other, sig-
nified a call to action. He then created a Change.org petition, which gained 
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almost 290,000 signatures.97 On why he took up the campaign to change the 
law, Father Paul said:98 
The more I thought about it, I thought, this didn’t make any sense. It got 
me fired up. I realised that this really was a terrible loophole and should 
be closed. 
Father Paul has been celebrated for the role he has played in changing the 
law,99 even being referred to as an LGBTI hero.100 Drawing from some of the 
teachings of Pope John Paul II, the priest has however said that stopping the 
homosexual advance defence ‘is the gospel’. In his words ‘this is real Christian 
teaching. They make it about homophobia when I’m trying to protect human 
dignity’.101 The priest acknowledged that his fight to put an end to the gay 
panic defence could be confused with fighting for gay rights, and has clarified 
that he remained aligned to the church’s view on same-sex marriage.102 For 
Father Paul, the aim ultimately was to put an end to laws that tolerated vio-
lence against particular groups.103 
It is remarkable that no religious leader in Nigeria has spoken out against the 
unending attacks on homosexuals in the country or tried to call their followers 
to order. Rather, they have been vocal in condemning sexual minorities, fuel-
ling the raging homophobia in the country. Nigeria can learn a lot from Father 
Paul Kelly with regard to showing respect, compassion and tolerance for the 
causes of gay people. He has shown that it is possible to accept and understand 
others whose orientation or beliefs are different from the norm without out-
rightly supporting their orientation or beliefs. 
It is submitted that the journey to changing attitudes towards sexual minori-
ties begins with trying to understand them and their struggles. The words of 
His Lordship, Justice Ackerman in the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality case104 to the effect that ‘To understand “the other” one must try as 
far as is humanly possible, to place oneself in the position of “the other”’ are of 
great significance to this discussion. 
7 Conclusion and recommendations 
This chapter has discussed Nigeria’s Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act 
2013 in detail, and has examined how the Act, and Nigeria’s other anti-gay 
laws encroach on the fundamental rights of gay people in Nigeria. It has shown 
how religious and cultural influences have shaped the demonization of same-
sex relationships in Nigeria. 
The chapter has also proposed ways in which a compromise can be reached 
between the two extremes i.e. respecting the rights of sexual minorities with-
out necessarily legalizing same-sex relationships. Although this could be con-
sidered as taking baby steps by the liberal world, it would be considered a 
major victory for gay activists and the gay community in Nigeria. 
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To show that a compromise is possible in the midst of cultural, moral or 
religious sentiments, the chapter has discussed the inspirational story of Rev. 
Father Paul Kelly as a lesson in tolerance in spite of opposing beliefs. Following 
in the priest’s footsteps in this regard will change the perception of homosexu-
ality in Nigeria. 
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Botswana has seen a steady rise in progressive decisions on the rights of LGBTI 
persons. Most markedly, in a unanimous decision poised to set the pace for 
juridical recognition of LGBTI rights in Africa, the Botswana High Court 
decriminalized same-sex sexual practices between consenting adults in private.1 
The Court in Letsweletse Motshidiemang v Attorney General, determined that the 
‘regulation of conduct deemed indecent, done in private between consent-
ing adults, is a violation of the constitutional rights to privacy and liberty’. In 
another landmark ruling, the Botswana Court of Appeal affirmed the consti-
tutional rights of LGBTI persons to assembly, association and expression and 
asserted that equal protection of the law extended to everyone without distinc-
tion. Similarly, in ND v Attorney General (the Gender marker case), the High 
Court found that a refusal by the Registrar of National Registration to change 
the gender marker on a transgender (trans) applicant’s identity document had 
interfered with his constitutional rights. This was a momentous decision that 
allowed trans people to alter their official identity documents to align them 
with their experiences of gender (legal gender recognition).
It remains apparent however, that progressive judgements alone, outside the 
backing of a comprehensive legislative or policy framework, are inadequate for 
the protection of rights. Moreover, approaches that fail to consider the lived 
experiences of the wider community beyond individual applicants can add bar-
riers to the realization of rights. In the Gender marker case for example, based 
on the applicants’ circumstances, the Court made gender-affirming surgery and 
hormonal therapy prerequisites for legal gender recognition notwithstanding 
the restricted access to such services within the Botswana public health man-
agement system. This effectively excludes self-identified trans people who have 
not transitioned medically from legal recognition.
This chapter explores the implication of the Gender marker case on the lives 
of trans persons in Botswana. It proposes more inclusive approaches to legal 
gender recognition that safeguard plurality and diversity. The chapter consid-
ers the different discursive models on trans identities, including the historical 
conceptions of gender diversity in Africa broadly and in Botswana. It critically 
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analyzes the Gender marker case unpacking the inherent biases in the Court’s 
approach. The case is evaluated using identity-based critiques of dominant cul-
tural practices to show how it reinforced exclusionary norms. 
2 Part I: Understanding trans identities 
While it is common to assume that being trans involves some kind of medi-
cal procedure or treatment, many trans people either cannot afford to transi-
tion medically or opt not to.2 Furthermore, access to appropriate and adequate 
hormone therapy and surgery in Africa is often difficult. A 2015 report by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) indicates that there are still very few 
appropriate and accessible health services available to trans patients.3 This is 
often due to a lack of professional training and relevant health system standards. 
For trans people who wish to transition medically, the lack of access to gender-
affirming services can contribute to feelings of dysphoria. As a result, some 
trans persons reportedly self-administer hormones obtained through illicit 
sources without medical supervision or guidance.4 This can result in a myriad 
of health complications and contribute to poor mental health and increased 
exposure to sexual risk.5 In a context where medical transition is a requirement 
for legal gender recognition, the lack of access to gender affirming treatment 
can present an insurmountable barrier. 
Trans activists advocate that there should not be any qualifications placed on 
the term ‘transgender’ based on the ability to pass for another gender or societal 
standards of appearance, hormone levels or the state of one’s genitals.6 This is 
an important assertion as such qualification results in the erasure of the distinc-
tiveness of the community. However, many people, including mental health 
professionals, still view the society as a strict binary composed of biological 
men and women. This is presented through the strict socio-political classi-
fication of gender as either male or female. This gender essentialist approach 
leaves little room for gender fluidity or for non-conformity and can result in 
precarious legal statuses for individuals who have not undergone any physical 
alterations resulting in institutional discrimination. 
2.1 History of the medical conceptualization of trans identities 
Many terms used to describe trans people today were virtually unknown or not 
in existence as recent as ten years ago. In fact, most terms widely used then are 
now considered outdated or offensive. Like homosexuality, the medical study 
of gender diversity began in earnest in the 19th century albeit with a conflation 
of gender identity and sexual orientation.7 The attribution of gender variance 
as a psychopathology has been credited to Krafft-Ebing (1886); however, the 
‘surgical construction’ of gender was popularized by George Jorgensten who 
went to Denmark as a man and returned to the United States as a trans woman 
in 1967.8 Many physicians and psychiatrists at the time perceived transness 
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in this cultural context that research on gender identity made its way into 
scientific analysis. Despite these prevailing negative framings, physicians like 
Harry Benjamin are credited for popularizing the term ‘transsexual’ as it is 
currently understood and for raising awareness on trans identities within the 
medical profession.10 Benjamin was among the first physicians to experiment 
with hormonal and surgical therapy for the treatment of individuals with gen-
der dysphoria.11 
Modern medicine and psychology remain at the forefront of investigation 
on trans identities and medical experts continue to shape perceptions on gen-
der diversity.12 This stems from the conception of medicine as authoritative, 
thorough and objective although historically, medicine has been manipulated 
to perpetuate oppression such as justifying slavery. Similarly, influences of 
oppositional sexism and essentialist assumptions about the connection between 
sex and gender continue to be evident in medical discourses about gender 
identity.13 The pathologization of trans experiences still plays a role in rein-
forcing gender hierarchies and disparities between normative genders and 
non-normative identities.14 Trans people throughout the world continue to 
have their access to basic human rights curtailed or denied on that basis.15 
While some physicians have demonstrated a commitment to creating a safer, 
more inclusive world for non-normative identities, others have served to erase 
them.16 The legacy of these latter experts has resulted in the perception of trans 
experiences as abnormalities and psycho-pathologies.17 They are responsible 
for the slow change in attitudes about gender and invalidating the authenticity 
of gender-variant identities. While it has been argued that the medical model 
has facilitated access to health care services for trans persons, there are many 
issues that attach to the diagnoses of trans identities as mental disorders. 
Trans people were first pathologized by the WHO through its International 
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems manual 
(ICD-9) in 1975. This is a manual used by clinicians and researchers globally to 
diagnose and categorize mental disorders. It is one of the key instruments that 
influenced views about trans persons along with the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III of 1980), published by the American 
Psychiatric Association. Both these manuals classified ‘transgenderism’ as a 
medical condition and mental disorder that could be treated through counsel-
ling, hormonal therapy, gender reassignment surgery and social and legal transi-
tion. The various editions of the DSM since DSM-III have approached gender 
diversity from the view that a discrepancy between the assigned sex (physical 
sex) and the psychological sex or gender, signal a psychiatric disorder.18 
The diagnosis of ‘gender identity disorder’ in the DSM was maintained until 
May 2019 when it was reclassified as ‘gender incongruence’ and categorized as 
‘gender dysphoria’ in DSM-V. The replacement of the diagnostic name was 
done with the aim of reducing stigma against trans people whilst ensuring clini-
cal care to persons who feel they are a different gender to their assigned sex.19 
Prior to its adoption, a Work Group on Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders 
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do so stating that this would jeopardize access to health care.20 It however, rec-
ommended the abandonment of binary terms such as ‘opposite sex’ and ‘ana-
tomic sex’ in the definitions of gender incongruence and replacing them with 
terms like ‘experienced gender’ and ‘assigned sex.21 A similar working group 
was set up by the WHO in the development of ICD-11 (Working Group on 
Sexual Disorders and Behaviours). The working group received recommenda-
tions from civil society organizations, activists and governments of member 
states to remove gender diversity from its classification of mental disorders. 
Criticisms levelled against the continued pyscho-pathologization of trans iden-
tities centred on the stigmatization that accompanies being labelled as mentally 
ill in most cultures.22 The working group acknowledged that there is substan-
tial evidence of the link between stigmatization and the classification, contrib-
uting to challenges with acquiring legal recognition, human rights abuses and 
restricted access to healthcare.23 Nonetheless, they too recommended retaining 
gender incongruence in ICD-11 to safeguard access to health.24 The principal 
difference between the two expert groups was that the WHO working group 
recommended removing gender dysphoria from categorization as a mental and 
behavioural disorder to ‘conditions related to sexual health’ whilst the DSM 
work group retained it as a mental condition. Whilst still pathologizing, the 
recommendations of the WHO working group are arguably more progressive 
and responsive to the needs and experiences of trans persons. The reclassifica-
tion of gender dysphoria as a sexual health issue rather than a mental illness is 
demonstrative of a growing sensitivity to gender diversity. Nonetheless, the 
failure to de-pathologize demonstrates a resistance to the full acceptance of 
gender variant experiences. Retaining such classification is not only stigmatiz-
ing, it makes trans people objects of science rather than autonomous subjects. 
This places medical practitioners as paternalistic gatekeepers of legal gender 
recognition. 
2.2 Trans identities in Africa 
African cultures throughout the continent have a history of recognizing 
and accepting gender non-conformity, or at the most remaining apathetic.25 
Although varying in degrees of acceptance, ‘gender crossing’ was common in 
communities like the Nigerian Hausa bori cult, the Maale of Southern Ethiopia 
and the Swahili speakers on the coast of Kenya.26 With the advent of colonial-
ism and the formulation of ‘African sexualities as primitive and backwards and 
in need of taming and civilizing’,27 attitudes grew steadily repressive. Now 
riddled with transphobia, stemming from a context which criminalizes same-
sex behaviour between consenting adults, attitudes towards the trans commu-
nity are more hostile.28 Across Africa, trans people face prevalent stigma and 
discrimination every other day, including at work, at home and using public 
facilities.29 In addition, they are continuously exposed to the threat of violence. 
Trans people are often required to disclose intimate and personal details to 
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a gender identity that is not reflected in official identity documents effectively 
denies trans people rights to citizenship.30 
The degree of recognition of trans individuals in Africa varies from country 
to country, with countries like Sudan and Mauritania being the most repres-
sive and South Africa the most progressive.31 Although many of the laws used 
are meant to punish homosexuals, they invariably affect trans people because 
of the common conflation of gender identity and sexual orientation. South 
Africa remains the only country in Africa with express legislation that recog-
nizes and protects trans persons. The Alteration of Sex Description and Sex 
Status Act of South Africa (ASDSS Act) was enacted to enable trans and inter-
sex persons undergoing gender-affirming treatment to change the names and 
gender-markers on their identity documents. The only other African country 
that has expressly affirmed the right to legal gender recognition for trans people 
is Kenya. In Republic v Kenya National Examinations Council, the Kenya High 
Court issued an order compelling the Kenya National Examinations Council 
to recall the certificate of a trans applicant and issue her with a new one bearing 
her preferred name and devoid of a gender marker. 
2.3 Trans identities in Botswana 
Like other African countries, the absence of a legal framework for the recog-
nition and protection of sexual minorities in Botswana has exacerbated social 
exclusion, stigma in social institutions and the denial of rights.32 A research 
report on the mental health and wellbeing of LGBTI people in East and 
Southern Africa, shows that trans people in Botswana experience violence 
more often than the general population.33 Similarly, experiences of sexual vio-
lence are significantly higher among trans and gender non-conforming people 
than with other sexual minorities.34 Although there is no law in Botswana 
which makes it illegal to identify as homosexual and indeed trans, and despite 
clarifications to this effect by the High Court, trans people continually face 
harassment and are subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention.35 Public officials 
have been known to use laws such as the Penal Code, which contains pro-
visions which criminalize same-sex sexual practices, to harass individuals. In 
addition, police have been known to charge trans persons under offences relat-
ing to nuisance, idle and disorderly conduct and vagrancy, especially those who 
are also sex workers. In 2019, however, the Botswana High Court declared 
sections 164 and 165 of the Penal Code ultra vires the Constitution as they 
violate rights to privacy and liberty. The Attorney General has filed an appeal 
on the basis that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by overruling the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Kanane v the State which fortified the notion 
that Batswana are not ready to embrace homosexuality. 
The Rainbow Identity Association of Botswana (RIA), an organization
that advocates for the recognition and inclusion of trans and intersex per-
sons in Botswana, has noted some of the challenges faced by trans persons in
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stakeholder report submitted to the second cycle of the Universal Periodic
Review of Botswana, RIA noted that the procedure for legal gender recog-
nition is unsystematic and unclear.36 It criticized the requirement on appli-
cants to submit to courts, medical reports concerning their gender identity
without the benefit of the cooperation of the Ministry of Health.37 In addi-
tion, Botswana does not offer gender affirming surgery as part of national
health services. Hormone therapy is available at government hospitals but
given at the discretion of medical practitioners who often display transphobic
attitudes and consider being trans a lifestyle choice rather than an inherent
part of identity.38 
3 Part II: A critical analysis of the case 
The Court in the Gender marker case was seized with a challenge by a trans
man, against the refusal to alter the gender marker on his national identity
document (omang) to reflect his self-identified gender. The applicant who had
been diagnosed with gender identity disorder (gender dysphoria), had under-
gone hormonal therapy and gender affirming surgery to make his body con-
gruent with his gender identity. These procedures altered his physical and
outward appearance and gave him a masculine appearance. Because of the
divergence in the information contained in his omang and his physical appear-
ance, the applicant applied to have his gender marker altered. The request
was denied on the basis that sex assigned at birth determines the contents of
one’s omang. The applicant then lodged an application with the High Court
arguing that the refusal violated his constitutional rights to equal protection
of the law, right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment, right
to privacy, right to freedom of expression and the right to protection from
discrimination. The Registrar of National Registration (Registrar) argued that
his wide-ranging discretion was limited in this case as Botswana employed a
system where sex was determined at birth. He argued that identity documents
issued by the state reflect sex and not gender identity and that the applicant
sought to change his sex and not gender. He argued further, that there was no
conclusive medical or legal position that could determine when a person’s sex
has changed. The Registrar argued that the law did not make provision for
such changes and in the absence of an enabling statute the change could not
be allowed. He insisted that the decision to undergo gender re-orientation was
that of the applicant and as result no state responsibility arose. On violation
of rights, he stated that by denying the application, he was in fact, upholding
the applicant’s right to equal treatment and freedom from discrimination as he
does not register and change particulars based on individual desires alone or
coupled ‘with an unproven medical or legal threshold as to what constitutes a
change in particulars’. 
In response to the Registrar’s submissions, the Court observed that an exer-
cise of discretion should consider all the relevant circumstances to make a 
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include the medical evidence presented plus the recommendations made by 
physicians that the gender marker should be altered to align it with his male 
identity. The Court noted that the National Registration Act (the Act), which 
allows for changes in particulars, does not state whether the changes to a per-
son’s particulars should be involuntary or can be ‘self-inflicted’. Rejecting the 
argument that the absence of a law on legal gender recognition meant that the 
change could not be made, the Court cited comparative case law which estab-
lishes that in the absence of legislative guidance, courts must take into account 
medical evidence establishing the gender of the applicant. The Court found 
that the state has a duty to uphold the fundamental rights of every person and 
to promote tolerance, acceptance and diversity within a constitutional democ-
racy. It found that this includes taking all necessary legislative, administrative 
and other measures to ensure that procedures exist for all state-issued identity 
documents which reflect a person’s gender or sex to reflect their self-defined 
gender. It found that having an identity document that correctly reflects self-
identified gender is fundamental to the right to dignity and freedom of expres-
sion. The Court expressed that by permitting changes to gender markers, the 
Registrar would be giving effect to the spirit and purport of the Constitution 
and extending much-needed help to vulnerable trans persons. It found that 
non-recognition of the applicant’s gender identity denied him equal protec-
tion of the law, thereby leaving him extremely vulnerable to harassment and 
violence in both public and private spheres. It observed that this can result in 
extreme discrimination in all societal spaces, especially in the areas of employ-
ment, education and healthcare. 
3.1 Significance of the case 
This case gave legal gender recognition to trans people in Botswana in a context
rife with systematic exclusion of non-normative identities. Faced with arguments
that changing the applicant’s gender marker would compromise the integrity of
the National Identification Register, the Court stayed faithful to its role in the
protection of rights and stated that rights could not be limited on the basis of
mere conjecture and speculation. The Court applied a liberal construction of
the Act, opening up its interpretation to include self-determined gender, albeit
supported by medical evidence. In arriving at its decision, the Court considered
the prevalent discrimination, stigma and harassment faced by trans people whose
gender identity is not recognized. In this regard, the Court emphasized the state’s
and indeed wider society’s duty to respect and uphold the individual right to
dignity notwithstanding any difference in views. Furthermore, the Court took
note that sex cannot always be accurately identified at birth and must be viewed
in light of gender identity. Responding to the scarcity of local authorities on
gender identity, the Court opened itself to guidance from jurisprudence from
international comparative case law and referred to international human rights
instruments and related documents. This demonstrates a growing judicial open-
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allowed the Court to interpret the Constitution as a living document that grows
and evolves in response to the changing needs and values of society. 
3.2 Critique of the case 
A critical interrogation of the decision exposes some inherent biases which 
disregarded the complexity of gender identity and the diversity of the trans 
community. The principal critique of the case is that it had the effect of 
pathologizing trans people and perpetuating the perception that they suffer 
from mental conditions. It further created a restrictive medical criterion for 
legal gender recognition that disregards autonomy to self-determine gender. 
By placing emphasis on the applicant’s physical and outward appearance and 
expression, the Court made the physical embodiment of, or ‘passing’ for the 
gender one identifies as, a requirement for legal gender recognition. This is a 
restrictive and exclusionary criterion that reinforced gender binaries and cis-
normative biases which benefit those who fit into dominant ideas of what it 
means to be male or female while ignoring those who cannot afford gender 
affirming treatment or who choose not to transition medically. 
The Court’s approach comports with a theory advanced by Stella Nyanzi,39 
who in interrogating the various theoretical approaches to governing sexual-
ity makes reference to the model of the ‘charmed circle’, a sexual hierarchy
concept developed by the feminist scholar, Gayle Rubin.40 This is a meta-
phorical tool through which identity is appraised according to a hierarchical
system of sexual value influenced by religion, psychiatry, popular culture and
politics.41 The position in the value metrics determines which sexual practices
are rewarded with social approval and which ones are denigrated as vice.42 The
‘charmed circle’ comprises of ‘good’, ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ sexualities and the
‘outer limits’ include ‘bad’, abnormal’ and ‘unnatural’ sexualities.43 Individuals
whose behaviour ranks higher in the hierarchy, such as married heterosexual
reproductive couples, are rewarded with certified mental health, respectability,
legality and institutional support.44 Individuals whose sexual behaviour places
them lower on the scale are subjected to a presumption of mental illness, crim-
inality, restricted social and physical mobility and loss of institutional support.45 
Although the theory has been critiqued by various scholars, Nyanzi argues that
it is important because it helps understand how dominant ideologies construct,
control and constrain sexualities.46 She contends that it is a useful tool for
scholars of African sexualities involved in the examination of the hegemonic
control of diverse sexualities by social powers such as religious, biomedical,
heteronormative or patriarchal influences. It is evident that the Court in this
case did not escape the influences of normative understandings of gender. As
a result, it created a protected category of trans persons who by virtue of their
class and ‘passing’ privileges are proximate to what is considered ‘normal’ and
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This theory is similar to Charles Ngwena’s contention that ‘natural catego-
ries’ are used to legitimize the institutional exclusion of non-heteronormative 
sexualities.47 Charles Ngwena calls for moving from oppressive generalizations 
and capturing the sexualities of Africans in their diverse social groupings and 
individual subjectivities.48 The overriding goal, according to Ngwena, is over-
coming social or status subordination arising from sexual hierarchy-related 
exclusionary laws and practices.49 Status subordination is viewed as imposing a 
single or over-simplified group identity that ignores particularities and assumes 
a conformity of interests.50 Ngwena views the failure to see a multiplicity 
of identities or to accommodate intersectionality and struggles within social 
groups seeking affirmation as paradoxically rendering equality oppressive.51 He 
reiterates that sexuality should be understood not as sameness but as relational 
and non-hierarchical difference and that people must be able to articulate dif-
ferent needs without being required to assimilate to a normative standard.52 
The failure of the Court in this case to recognize diversity in gender expression 
resulted in a form of status subordination that necessarily dictates that those 
who seek legal gender recognition must assimilate to normative standards of 
gender. This essentially forces trans individuals seeking recognition to con-
form to performative gender norms, such as dress, mannerisms and to undergo 
medical treatment to alter their bodies or risk losing institutional support. 
A further critique of the case is that although the Court found that an
absence of laws to ensure a clear process for legal gender recognition exposed
the process to the exercise of unfettered discretion, it made no related orders
pending enactment of the necessary legislation. With the understanding that in
a constitutional democracy, courts must be wary of taking over the legislative
function and not be prescriptive in their remedial orders, the Court ought to
have provided some guidance, more so that this was an exercise in constitu-
tional adjudication. The Court as the ultimate interpreter and arbiter of the
Constitution had a duty to ensure that the rights of the wider trans commu-
nity, were effectively protected in the absence of clear legal guidance. It has
been established that the interpretation of legislation or Acts of parliament is an
interpretation of the Constitution as laws are enacted to serve the public good
or public interest. This is buttressed by section 26 of the Interpretation Act of
Botswana, which states that ‘every enactment shall be deemed remedial and for
the public good and shall receive fair and liberal construction as will best attain
its object according to its true intent and spirit’. Accordingly, the courts are
mandated to interpret the Constitution, and by extension legislation, as a living
and dynamic document of progressive human rights. In this spirit, the Botswana
Court of Appeal has held in Attorney General v Dow, that ‘the Constitution…is
meant to serve not only this generation but also generations yet unborn…the
primary duty of judges is to make the Constitution grow and develop in order
to meet the just demands and aspirations of an ever developing society…’ The
Court ought to have accorded a generous and broad interpretation of the Act























Legal recognition of transgender persons 161 
4 Part III: International human rights law & 
standards on legal gender recognition 
International human rights law makes provision for the right to legal gender 
recognition and sets standards for gender registration. The Court in the Gender 
marker case considered these standards however not in their entirety. The fol-
lowing discussion demonstrates how an extensive consideration of these stand-
ards would have benefitted the trans community in Botswana. 
4.1 The Yogyakarta Principles 
The Court referenced the Yogyakarta Principles, which are a set of 29 inter-
nationally recognized principles developed by a team of human rights experts
for the protection of the rights of LGBTI persons. They state in their definition
of gender identity that it ‘may involve if freely chosen, modification of bodily
appearance or function by medical, surgical or other means…’ (emphasis added).
Principle 3 explicitly states that, no one shall be forced to undergo medical pro-
cedures including sex reassignment surgery and hormonal therapy as a require-
ment for the legal recognition of their gender identity. In addition, the Court
had regard to the supplementary Yogyakarta Principles (YP+10). Principle 31
of the YP+10 provides for the right to change gendered information in identity
documents while gendered information is included. The principle calls on states
to ensure that official identity documents only include personal information
that is relevant, reasonable and necessary as required by the law for a legitimate
purpose, thereby ending registration of sex and gender in identity documents.
It further calls on states to ensure access to mechanisms to change names based
on the self-determination of the applicant. Where sex and gender continue to
be registered, the principle requires states to ensure access to mechanisms that
legally recognize and affirm each person’s self-identified gender identity, make
available a multiplicity of gender marker options, and ensure that no eligibility
criteria is used as a prerequisites to change information. Similarly, Principle 32
provides for the right to bodily and mental integrity, autonomy and self-deter-
mination. The YP+10 call on states to ensure access to gender affirming health-
care, provided by the public health system or if not so provided, that the costs
be covered or reimbursable under private and public health insurance schemes. 
Both sets of principles make express provision for the right to legal gender 
recognition without any eligibility criteria. They recognize that requirements 
for medical or psychological interventions as prerequisites to change name, 
legal sex or gender are unnecessary. The trans community would have ben-
efited from a liberal application of the principles to the Gender marker case. 
4.2 The United Nations human rights framework 
UN special procedures and treaty bodies have spoken out against the patholo-
gization of trans identities in legal gender recognition. In 2015, a selection of 
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UN agencies released a joint statement calling for legal gender recognition 
without stringent and abusive requirements.53 The Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Committee on ESCR), in General Comment 22, 
has also found that regulations requiring trans persons, to be treated as mental 
or psychiatric patients, or requiring that they be ‘cured’ or ‘treated’, violate 
rights to sexual and reproductive health. The Committee on ESCR further 
found that laws and policies that indirectly perpetuate coercive medical prac-
tices, including hormonal therapy and surgery or sterilization requirements for 
legal gender recognition, constitute violation of state responsibility to respect 
human rights. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has stressed 
that states must respect the physical and psychological identity of trans per-
sons by legally recognizing self-identified gender without additional require-
ments that may violate rights.54 This sentiment has been echoed by various 
treaty bodies, in their recommendations to specific countries, including the 
Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women 
which criticized Switzerland for the persistence of gender reassignment surgery 
targeting trans persons, including involuntary medical treatment. In 2017, the 
Human Rights Committee dealt with its first individual case on the right to 
legal gender recognition in G v Australia. The Committee held that Australia’s 
policy forcing married trans persons to divorce as a requirement for legal gen-
der recognition violated their rights to privacy, family life as well as the right 
to be free from discrimination. In a later review of Australia, the Committee 
stated that the state should take necessary measures to remove surgery and 
marital status requirements for sex marker changes on official documents. 
In 2017, the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrim-
ination based on SOGI stated that the prevalent practice of denying trans per-
sons recognition of their self-identified gender, even with gender realignment 
surgery, leads to violence and discrimination.55 In the report, the Independent 
Expert made an invitation to destigmatize and depathologize trans identities 
to ensure respect for all persons without distinction.56 Similarly, in 2019, the 
Independent Expert recommended that states enact gender recognition laws 
concerning the rights of trans persons to change their names and gender mark-
ers on identification documents.57 He called on states to enact procedures that 
are quick, transparent and accessible, without abusive conditions and respectful 
to the principle of free and informed choice and that of integrity.58 Although 
the 2019 report postdates the Gender marker case, it merely reinforced that 
requirements for surgical and hormonal treatments as prerequisites for legal 
gender recognition violate human rights principles. A consideration of this 
framework would have undoubtedly resulted in a different approach by the 
court in the Gender marker case. 
4.3 The African human rights system 
There is no express mention of legal gender recognition within the frame-
work of the African human rights system. However, through the issuance 
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of Resolutions, General Comments and other communications, the African 
Commission has affirmed the freedom from discrimination based on gender 
identity. Protection of trans people against violence and discrimination in 
Africa is anchored on two binding treaties: The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), 1981, and the Protocol to the African 
Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol), 2003. The 
African Charter observes the rights to equality and equal protection of the law, 
freedom from discrimination and the rights to life, dignity and integrity. The 
Maputo Protocol imposes obligations on states to take specific measures to 
combat violence against women regardless of their sexual orientation or gender 
identity. In 2014, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Commission) adopted Resolution 275, which expresses grave con-
cern about the increasing violence and other human rights violations against 
persons based on their real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity. 
The Resolution urges states to take action to stop violence and ensure adequate 
remedies are provided to victims of violence. Building on this framework, the 
African Commission included in its 60th session agenda, items pertaining to 
sexual orientation, gender identity and sex characteristics, including ‘correc-
tive’ rape to ensure protection of human rights defenders. In 2018, the African 
Commission held a joint dialogue with the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the UN human rights mechanisms on sexual orientation 
and gender identity.59 This was a follow up to a similarly themed dialogue 
held in 2015.60 The participants of the dialogue emphasized the applicability 
of human rights standards to LGBTI persons and highlighted states’ obligation 
to create an enabling environment for the effective enjoyment of rights.61 The 
Court in the Gender marker case missed an opportunity to fully operationalize 
Resolution 275. 
5 Comparative jurisprudence and legislation 
Comparative case law provides guidance on approaches to legal gender rec-
ognition that are inclusive and not burdensome. For example, the Indian 
Supreme Court in National Legal Services Authority v Union of India has found 
that self-determination of gender is an integral part of self-autonomy and self-
expression and falls within the realm of personal liberty. It found that self-iden-
tified gender can be either male or female or a third gender and that the rights 
of trans persons have to be protected irrespective of chromosomal sex, genitals, 
assigned birth sex or implied gender roles. The self-determination approach 
employed by the Court in this case demonstrates that legal gender recognition 
can be granted outside of restrictive medical requirements. Similarly in 1 B v 
R the German Federal Constitutional Court found that the requirement in 
the Civil Status Act of Germany (2007), for every person’s sex to be entered 
on the birth register, outside of the availability of a third option for intersex 
persons, was unconstitutional and amounted to discrimination based on sex. It 
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male or female deprived those who fall outside of the binary, the opportunity 
to be identified in their innate gender. The judgement has been welcomed as a 
milestone in the protection of the rights of intersex persons, for providing for a 
third gender option, a radical challenge to dominant ideas of sex and gender.62 
These two cases demonstrate an awareness of the unpredictability of sex and 
gender and that trans people are characterized by differences in gender expres-
sion and not all fit neatly into binary gender categories. An openness to gender 
diversity beyond traditional understandings of man and woman is critical for 
ensuring inclusivity and plurality. 
Like case law, different countries employ differing approaches to legisla-
tion on gender recognition. While the medical approach remains prevalent,
many countries have made a move towards the depathologization of gender
diversity. Notably, Argentina and Malta both have model laws on legal gender
recognition. The Human Rights Committee has lauded the Gender Identity
Act of Argentina (2012) as a best practice for legal gender recognition. The
law was celebrated for its simple administrative processes for modification of
sex markers without any requirements of medical diagnosis and medical treat-
ment. The Act does however, allow for access to gender affirming surgical
interventions and hormonal treatments for those who are desirous of transi-
tioning medically. It obligates the state to either provide or ensure access to
gender affirming health care. The Act requires neither judicial interventions,
nor a diagnosis with gender dysphoria, demonstrating that gender diversity
can be depathologized without hampering access to gender affirming health-
care. Similarly, the Gender Identity, Gender Expression Sex Characteristics
Act (GIGESC Act) of Malta (2015) encompasses both legal recognition and
protection against discrimination for trans and intersex persons. This radical
combination sets Malta apart from other gender identity laws. The GIGESC
recognizes the right to bodily integrity and physical autonomy as an immu-
table part of the right to gender identity. It recognizes the right to gender
identity and to be treated according to one’s gender identity, including the
right to be identified in that way in identity documents. Like the Argentinian
Act, the Act does not require proof of medical procedures. The Act also
recognizes foreign decisions on gender identity including gender markers
other than male or female or no gender at all. The GIGESC Act explicitly
denounces the pathologization of any form of gender identity or expression
and states that the nullification of classification under the ICD or any other
classification shall not impact the provision of any healthcare service related
to sex or gender negatively. Other non-pathologizing gender recognition
laws can be found in Colombia, Denmark, Ireland and Norway. These prove
that a legal and administrative framework can be established to facilitate legal
gender recognition without restrictive conditions. Borrowing from this pro-
gressive comparative legislation, Botswana can develop a framework for legal
gender recognition that not only ensures that trans people are depathologized
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5.1 Emerging models of gender recognition 
There are other emerging models to gender recognition such as ending gen-
der registration as envisaged by Principle 31 of the YP+10. The principle
calls for the curtailment of collection of gender and sex information where
possible, considering issues of national security and other legitimate con-
cerns. While acknowledging that data on gender and sex may be necessary
for national development initiatives such as ensuring gender equity, such
information can be collected without the need to include it on official iden-
tity documents. The recording and visible display of gender markers in iden-
tity document as already demonstrated, can infringe rights to privacy and
the freedom from discrimination. Furthermore, in the face of technological
advancements and the use of bio-metric data, the use of gender markers
has grown increasingly obsolete and unnecessarily invasive. There are other
means of identity verification such as the unique identification number in
omang cards which ensures robustness of the national identity system and
capturing of gendered data without express registration.63 Ending gender reg-
istration would be an important step towards building a society that accepts
gender as personal. 
Another emerging approach is the recognition of gender plurality, including 
the adoption of a third gender or ‘x’ as a viable gender marker. This ensures 
social and cultural participation for those who do not conform to normative 
conceptions of gender or who fall outside of those gender constructs. With 
the understanding that personal autonomy and self-determination are core to 
individual conceptions of gender, it follows that non-binary persons or gender 
non-conforming persons should be allowed to use gender markers that are 
representative of their gender identities. The recognition of gender plurality 
will of course necessitate a dismantling of conformist considerations of gen-
der and a deliberate effort to build understanding of plurality and acceptance 
of difference. This is important for ensuring equality before the law as well 
as equal protection of the law. Jurisprudential comparisons provide an evi-
dential basis for this assertion, especially Justice Sikri in National Legal Services 
Authority v Union of India that equality is anchored on two complementary 
principles, non-discrimination and reasonable differentiation, are particularly 
instructive. The Judge observed that equality is not just about preventing dis-
crimination, but about ending systematic discrimination. He emphasized that 
reasonable differentiation speaks to creating a gender classification that would 
accommodate non-binary gender experiences and bring them within the fold 
of rights enjoyed by traditional male and female genders. While acknowledg-
ing the administrative difficulties and uncertainties that may come with imple-
mentation of a third gender category, jurisprudential comparisons provide an 
in-depth evidential basis for learning and improving.64 Besides, administrative 
challenges cannot suffice as justification for limiting the enjoyment of rights. 
Other gender-inclusive models for gender recognition include the opt-in 
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with an ‘x’ and upon attaining the age of 16, they choose their sex descriptor.65 
This model, which comports with the self-identification approach, is premised 
on the understanding that every form of gender identity expression is legiti-
mate and therefore should be recognized.66 
Conclusion 
The Gender marker case affirmed that trans people form part of the diversity of 
Botswana and acknowledged that the ability to access proper identification, 
that is representative of one’s self-determined gender, is at the core of human-
ity and dignity. Although not establishing a framework for administration of 
requests for changes in gender markers, it helped clarify that this was a consti-
tutionally enforceable right. 
The approach adopted by the Court however, created a restrictive require-
ment for legal gender recognition predicated upon essentialist conceptions of 
gender. This is notwithstanding that international human rights law calls for 
the repeal of discriminatory practices that hinder access to legal gender recog-
nition. Moreover, comparative jurisprudence and legislation provide guidance 
on alternative approaches to legal gender recognition that are not unnecessarily 
burdensome and respect the rights of trans persons to self-determination. 
It is important to emphasize that the recommendation for the removal of 
medical requirements for legal gender recognition is not to dismiss the impor-
tance of ensuring access to gender affirming services for those who are desirous 
of transitioning medically. This is critical for alleviating experiences of gender 
dysphoria and ensuring access to health. Access to gender affirming healthcare 
services must be facilitated for trans people who wish to transition medically. 
To ensure accessibility, it should be provided by the public health system or 
covered by private and public medical aid schemes. 
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Advancing the rights of 
sexual and gender minorities 
under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights
The journey to Resolution 275
Berry D. Nibogora
1  Introduction
The advocacy paths around protection of individuals from violence and other 
violations of human and peoples’ rights based on sexual orientation, gender 
identity and expression and sex characteristics have been a struggle. Two steps 
forward, one step backward. This is true for a number of areas in which the 
rights discourse faces more controversies on the African continent (abortion, 
women’s rights, child rights, etc.), be it due to lack of written documentation 
or the state of denial that exists in a number of countries.1
This chapter is divided in five sections. After the introduction, the second 
section discusses the application of international human rights law to sexual 
and gender minorities2 in Africa with a focus on the role of the Commission. 
The third section explores strategies implemented to achieve the adoption of 
the resolution on protection against violence and other human rights violations 
based on real or imputed sexual orientation and gender identity (Resolution 
275). Section four deep-dives into the context around the passing of and the 
reactions to Resolution 275. The fifth and last section concludes with the way 
forward in the struggle for equality in Africa.
This introduction looks at the challenges faced by sexual and gender minori-
ties in Africa. Firstly, 33 countries explicitly criminalize same-sex sexuality and 
gender non-conforming identity generically referred to as homosexuality.3 
Documented evidence has shown that criminalization of same-sex sexual con-
duct forces homosexual persons of all ages to live in absolute fear of harassment, 
torture, extortion, mob violence and denunciation.4 Arguably, criminalization 
deprives people of their dignity and most basic rights, rendering them utterly vul-
nerable and, in some cases, effectively disenfranchized.5 Using Kenyan context as 
a case study, Shaw describes criminalization as a dignity taking, directly through 
forced anal examinations, and indirectly through state-sanctioned violence.6
Secondly, even in countries where there is no anti-homosexuality laws or 
where protective laws do exist such as South Africa, public sentiments led 
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actively oppresses LGBTIQA individuals within their families, at school, at 
workplace and in the broad community.8 In most African countries where 
there is no specific law criminalizing homosexuality, there is generally an 
unspoken rule of tolerance called by Kerrigan the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ code: 
as long as LGBTIQA are silent and discreet about who they are and what issues 
they face, they will be tolerated.9 Rudman sees it not as tolerance of one’s 
sexual life but as deliberate ignorance of a hidden behaviour.10 The knowl-
edge by family members, neighbours, school teachers, employers and the broad 
community of one’s homosexuality leads to far-reaching consequences ranging 
from being disowned, bullied, physically and verbally abused, stigmatized and 
discriminated against, etc.11 
Thirdly, violations of human rights of LGBTIQA persons in many African 
countries seem to be justified by the criminal label associated with their iden-
tity. The general public, under religious and homophobic influence, sees vio-
lation of LGBTIQA rights not as illegal but rather as ‘a crime of honour’ 
that enjoys flagrant impunity.12 This makes access to justice inefficient in most 
African countries for LGBTIQA victims of ordinary crimes as perpetrators’ 
tactics to raise their (homo)sexuality turn them into targets of prosecutions in 
instances where they appeared first as victims.13 
Fourthly, the challenges faced by sexual and gender minorities are height-
ened by a systematic social exclusion from development programmes, be it 
within the 2030 United Nations sustainable development agenda or the 
African Union Agenda 2063. Poku et al. describe the continental experience 
of LGBTI exclusion from markets, including housing, employment, economic 
opportunity, participation in family or community credits schemes, religious 
and cultural spaces, etc.14 They conclude that although it is strategic and oppor-
tune to push for social inclusion of sexual and gender minorities in the devel-
opment progammes as unconditional requirement for ‘leaving no one behind’, 
‘data are still needed to understand the ways in which sexuality and gender 
interact with other facets of identity to create multiple and interlocking forms 
of exclusion’ of LGBTIQA people across Africa.15 
Given the protection gaps of LGBTIQA rights at national and sub-national 
levels, regional and international human rights bodies have repeatedly stressed 
the importance of state compliance with the obligation to respect, protect and 
fulfil human rights for LGBTIQA persons, recalling that human rights princi-
ples are applicable to sexual and gender minorities.16 In the next section, we 
focus on the particular role of the Commission. 
2 Application of human rights law to sexual and gender 
minorities in Africa and the role of the Commission 
2.1 International human rights law and the protection 
of sexual and gender minorities 
Despite different biases that drive the opposition to the applicability of human 
rights to sexual and gender minorities in Africa,17 the legal obligations of states 
to safeguard human rights of sexual and gender minorities are well established 
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under international human rights law, be it within the framework of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights or subsequent human rights instru-
ments ratified by member states. The jurisprudence of human rights bodies has 
been unequivocal: all people irrespective of sex, sexual orientation or gender 
identity, are entitled the protection provided for by international human rights 
law, including the rights to life, security of person and privacy, non-discrim-
ination, association, peaceful assembly and freedoms from torture, arbitrary 
arrest and detention, of expression, etc.18 
The United Nations (UN) treaty bodies asserted states obligations in rela-
tion to human rights of sexual and gender minorities on numerous occasions. 
As early as 1994, in the case of Toonen v Australia (Toonen case), the UN Human 
Rights Committee held that the criminalization of same-sex conduct between 
consenting adults breaches the state obligation to protect individual privacy 
and to guarantee non-discrimination. 
In the case of X v Colombia, the same Committee held that the prohibition 
against discrimination under Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) comprises also discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. 
In the same vein, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
rights (Committee on ESCR) stated in General Comment No 20 that 
states parties should ensure that a person’s sexual orientation is not a bar-
rier to realising Covenant rights, for example, in accessing survivor’s pen-
sion rights. in addition, gender identity is recognised as among prohibited 
grounds of discrimination; … . 
Similarly, the Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
against Women (the CEDAW Committee) stressed that ‘discrimination against 
women based on sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors that 
affect women, such as … sexual orientation and gender identity’. 
Further, the Committee against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Committee against Torture) held that 
states parties must ensure that, in so far as the obligations arising under the 
Convention are concerned, their laws are in practice applied to all persons, 
regardless of … sexual orientation (or) transgender identity. 
Other regional human rights mechanisms have made similar explicit pro-
nouncements. The European Court on human rights has moved from the 
negative-obligation approach to sexual orientation and gender identity based 
on the right to privacy to a more positive approach by striking down anti-
sodomy laws using anti-discrimination provision and further cementing the 
entitlement to equality regardless of one’s sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity.19 Similarly, the Inter-American human rights monitoring bodies repeat-
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include sexual orientation and gender identity. In the landmark case of Karen 
Atala and Daughters v Chile (Atala Case) the Court concluded: 
Bearing in mind the general obligations to respect and guarantee the rights 
established in article 1(1) of the American Convention, …the sexual ori-
entation of persons is a category protected by the Convention. Therefore, 
any regulation, act or practice considered discriminatory based on a per-
son’s sexual orientation is prohibited. Consequently, no domestic regula-
tion, decision, or practice, whereby states authorities or individuals may 
diminish or restrict, in anyway whatsoever, the rights of a person based on 
his or her sexual orientation. 
It is argued that the above jurisprudence applies within the African context 
given that the Commission, in interpreting the provisions of the African 
Charter draws inspiration from international law and takes into consideration 
other general or special conventions in determining the principles of law. 
Although some scholars considered that the questions of sexual orientation 
and gender identity have remained on the margins of international human 
rights law and outside the consideration of the Commission,20 this is no longer 
the case given that international human rights bodies’ jurisprudence and the 
Commission’s practice have unequivocally asserted sexual orientation and gen-
der identity as protected grounds from discrimination.21 
2.2 The role of the Commission in advancing LGBTIQA rights in Africa 
The Commission played a key role in advancing human and peoples’ rights of 
sexual and gender minorities in Africa. Over the years, it indirectly recognized 
that the African Charter prohibits violence and discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation and gender identity. This submission is based on the follow-
ing arguments. 
Firstly in 2006, in the case of Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v
Zimbabwe, the Commission stated that Article 2 of the African Charter provides
for ‘equality of treatment for all individuals irrespective of … sexual orientation’. 
Secondly, in its first general comment adopted in 2012 on Article 14 (1) 
(d) and (e) of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in 
Africa, the Commission stated that: 
3. Given the susceptibility of women to HIV and related rights abuses in 
Africa, the African Commission recognises that the societal context based 
on gender inequalities, power imbalances and male dominance has to be 
addressed and transformed in order for women to meaningfully claim and 
enjoy freedom from violence.... 
4. According to the African Commission, there are multiple forms of dis-
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Read together, these two paragraphs suggest that the Commission acknowledged
that, on one hand, the root causes of gender inequalities affecting women reside
in the power imbalance and male dominance. On the other hand, for women
to meaningfully enjoy the rights in the Protocol and be free from violence, dis-
crimination based on race, sex, sexuality and sexual orientation, age, disability,
harmful customary practice and religion must be addressed. Garrido argues that
the Commission’s inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of dis-
crimination as well as LGBTI amongst the vulnerable and disadvantaged groups
in the 2011 Guidelines and Principles on Economic, Social and Cultural rights
was the most relevant recognition of the African human rights systems.22 
Equally, in its General Comment No 4 on the right to redress for victims 
of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment or treatment 
under Article 5 of the African Charter, the Commission acknowledged that: 
…Acts of sexual violence against men, boys, persons with psychological 
disabilities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons are 
of equal concern and must also be adequately and effectively addressed by 
State parties. 
Thirdly, the Commission has raised concerns over violence and discrimina-
tion targeting sexual and gender minorities in countries under review not only 
during the interactive dialogue between commissioners and state delegates but 
also and most importantly in the concluding observations and recommenda-
tions to states. 
Fourthly, the Commission issued in 2014 the resolution on protection 
against human rights violations against persons on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity. Resolution 275 urges member states to end all acts of 
violence committed by states or non-state actors by: 
…enacting and effectively applying appropriate laws prohibiting and pun-
ishing all forms of violence including those targeting persons on the basis 
of their imputed or real sexual orientation or gender identities, ensuring 
proper investigation and diligent prosecution of perpetrators, and estab-
lishing judicial procedures responsive to the needs of victims. 
This resolution was adopted within the mandate of the Commission, which is
two-fold: promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights enshrined
in the African Charter. The protective mandate of the Commission is con-
tained in Article 45(2) and detailed in Articles 47 to 55, whereas the promo-
tional mandate is in Article 45(1) of the African Charter. An interpretation
of Article 45(1) allowed the Commission, in its efforts to ‘formulate and lay
down principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human
and peoples’ rights’, to adopt resolutions to address various human rights
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(1) thematic resolution, (2) administrative resolutions and (3) country-specific
resolutions. 
Thematic resolutions elaborate in greater details the states’ obligations 
in respect of a specific right and describe the standard set by the Charter. 
Administrative resolutions deal with the Commission’s procedures, internal 
mechanisms and relationship between the Commission and other stakeholders. 
Country resolutions address pertinent human rights concerns in member states. 
As the centre-piece of this chapter, Resolution 275 is a thematic resolution 
articulating states’ obligation to end violence and other human rights viola-
tions against persons on the basis of their real or imputed sexual orientation or 
gender identity. 
Part of the challenges related to the protection of LGBTIQA rights is that the 
binding nature of the Commission’s resolutions has been questioned by states 
and enforcement has been elusive over the years.23 Further, the Commission 
has been divided on the issue of sexual orientation as some commissioners do 
not see it as a human right issue, but rather a matter that hits their moral and 
religious stand.24 The adoption of Resolution 275 was a culmination of strate-
gic and tireless efforts. 
3 The road to Resolution 275: strategic choices and key 
moments 
Struggles for human rights to equality and non-discrimination of African 
LGBTIQA must be understood as part of the liberation process. Liberation 
of our minds, of our bodies, and of our sexuality from a third-party con-
trol or simply from oppression. As argued by Heyns, ‘human rights are not 
dependant on recognition by the state. People can claim them even when 
the law, whether made by a dictator or by the majority, denies those rights’.25 
Moreover, the denial against LGBTIQA rights is deeply influenced by religion 
and morality, which perpetuate patriarchal and capitalistic gender inequalities, 
as one of the feminist scholars explains:26 
As one of the most important forces that influence the belief systems that 
African people have, shaping and defining the deepest values that they 
hold, religion heavily impact on issues of sexual morality. The sexual 
morality espoused by most religions and the law perpetuates gender hier-
archies, thereby depriving certain groups of their full citizenship. 
Given the hostility of national contexts, activists turned to supra-national 
human rights bodies – such as the Commission – to achieve equality and no 
discrimination in respective African countries. Indeed, despite their legal limi-
tations ‘there is no doubt that [resolutions passed by the Commission] remain 
important soft law to hold government accountable to their obligations under 





The rights of sexual and gender minorities 177 
For the purpose of this section, I will focus on the advocacy process that was 
deliberately followed to get Resolution 275 adopted. It can be summarized by 
the following cycle: 
1. Identify the 







2. Develop a 
strategy: 7 
actions 
3. Implement the 
strategy - between and 
during the African 
Commission 
Ordinary sessions 
Figure 11.1 Making a strategic choice: why a resolution on violence? 
The first step of the advocacy cycle for Resolution 275 was to identify the 
issue; which for the purpose of this journey was rather a choice of what to push 
for between a complaint before the Commission to obtain jurisprudence; a 
general comment; or a resolution to achieve recognition that sexual and gender 
minorities in Africa are indeed protected within the existing African human 
rights framework.28 
The choice of a resolution was a logical conclusion for a number of reasons. First,
the development of a general comment was not in the practice of the Commission
before 2012. Second, exploring the litigation avenue has been an option that activ-
ists and researchers consistently cautioned about given the uncertainty of the out-
come and the risk of a negative precedent that will take years to reverse.29 
The choice of a resolution was, therefore, strategic given the likelihood 
of success, the relatively easy process to table it and get it adopted by the 
Commission. More strategic was the focus on violence and the reasons why 
it took precedence over other issues. Firstly, violence faced by LGBTIQA 
people in Africa was well-documented through shadow reports and newspa-
per articles. Secondly, violence is unanimously rejected and the least contro-
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those who self-identify as member of the LGBTIQA community but also their 
human rights defenders or family members, violence leaves none outside the 
protection gap, hence taking action was overdue. 
3.1 Developing and implementing an advocacy 
strategy: taking stock of decisive moments 
The second step was to develop a strategy, which consists of ‘a plan of actions 
designed to achieve a long-term or overall aim’.30 The plan consisted of a series 
of coordinated actions, processes or messages ‘intended to persuade or produce 
a particular corrective action’,31 in this case the adoption of a resolution. 
Below are a series of key processes undertaken between 2011 and the adop-
tion of Resolution 275 in May 2014. The 1st action consisted of building a 
critical mass for each Commission’s session to ensure visibility and disruption. 
The investment in physical participation and visibility of LGBTIQA people in 
all sessions shifted the mind of the general public and the Commission. The 
2nd action was to document human rights violations based on SOGIESC. 
Civil society organizations such as the African Men for Sexual Health and 
Rights (AMSHeR) have been involved in documenting not only violations 
faced by the LGBTIQA persons but also positive contributions they bring to 
the society.32 Documentaries, web-series, short films emerged as powerful tools 
to mobilize solidarity from the general population. 
In accordance with Rule 79(3) of the Commission, 
Institutions, organizations or any interested party wishing to contribute to 
the examination of the Report and the human rights situation in the coun-
try concerned, shall send their contributions, including shadow reports, to 
the Secretary at least 60 days prior to the examination of the Report. 
Activists working on Resolution 275 invested in shadow reporting to ensure 
evidence is brought to the attention of commissioners and state delegates dur-
ing the review. This was successful in a number of cases, despite that submis-
sion of shadow reports as a strategy may not be all times efficient.33 
The 3rd action consisted of alliances with mainstream civil society organiza-
tions. Countering hegemonic sexual discourses and addressing the protection 
gaps faced by sexual and gender minorities in Africa requires intersectional-
ity34 and building alliances among organizations through the NGO Forum35 
or other meaningful ways. In 2012, LGBTIQA rights activists introduced the 
practice of side-events during the NGO Forum for civil society organizations 
to deep-dive into issues of specific interest to their work. This practice allowed 
SOGIESC activists to build alliances whilst evolving as credible partners within 
the civil society spectrum at the Commission. 
The 4th action was to map key stakeholders using what was referred to
as the ‘traffic-light-exercise’. This exercise targeted the eleven commissioners
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‘traffic-light exercise’ consisted of colouring commissioners in green – for allies
who would vote in favour of a resolution condemning violence, in orange – for
commissioners whose stand was not known either for not having engaged with
them or for being new in the space, and red – for non-allies. The purpose of
this session was to further devise strategies for engaging those in green to remain
green, and those in orange and red to become green.36 One of such engage-
ments consisted of side meetings with commissioners during ordinary sessions. 
The above actions not only required coordination but also built on key 
opportunities that created momentum or milestones that marked the pathway 
towards the adoption of Resolution 275. 
The first key moment is the decision to engage the Commission on 
LGBTIQA issues. In May 2006, the International Gay and Lesbian Human 
Rights Commission (‘IGLHRC’) in conjunction with CAL, Behind the Mask 
(‘BTM’) and All Africa Rights Initiative (‘AARI’) conducted an exploratory 
mission to Banjul, The Gambia. The mission was meant to study the space and 
establish challenges and opportunities to engage the Commission. However, 
when activists learnt that Cameroon was up for review, a small group was 
formed to draft accounts of violations based on SOGIESC, and submitted to 
the Commission an alternative statement to the state report. The statement 
informed the Commission’s concluding observations raising concerns around 
an ‘upsurge of intolerance against sexual minorities’. 
The momentum was also gained through the growing role of the NGO 
Forum in adopting ‘resolutions’ subsequently submitted to the Commission 
for consideration. At the beginning, there was resistance from conservative 
NGOs. But due to the resiliency of activists, the Forum adopted its first-ever 
resolution with reference to SOGI ahead of the 41st session in 2007 and in 
subsequent sessions. However, the Commission did not endorse those resolu-
tions and removed the words ‘lesbians and bisexual’ women.37 
The second key moment is the denial of observer status to the Coalition 
of African Lesbians (CAL) and the wave of solidarity that followed from civil 
society organizations. The application was submitted by CAL in May 2008, the 
Commission took the decision to deny observer status to CAL on 20 October 
2010. The reasons for denial were made public later stating that ‘the activities 
of the said organization do not promote and protect any of the rights enshrined 
in the African Charter’.38 An outcry of civil society solidarity marked the fol-
lowing session in November 2010, as most observers included in their state-
ments a paragraph condemning the Commission’s decision.39 
The third key moment is the adoption of resolution 17/19 on human rights, 
sexual orientation and gender identity by the United Nations’ Human Rights 
Council on 14 July 2011. The resolution mandated the office of high commis-
sioner to conduct a study 
documenting discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against 
individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, in all 
regions of the world, and how international human rights law can be used 
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to end violence and related human rights violations based on sexual orien-
tation and gender identity. 
Subsequent to this resolution, a series of regional meetings were held in vari-
ous regions of the world but no such meeting was held in Africa.40 The process 
culminated in an international conference held in Oslo, Norway from 15 to 
16 April 2013 and the co-chair meeting notes recognized an ‘increased atten-
tion paid to the issues (of SOGIESC) by the African Commission …’41 
The fourth decisive moment was the launch of the report on violence 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity in Africa, jointly authored 
by AMSHeR and CAL, documenting instances of violence across Africa.42 A 
commissioner was attending the NGO Forum and participated in the launch 
of the report.43 A draft resolution was adopted by the Forum condemning the 
instances of violence documented in the report. The same draft resolution was 
submitted to the Commission for consideration during the private session. It 
was not considered due to time constraints,44 but postponed for consideration 
at the following 55th ordinary session. 
4 The passing of Resolution 275: context, 
content and usefulness 
The 55th session was held in Luanda, Angola from 28 April to 12 May 2014. 
As usual, activists held side events and engaged various stakeholders around 
SOGI issues, with the majority leaving after one week into the session.45 
Circumstances played on the activists’ side though. The session’s schedule 
was light and postponed resolutions from the 54th session were tabled for 
consideration. Further, the Chairperson of the Commission Kayitesi Z. Sylvie, 
whose stand is well-known to be strongly opposed to SOGI issues, had to leave 
just after the opening of the private session due to personal reasons, leaving 
the co-chair role to Commissioner Alapini Gansou. Gansou’s leadership and 
out-spoken support for equality and non-discrimination should not be under-
estimated given the powers of the Chair and Vice-chair of the Commission 
in terms of order of precedence, directing the conduct of business, moving 
motions, and closing discussion on matters before the Commission as a col-
lective deliberating body. This factor played in favour of the adoption of 
Resolution 275. 
Following the news of the adoption of Resolution 275, a wave of celebra-
tion followed, and messages flowed from the four corners of the globe com-
mending the Commission.46 Sexual rights activists issued supportive statements 
to the extent that the International Human Rights Day, 10 December 2014, 
celebrated the passing of Resolution 275. 
Adopting resolution 275 was an unprecedented move by the Commission. 
It sent a strong message that LGBTIQA people, like any other African, are fully 
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The content of Resolution 275 is three-fold. The first part gives the legal 
basis that the Commission used as a legitimate foundation of its action. This 
is Article 2 prohibiting distinction of any kind in the enjoyment of rights 
enshrined in the Charter by every individual; Article 3 prescribing equality 
and equal protection of the law; and Articles 4 and 5 read together, which in 
essence make life, dignity and integrity of the person sacred, including pro-
hibition of torture and other forms of exploitation or cruel and inhumane 
treatment. 
The second part sends an alarming warning due to instances of violence 
based on persons’ real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity. It 
lists different forms of violence, classifies the perpetrators of such violence and 
equally condemns them regardless of their category – state and non-state actors 
– and the motivation behind such violence. This paragraph also provides for 
protection of activists working on issues of sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity, and calls on states to ensure an environment free from violence, attacks 
and reprisals against them. 
The third and last paragraph is the executive part directing different stake-
holders – primarily states as duty bearers – what to do to comply with their 
obligations towards sexual and gender minorities. These obligations include 
stopping violence and abuses, and creating an enabling environment free of 
stigma, reprisals or criminal prosecution for human rights defenders. For avoid-
ance of any doubt, the Commission clarified that ending violence requires 
positive obligations on the part of the states, including enacting and effec-
tively applying appropriate laws prohibiting and punishing all forms of violence 
including those targeting persons on the basis of their imputed or real sexual 
orientation or gender identities, ensuring proper investigation and diligent 
prosecution of perpetrators, and establishing judicial procedures responsive to 
the needs of victims. 
These three positive obligations are related to legislative reforms and access
to justice, including remedies for the victims. As such, it is argued that they
are not subject to progressive realization but rather immediate enforcement
given their nature of the rights they seek to protect and respect. Further in
terms of Resolution 275, African States are arguably obligated to decriminal-
ize same-sex relations and adopt protective laws that ensure that adults engag-
ing in consenting same-sex relations or those with non-conforming gender
identity live in full enjoyment of their rights, free from hatred, violence and
discrimination. That is the minimum content of the phrase ‘enacting and
effectively applying appropriate laws prohibiting and punishing all forms
of violence including those targeting persons on the basis of their imputed
or real sexual orientation or gender identities’ contained in the first part of
Resolution 275(4). 
Further, by virtue of Resolution 275(4) and given the plight of violence, 
impunity and the access to justice across Africa, states should consider creat-
ing LGBTIQA crime investigation units to ensure perpetrators are brought to 
book diligently and in a manner that is responsive to the needs of the victims. 
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That is also the core meaning of the phrase ‘ensuring proper investigation 
and diligent prosecution of perpetrators, and establishing judicial procedures 
responsive to the needs of victims’ contained in the last part of Resolution 
275(4).47 
Despite the fact that the above steps are yet to be undertaken in any country 
across Africa, Resolution 275 has been used to educate and sensitize LGBTIQA 
community members, policy makers, other civil society organizations and the 
general public. In police trainings, before parliaments or technical groups such 
as law reform commissions, Resolution 275 has been used in ways that were 
not anticipated before.48 
Two dialogues between African and the Inter-American human rights sys-
tems with UNAIDS and the United Nations mandate holders have resulted 
in reports that are used to educate various stakeholders49. These interventions 
serve to continuously identify ways of making progress in addressing the pro-
tection gaps faced by LGBTIQA with context-tailored approaches. 
In March 2016, the first regional seminar to find practical solutions for 
ending violence and discrimination based on SOGIE in Africa was held in 
response to the call from Resolution 275.50 A final declaration clarifying differ-
ent obligations and recommendations was adopted and published.51 
Finally, the Commission has also been using Resolution 275 in states review 
and subsequent norms development work (general comments, guidelines and 
concluding observations). 
5 Conclusion 
The journey to Resolution 275 was long and the promises it brought to 
Africans is a manifestation of the virtues of Africa’s historical traditions and the 
values of a civilization based on humanness ‘Ubuntu’, inclusiveness and respect 
for human dignity in our differences. 
The adoption of Resolution 275 by the primary body in charge of protect-
ing and promoting human rights in Africa is a culmination of tireless advocacy, 
educational and lobbying efforts. By adopting Resolution 275, the Commission 
simply did its overdue job. It sent a message that it does not exist to reflect the 
prejudices of member states, but to hold states accountable when they fail to 
observe the required human rights standards for all their citizens. 
However, not all the Commission’s work is rosy. The recent Decision 
1015 of the African Union Executive Council52 and the response of the 
Commission – which withdrew CAL observer status in application of the 
above decision, without appreciating the impact of such move on its inde-
pendence – are cause for concern. Further, given the contemporary criticism 
against human rights by left and right-wing regimes,53 the future of protection 
of sexual minority rights in Africa is uncertain and the likelihood of reversing 
the gains is high. 
As a way forward, it is suggested to amplify advocacy around Resolution 
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Further, it is urgent to get African states to speak out against the project of dis-
mantling the accountability mechanisms that still exist on the continent. The 
African Charter is among the most ratified instruments and, therefore, enjoy 
a full commitment from states parties to realize the Charter’s rights with the 
guidance of the Commission, including the authoritative interpretations for-
mulated through resolutions, general comments, recommendations and deci-
sions. It is only by doing so that Resolution 275 and other standards set by the 
Commission will deliver ‘the Africa we want’. 
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discursive role of international human rights law’ (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law 
Journal 273. 
25 C Heyns ‘A ‘struggle approach’ to human rights’ in C Heyns & K Stefiszyn (ed) Human 
rights, peace and justice in Africa:A reader (2006) 16. 
26 S Tamale ‘Exploring the contours of African sexualities: Religion, law and power’ (2014) 
14 African Human Rights Law Journal 175, 176. 
27 H Hillgenberg ‘A fresh look at soft law’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law
499 in Balagon & Durojaye (n 2) 379. 
28 Murray & Viljon (n 21) 100 111. 
29 Ibrahim (n 25) 272. 
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30 Oxford online dictionaries https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/strategy 
(accessed 14 January 2019). 
31 United Nations, OHCHR ‘Manual on human rights monitoring’ (2011) 4. 
32 See Alternative reports to states periodic reports submitted before the African 
Commission on Cameroon, Togo, Nigeria, Malawi, Namibia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Burundi, etc. (on file with the Author). On positive narrative queer people in Africa, see 
AMSHeR ‘Voices of Freedom’ (2014) https://www.amsher.org/the-voices/ (accessed 
21 December 2018). 
33 Low compliance with the reporting obligations by states, uncertainty about the review 
schedule, etc. e.g. the review of the periodic report of Rwanda postponed at the 60th 
ordinary session after the 60th public session in Niamey had already started. 
34 Temale (n 27) 170. 
35 The NGO Forum is a three-day gathering organised ahead of each session to facilitate 
participation of non-governmental organizations with observer status to the session of 
the Commission. 
36 This included invitation of Commissioners to intersession workshops on SOGI issues 
or using connections activists  had with specific commissioners from their countries or 
based on common a history of working, studying or worshiping together. 
37 For a full account of the responses of the Commission to SOGI resolutions submitted 
through the NGO Forum, see S Ndashe ‘Seeking the protection of LGBTI rights at the 
African commission on human and peoples’ rights’ (2011) 15 Feminist Africa 19. 
38 28th Activity report of the African Commission (2009), para 33 http://www.achpr.org/ 
files/activity-reports/28/achpr47eo8_actrep28_20092010_eng.pdf (accessed 14 January 
2019). 
39 Ndashe (n 38) 31. 
40 No country accepted to come forward and host such a meeting and speculation have 
been ongoing that despite its legal framework and historical leadership on non-discrim-
ination issues, South Africa did not want to take the lead as it would lose the support it 
needed from the Africa bloc to get a seat at the UN Human rights council. See e.g. E 
Jordaan ‘South Africa and sexual orientation rights at the United Nations: Battling for 
both sides’ (2017) 1–26 http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2079 (accessed 21 
December 2019). 
41 Outcome document of the Oslo international conference on human rights, sexual ori-
entation and gender identity (2013) https://outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files
/Co-Chairs%20Summary%20of%20Conclusions.pdf (accessed 21 December 2019). 
42 The report was authored and presented by African organizations was deliberate and 
aimed at countering the argument of SOGIE issues being un-African. 
43 The Special rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Reine Alapini 
Gansou attended the NGO Forum and co-launched the report. 
44 This inside information was received off the record from the Secretariat staff.This was 
confirmed by friendly commissioners during side interactions in subsequent sessions. 
45 Owing to the cost of staying in Luanda – one of the most expensive cities in the world –
and the light programme of the session. 
46 The then UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon and the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights expressed their congratulatory messages to the Commission for such a step in the 
right direction. 
47 For a detailed description of action required to states and non-state actors arising from 
Resolution 275, see the booklet by AMSHeR & Centre for Human Rights ‘Resolution 
275:What does it mean for states and non-state actors in Africa?’ (2018) 1 http://www. 
chr.up.ac.za/images/researchunits/sogie/documents/resolution_275/resolution_275_
eng.pdf (accessed 14 January 2019). 
48 See AMSHeR activity reports from resolution watch sessions (On file with the author). 
  
        
         
   
        
   
   
   
 
     
 
       
      
  
            
    
        
      
186 Berry D. Nibogora
49 See the Report of the first joint dialogue https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/
Discrimination/Endingviolence_ACHPR_IACHR_UN_SOGI_dialogue_EN.pdf
(accessed 21 December 2018). 
50 Opening remarks by the Chair of the South African Human Rights Commission, 
Regional Seminar on finding practical solutions for ending violence and other human 
rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity or expression, held on 
5th March 2016, in Ekurhuleni, South Africa. 
51 Ekurhuleni Declaration (2016) https://www.oursplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
EKURHULENI-DECLARATION-FINAL.pdf (accessed 21 December 2018). 
52 Executive Council Decision at the 33rd ordinary session, 28–28 June 2018. 
EX.CL/1015(XXXIII) (2018). 
53 M Langford ‘Critiques of human rights’ (2018) 14 Annual Review of Law and Social Science
83. 
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1  Introduction
This chapter focuses on lessons learnt from the experiences of the Southern 
Africa Litigation Centre (SALC) in instituting and supporting strategic litiga-
tion on sexual and reproductive health rights in Southern Africa. Strategic 
litigation in this context focuses on litigation with the potential to positively 
impact women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights(SRHR), by broad-
ening the interpretation of the rights and working toward positive legal or 
other reforms in line with such interpretation. It accordingly consists not sim-
ply of the filing of a legal case, but also involves substantial research to ensure 
an effective outcome and sustained advocacy to support the case. Strategic 
litigation should lead to eventual reforms. Developing a strategy to ensure 
a tactical impact requires knowledge of the specific needs of women in the 
country, the laws and jurisprudence affecting these needs, and the extent to 
which litigation can have impact depending on the composition of the judici-
ary and the prevailing socio-political conditions in the country.
Strategic litigation has steadily gained momentum in many African coun-
tries. Some of the cases filed include challenges to violation of rights related to 
the right to health including sexual and reproductive health and rights. Thus, 
jurisprudence has emerged on issues such as maternal mortality, HIV testing, 
denial of life-saving medications, child marriage and adolescent sexuality. This 
emerging trend in social rights litigation in Africa would seem to be a positive 
development. While challenges remain, this development is capable of paving 
way for a more accountable and just society in the region.1
For strategic litigation to have an impact, there are several factors to consider:
 • Does the social or societal problem have a legal issue requiring adjudication?
 • Would a court be receptive to the arguments? Is the judiciary sufficiently 
progressive and independent?
 • Would a positive judgment be implemented? Are the authorities receptive 
enough and are there resources?
 • Is it worth it even if a positive judgment will not be implemented?
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Roa and Klugman in their useful article have identified some important con-
siderations for a successful strategic litigation.2 These include: 
• An existing rights framework – implying that the existing law in a country 
guarantees recognized rights for which redress can be sought. 
• An independent and knowledgeable judiciary – the court is often referred 
to as the last hope of the masses. To effectively play this role, the judiciary 
must be proactive and independent from any form of interference. 
• Civil society organizations with the capacity to frame social problems as 
rights violations and to litigate– public interest litigation is often initiated 
by civil society. Consequently, rights litigation will thrive in a society 
where the civil society groups are active, conversant with the issues and 
able to challenge human rights violations. 
• A network to support and leverage the opportunities presented by liti-
gation – successful social litigation requires the involvement of many 
stakeholders fighting for the same cause including media, health care pro-
fessionals, economists and community groups. 
2 Litigation Strategy 
Having decided to litigate after this consideration, it is important to develop a 
litigation strategy. This will include an assessment of the jurisprudence, legal 
framework and litigation options in each country. Sexual and reproductive 
health rights are not often directly protected. Where they are, it is usually done 
in a restricted manner. For example, the Zimbabwean Constitution protects 
the right to health, inclusive of reproductive health. Yet, policies and laws 
more directly address issues like maternal mortality and general family plan-
ning and do not cover the broad spectrum of SRHR, including access to safe 
abortion. In this instance, strategic litigation might be aimed at broadening the 
scope of protection and promotion of sexual and reproductive rights including 
the provision of safe abortion. 
In appropriate cases and where time and resources permit, it is beneficial 
to use prior research to inform possible litigation. Research, especially field 
research, will help in identifying the social gaps, and may indicate the pos-
sible reception by the public or respondents of any changes or developments. 
For example, in Malawi, after encountering a case involving the detention of 
pregnant learners, SALC filed a judicial review and instituted research with the 
Malawi Human Rights Commission on the implementation and impact of the 
official learner pregnancy management policy.3 The outcome of the research 
helped formulate a strategy for litigation. The research was necessary because 
it showed that most learners, and even implementers, were not aware of the 
official policy. Therefore, the application of the policy was arbitrary in most 
of the cases and dependent on the institution and implementers. The research 
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SALC uses a very effective method of an incremental approach to strategic 
litigation, using small or indirect cases to pave the way for bigger or higher-
impact and more complex cases. This enables building of jurisprudence that 
can be used in future. Considering the often sensitive issues around SRHR, 
some courts take time to become receptive to certain issues and the incremen-
tal approach helps to generate gradual understanding. 
Strategic ligation or social rights litigation can play an important role in 
advancing the rights of vulnerable or marginalized groups. It is important in 
providing avenues to redress human rights violations, empowering marginal-
ized groups to obtain justice,4 serving as a means of accountability,5 serving as a 
catalyst for change in society, helping to create awareness on an issue and serv-
ing as a tool for social justice in society.6 Despite these positive aspects of stra-
tegic litigation, some commentators have expressed concerns about the impact 
of such litigation. For instance, regarding health rights litigation in Brazil, it 
has been argued that social rights litigation does not advance the right of the 
poor but tends to favour the middle class7. Others have lamented the danger 
of placing too much hope in litigation given the various challenges facing the 
court system in Africa.8 
3 Some case studies 
Valuable lessons have been learnt from the experience of litigating cases that 
highlight the issues around sexual and reproductive health and rights, like preg-
nancy, safe abortion, and how complex court procedures affect the realization 
of sexual and reproductive health rights. Three of SALC’s cases are discussed 
in more detail below: The first case relates to the dismissal of pregnant women 
from the Lesotho Defence Force; the second relates to the provision of emer-
gency contraceptives to rape survivors, and the third relates to prescription in 
medical negligence cases. Each of these cases is illustrative of the many possible 
ways in which strategic litigation can be developed. 
3.1 Mokhele and Others v Commander, Lesotho Defence Forces and Others 
The right to decide if, when, and how to bear children is at the heart of 
reproductive autonomy, in line with international and regional standards. It 
can only be interfered with, if at all, for rational and reasonable practical con-
siderations. International Labour Organisation (ILO) Standards have generally 
recognized the right of women workers to be accorded room to bear children 
without having to give up their careers. The standards laid out, for example, 
in the Maternity Protection Convention 183,9 include the right to paid mater-
nity leave, protection from hazardous work during pregnancy, and childcare 
and protection from discrimination on the basis of maternity. In addition, the 
standards call for protection from the loss of employment due to maternity and 
paid maternity leave for the pregnant woman if there is need for protection of 
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the Southern African region, into the enactment of maternity protection poli-
cies, including fully or partially paid leave and protection from discrimination. 
The dilemma is with balancing the right to reproduce with the practical 
considerations attendant with the chosen profession, especially for women in 
non-traditional roles and hazardous employment. This is well illustrated in a 
case SALC supported in Lesotho regarding reproductive rights in the mili-
tary, the case of Mokhele and Others v Commander& Lesotho Defence Forces and 
Others.10 In this case, 3 female soldiers in the Lesotho Defence Forces were dis-
missed from the army for falling pregnant in contravention of a Standing Order 
imposed by the Commander of the Lesotho Defence Forces. The Standing 
Order, communicated to the applicants at their passing-out parade, prohibited 
female soldiers of less than 5 years’ service from falling pregnant, with the 
penalty of dismissal. The three applicants, two of whom were married and one 
of whom had suffered a miscarriage, were charged with violating the Standing 
Order. Instead of subjecting them to court martial or summary trial in line 
with the army regulations, the Commander dismissed them under a section of 
the Lesotho Defence Forces Act, which allowed the Commander to discharge 
members ‘in the interest of the army’. 
SALC supported local lawyers Phoofolo Associates and Advocate Monaheng 
Rasekoai in filing judicial review of the dismissals and the Standing Order in 
the High Court. FIDA-Lesotho supported the advocacy initiatives at the court. 
The applicants’ arguments were both procedural and substantive, challenging 
the process by which they were discharged, the basis for the dismissals and the 
lawfulness of the Standing Order. 
The applicants argued the decisions of the Commander to enact the Standing
Order and discharge the applicants were contrary to public policy and com-
mon law principles of reasonableness, legality, and rationality. The charges did
not raise any issues with the physical capacity of the applicants but were merely
based on the non-compliance with the Standing Order. The respondents failed
to consider the individual circumstances of each soldier and made blanket dis-
criminatory assumptions that female soldiers would be negatively affected by
pregnancy and birth. It was also argued that the Standing Order had a dispro-
portionate impact on, and unduly interfered with, intimate family life and sex-
ual and reproductive rights to choose methods and timing of family planning. 
It was acknowledged that for practical considerations, there may be reason 
for certain restrictions but the provisions for reasonable accommodation in line 
with international best practice should be implemented. Reasonable accom-
modation would consider individual circumstances. The standard practice is to 
allow pregnant women to undertake modified duties, provide leave options, 
and enable them to return as soon as they are able. It was also argued on behalf 
of the applicants that the Standing Order was unlawful in that it amounted 
to class discrimination, because the army already has provisions for maternity 
leave for female soldiers in terms of the Defence Forces Act and Regulations 
and the Standing Order purported to arbitrarily take this right away from 
female soldiers of less than 5 years’ service. 
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The respondent argued that the army was entitled to impose whatever 
restrictions deemed necessary for discipline. They claimed applicants could not 
enjoy their rights like civilians, relying on the case of Thabang Hlapisi and Anor 
v The Commander & Botswana Defence Force & 4 Others11 and the provisions 
of section 24(3) of the Constitution. In justifying the Standing Order, they 
argued that pregnancy interfered with army discipline and the applicants’ abil-
ity to be effective as army recruits, and interfered with partaking in military 
activities and strenuous physical activity like rolling, and combat-readiness. 
In addition, the Commander as ‘guardian’ to the recruits argued that recruits 
were becoming pregnant at an alarming rate and needed guidance, and thus the 
restriction on falling pregnant. The argument was also made that pregnancy has 
a negative impact on a soldier, and therefore pregnant female soldiers would 
no longer be effective compared to their male compatriots. Even though all 
of the applicants were adults and two of them were married at the time of 
the pregnancy, due to the possibility of contraceptive failure, the respondents 
argued that they should have abstained from sex as a foolproof way of prevent-
ing pregnancy. The arguments were contradictory in that the applicants were 
deemed to be mature enough for combat training, including handling firearms, 
but not mature enough to make reproductive choices. 
The Lesotho Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex (in terms 
of section 18) and provides for equality and equal protection of the law. The 
decisions of the respondents and the effects of the Standing Order could ordi-
narily have been challenged as breaches to the Bill of Rights. However, the 
provisions of section 24(3) allow for the limitation of most of the Bill of Rights 
by military law, rendering it difficult to file a direct constitutional challenge. 
It was therefore decided to file judicial review based on the usual grounds of 
lawfulness, rationality, and reasonableness. It was argued that decisions that 
amount to unfair discrimination, and decisions made for improper purposes 
are included in the definition or consideration of the unreasonableness of 
administrative action. Amongst the principles of state policy in the Lesotho 
Constitution are the values of equality, non-discrimination and justice and just 
and favourable work conditions, including maternity protection. 
In reviewing the reasonableness of the Commander’s decisions, the law-
fulness of the Standing Order itself, and the decision to discharge the appli-
cants, the Court made very progressive findings on women’s reproductive 
rights. The Court held that by virtue of the provisions of international instru-
ments like CEDAW and the 2000 International Labour Organisation(ILO) 
Maternity Protection Convention,12 women in the army were entitled, like 
other women, to the rights enshrined therein, and that the army, like every 
other entity, had the duty to ensure that their rights were protected. The 
Standing Order was held to be ultra vires the enabling legislation (the Defence 
Forces Act and Regulations), which did not prescribe pregnancy as a ground 
for discharge. The Court held the Commander could not make regulations 
which had the effect of disenfranchising a whole section of the army. This 
was the province of parliament. The Court also found that there was no basis 
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for differentiating between women recruits and women who were entitled to 
maternity leave in the army. Therefore, the court found that the Commander’s 
decisions in enacting the Standing order and instituting the process of discharge 
of the applicants were arbitrary and irrational. The Court cited with approval 
the cases presented by the applicants, like the United States case of Crawford v 
Cushman13 in which it was held that the policy of discharging pregnant women 
violated their right to due process under the 5th Amendment because it created 
an irrebuttable presumption that a pregnant woman would be permanently 
unfit for duty, despite the fact that pregnancy is temporary and not a perma-
nent disability. The Court stated: 
The contention by the Commander that pregnant soldiers must be dis-
charged because they compromise the army’s operational capacity and 
jeopardize military discipline is not only an argument in torrorem populi but 
a throw-back to the patriarchal view that pregnant women are not fit to 
work and, therefore, are a disposable workforce. The view that soldiers 
need permission to be pregnant — which permission is obtainable after 
five years’ service — is merely mentioned to be rejected.14 
In agreement with the decision of the European Court of Justice in Brown 
v Rentokil,15 the court also decided that dismissal on account of pregnancy is 
direct discrimination on the grounds of sex, because pregnancy is a condition 
that affects only women. The Court aptly characterizes the true nature of the 
case thus: 
This case is, therefore, about the applicability and observance of the values 
espoused by these international instruments in relation to the laws govern-
ing military service in the Kingdom. Although, in form the case is about 
the legality of the decision of the Commander of the Lesotho Defence 
Force to discharge pregnant soldiers, it is in substance a challenge to the 
culture of patriarchy in the military and an assertion of sexual and repro-
ductive rights in military service. What is being contested is the idea that 
female soldiers are incapable to bear arms and babies at the same time and, 
on that account, are not fit for military purpose.16 
Despite the worldwide existence of maternity protection in line with ILO 
standards, the international and regional standards laid out in CEDAW, and the 
Maputo Protocol, maternity protection does not always amount to proper rec-
ognition of women’s rights to reproductive choices, especially in the interpre-
tation of the courts. The Lesotho judgment is a good example in this respect. A 
recent South African Labour Court case regarding maternity protection restric-
tions in hazardous employment environment, however, achieved the opposite 
result.17 
The conflicting results in the above two cases show the difficulties in litigat-
ing for reproductive rights in the context of employment and disciplinary or 
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hazardous contexts, where traditional patriarchal norms in the guise of practical 
or health concerns limit women’s autonomy. The way these practical or health 
concerns are handled betray the underlying disregard for the rights of women. 
Nonetheless, it is encouraging that the courts are beginning to liberalize and 
dismantle the patriarchal system. 
3.2 Mapingure v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 
SALC provided some technical support to Zimbabwe Women Lawyers 
Association (ZWLA) on the Zimbabwean case of Mapingure v Minister of Home 
Affairs & Others.18 The case illustrates the courts’ treatment of reproductive 
autonomy in the context of the right to safe abortion. Abortion is only legal 
under limited circumstances in Zimbabwe, including in cases where the preg-
nancy is the result of rape or incest, or where it poses a danger to the life or 
physical health of the woman. 
Zimbabwe is a state party to and has ratified the Convention on the 
Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
Article 12 of CEDAW mandates member states to eliminate discrimination 
against women in healthcare and to ensure equal access to health services, 
including reproductive health services. In terms of General Recommendation 
24 of the CEDAW Committee on Article 12, it is discriminatory for a state to 
refuse legal provision of reproductive health services for women.19 In the case 
of conscientious objection to the performance of such services, an alternative 
for their provision should be made. To respect, protect, and fulfil women’s 
rights to equal access to health services, states are mandated to ensure this is 
achieved through legislation, policy executive action, and an effective judicial 
system. States are also urged to respect women’s right to access healthcare by 
not putting up barriers through means of obstructive laws that impact services 
only sought or needed by women, including criminalization and punishment.20 
The obligation to protect women’s rights to healthcare entails enacting laws 
and policies binding on public and private entities, like hospitals, to address 
violence against women and the provision of appropriate healthcare. Although 
CEDAW does not explicitly refer to the right to safe abortion as part of states’ 
obligations to ensure equal access to health care by women, this is implicit in 
the reference to services that are specifically needed by women. 
In the case of LC v Peru,21 decided by the CEDAW Committee, a 13-year-
old girl was denied an abortion after falling pregnant because of sexual abuse. 
She became permanently disabled from the lack of timely treatment after suf-
fering serious injuries from a suicide attempt. This took place even though the 
Peruvian Penal Code allowed for access to abortion where the pregnancy posed 
a danger to her health. She brought a Communication before the CEDAW 
Committee and alleged violation of her right to health, dignity, and freedom 
from discrimination in the access of health services. The CEDAW Committee 
interpreted General Recommendation 24 in this case, stating the denial by the 
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discrimination. It also found that, although LC was entitled to a legal abortion 
in terms of the Peruvian Penal Code, the state legal and health systems had 
failed in implementation to realize the rights conferred by the law. Therefore, 
the state had failed to establish legal protection of women’s rights as envisaged 
in Articles 2(c) and 2(f). 
Zimbabwe, as a state party to CEDAW is obliged to protect, promote, and 
fulfil the rights of women to healthcare services. By implication, Zimbabwe 
is mandated to provide safe abortion where it is required, specifically by the 
effective implementation of laws that allow for access to safe abortion. The 
CEDAW Committee’s Concluding Observations in 2012 made recommenda-
tions to Zimbabwe to liberalize its abortion laws, decriminalize, and ensure 
access to safe abortion by simplifying the procedures required to access it.22 
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women (Maputo Protocol) in its Article 14(1) defines the rights of 
women to health and reproductive health, including the right to control their 
own fertility, to make free decisions on child rearing and child spacing, to have 
family planning education, and to make choices of contraception. Article 14(2) 
directly specifies measures to be taken by states to realize the rights in Article 
14(1), which includes access to safe abortion as one of the requisite measures. 
It can be argued that in specifying legal abortion on limited grounds, Article 
14(2) (c) limits the rights conferred in Article 14(1). However, the explicit 
mention of the right to access safe abortion in the Protocol is a progressive 
move and imposes a peremptory obligation on member states to provide for 
safe abortion. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has 
elaborated on the provision of Article 14 (2) (c) explaining that states are obli-
gated to remove all barriers to safe abortion services for women.23 According to 
Ngwena,24 this elevates the right to access safe abortion as a recognized human 
right, which imposes obligations on member states. 
Mapingure’s case illustrates the extent to which safe abortion is available 
where it is legally permissible, and to what extent the international obligations 
of Zimbabwe are achieved. This was a case challenging the government’s fail-
ure to provide emergency contraception to prevent pregnancy and its subse-
quent failure to assist in procuring a legal abortion after rape. 
The applicant in the matter was gang-raped at her house and promptly
sought assistance from the doctor who treated her, for emergency contra-
ceptives to prevent pregnancy. The doctor declined to assist without a for-
mal police report, which the police delayed in supplying until the crucial
72-hour period expired. She had already fallen pregnant by this time. After
discovering the pregnancy, the applicant approached a prosecutor for advice
and assistance in obtaining a lawful abortion, provided for in terms of the
law. She was erroneously advised that she had to wait for the criminal case
to be completed before she could be issued with the Magistrate’s certificate.
By the time she obtained the certificate, the pregnancy was at an advanced
stage and the medical professionals declined to perform the abortion, judg-
ing it unsafe. 
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She issued summons against the Ministry of Home Affairs (for the police), 
the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare (in charge of doctors), and the 
Ministry of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (in charge of the courts) for 
breach of their duty of care in failing to prevent the pregnancy and in failing 
to provide a lawful abortion. She sought damages occasioned from the physical 
and mental anguish caused by the respondents’ negligence and breach of their 
duty of care. She further characterized the case as a wrongful pregnancy and 
birth issue,25 and sought damages for the financial and psychological costs of 
having and raising the child. 
The High Court dismissed the claim on the grounds that the respondents’ 
duties of care towards the applicant did not extend to the termination of preg-
nancy outside any stated obligations in the Termination of Pregnancy Act. The 
Court stated that the Police, although admittedly negligent in their dilatoriness 
in rendering assistance to the applicant, could only be considered to have been 
‘negligent in the air’, and thus attracted no liability. The Court also stated that 
the doctor had no obligation to terminate the pregnancy in the absence of 
authorization in the form of a certificate from a Magistrate in terms of the law. 
This was despite the fact that emergency contraception administered within 
72 hours of the sexual assault would have prevented, not terminated, the preg-
nancy, and therefore would not have needed an authorization. The doctor 
and, apparently, the Court were clearly mistaken about the law and facts in 
this instance. In dismissing the claim against the court officials who had given 
erroneous advice, the Court held that the laws were clear that it was the appli-
cant’s duty to take steps to obtain the requisite authorization. Therefore, the 
fact of erroneous advice from the court officials did not raise liability because 
they ‘were not her legal representatives’. The Court found that the applicant’s 
predicament was caused by her own ignorance of the procedures she had to 
follow, and therefore her ignorance of the law could not be an excuse to find 
the respondents liable. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court found the state (the Police and the Ministry 
of Health) liable for failure to facilitate and provide emergency contraceptives 
to prevent the pregnancy. However, the Court found the state was not liable 
for failure to provide a legal abortion, as the Court decided that the responsi-
bility to procure the abortion lay on the applicant. The basis upon which the 
court found the Police and the doctor liable was that the police’s duty of care 
extended beyond their statutory duties to arrest and investigate crime, and the 
doctor’s duty of care extended beyond his duties to administer the emergency 
contraceptive drug or to advise her where to get it, even though the drug was 
apparently obtainable over the counter in pharmacies. Their failure to exercise 
this extended duty of care resulted in harm to the Appellant, for which they 
were liable. 
It is not clear why the court officials could not be held to the same standard 
as the police and be found liable for failure by the appellant to obtain a law-
ful abortion, especially since they volunteered wrong legal advice, which the 
Appellant probably relied upon, causing the delay. Feltoe26 argues that once 
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the court officials had volunteered legal advice, they put themselves within the 
ambit of a duty of care towards the Appellant. Further, there might have been 
a basis for liability if the trial court had called for evidence or the Supreme 
Court remitted the matter for more evidence to the High court. The Supreme 
Court held the provisions of the Termination of Pregnancy Act meant that it 
was the Appellant who had a duty to take measures to obtain the certificate, 
which included filing an affidavit with a magistrate detailing the grounds for 
termination. 
The Supreme Court in its judgment referenced international norms derived 
from CEDAW (particularly Article 16, on the right for women to decide on 
the number and spacing of children and to have adequate access to informa-
tion in exercising those rights), and the United Nations Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women 1993 regarding the duty of states to 
ensure elimination of violence against women by providing effective redress 
mechanisms. It also referred to the rights and imperatives in Article 4 of the 
Maputo Protocol, which require states to establish effective information and 
reparation systems for women victims of violence; Article 14(1) on reproduc-
tive rights; and Article 14(2)(c) on access to safe abortion. This was from the 
arguments raised by the Appellant. The Court found these international instru-
ments should have persuasive value in the interpretation of statutes and the 
common law, although not formally binding because of non-domestication. 
However, as far as the Court was concerned, the extent to which these norms 
were relevant was in the state enacting laws to enable termination of preg-
nancy where appropriate and providing the necessary information and facilities 
within the available state resources. It did not extend to a duty to initiate Court 
proceedings on behalf of the victim. 
The Court found, however, in passing, that the law as written was unclear 
in the required steps to be taken by a victim of rape who requires termination 
and the relevant duties of state actors in the process. The Court stated that, to 
bring the state in compliance with its international obligations, it must amend 
the law to ensure effective assistance to rape victims. This is an admission by 
the Court of the ineffectiveness of redress mechanisms put in place through 
legislation. 
The Court decision on abortion is illustrative of the limitations to wom-
en’s access to abortion occasioned by conservative application of the law. The 
Court fails to affirm a women’s right to safe abortion and the obligations of 
the state, including the judiciary, to uphold this right as recognized in legisla-
tion. In addition, the new Zimbabwe Constitution of 2013 had already been 
passed when the matter was argued, with provisions on the right to health. 
The provision of the Constitution on the right to health ought to have been 
considered by the Court in this case. Section 76 of the Constitution provides 
for the right to basic healthcare services, including reproductive healthcare, 
and requires the state to put in place measures for the progressive realization 
of the right. When the provisions of the constitution are read together with 
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is therefore constitutionally guaranteed. A provision in section 48, however, 
limits this right by restricting abortion through the protection of the life of the 
unborn child. Abortion is only allowed in terms of the provisions of an Act of 
Parliament.27 
The Court completely overlooked the provisions of the Constitution in its 
interpretation of the Termination of Pregnancy Act in the context of the acts 
complained of and the right of access to reproductive healthcare. This is despite 
that in terms of section 46(2), the Court is supposed to be guided by the spirit 
and objectives of the Bill of Rights in its interpretation of legislature. Some 
of the relevant human rights contained in the Bill of Rights which the court 
should have applied include the right to bodily and psychological integrity,28 
which encompasses the right to make reproductive choices, the right to equal 
protection of the law, and non-discrimination on the basis of sex and gender29 
in addition to health rights. In this case, the court found problems with the law 
but declined to take up the challenge. 
This submission is made mindful of the fact that the case had not been 
brought on a Constitutional basis, but in delict. This, of course, made it dif-
ficult to make constitutional arguments or have the court make constitutional 
findings. However, the Court is empowered in terms of section 176 of the 
Constitution to develop the common law in line with justice and the constitu-
tion, which it could have done on its own. For example, the High Court in 
the case of S v Jeri30 applied constitutional imperatives in a murder case where 
a woman had been killed because she had rejected the sexual advances of the 
man accused. In convicting the accused, the court concentrated on the gender-
based violence dimensions of the offence and the constitutional provisions that 
militate against it. The Court applied the provisions of sections 51(right to 
dignity) and 52(b) (right to freedom from violence) to contextualize the duties 
of the court in assessing the facts relating to the motivations, given the defences 
to the killing. The Court determined the accused had violated the deceased’s 
rights. The Court said: 
As courts, it is our duty to be alive to the constitutional imperatives and 
to make the gender connections from the everyday cases that we deal 
with. The motivations for the assault were clearly gendered and to fail to 
speak to the gender dimensions of this case would be to legitimise gender-
based violence within the criminal justice system. Our efficacy as courts in 
addressing gender-based violence rests in ensuring that the criminal justice 
system speaks to the lived realities and experiences of all its victims.31 
According to Feltoe,32 the Jeri judgment is a good example of how the courts 
should approach cases involving violence against women: 
The judgment in the Jeri case shows how the courts should approach cases 
involving gender-based violence. The courts have an obligation to base 
their judgments in such matters squarely on the constitutional provisions 
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on the rights of women. They need to make it quite clear that violent 
behaviour arising from erroneous male misconceptions and prejudices 
about their right to dominate women will be severely dealt with. 
It is possible that the court in the Mapingure case might have made different 
conclusions had the matter been brought as a constitutional challenge under 
the provisions of the new constitution. However, when the case was initially 
filed in 2007, the Zimbabwe Constitution, 1979 did not contain health rights 
or some of the other progressive rights present in the new Constitution. It 
could have been possible to bring a claim alleging discrimination based on 
sex, but without guarantee of success. The major complication with cases of 
this nature is that they are often delictual and subject to rigid common law 
principles that are often difficult to discharge. With the new Constitution, it 
is hoped that a new kind of jurisprudence relating to the direct protection of 
rights, including sexual and reproductive rights, will emerge in Zimbabwe and 
ensure justice for women. 
Nevertheless, the judgment as it stands affords some relief to victims of 
sexual violence with regards to the duties of the police and other officers with 
a direct duty of care. Another positive aspect of the judgment was the court’s 
acknowledgment of the lack of clarity in the law, bringing attention to the 
need for law reform and giving room to advocacy. This effectively leaves room 
for future development. 
The applicant was subsequently awarded damages against the police and 
health ministry. Despite this positive outcome at court in this matter, the appli-
cant took years to receive payment from the state. This highlights the need for 
persistent follow-through and advocacy at the domestic level to the point of 
implementation to ensure that, in addition to the greater good coming out of 
a precedent-setting judgment, the individual on whom the case is predicated 
actually receives remedies. 
3.3 GMJ v Attorney General of Botswana 
Many countries in Southern Africa do not have stand-alone mechanisms for 
the protection of sexual and reproductive health rights. In seeking redress for 
violations of sexual and reproductive rights, women must turn to the civil 
litigation system and, more commonly, file medical professional negligence 
claims. In addition to the complexities of the medical field which many mar-
ginalized and vulnerable women have little knowledge about, women have to 
contend with navigating the rather tenuous road of legal and court procedures. 
The complexities often lead to failure to access justice and redress for viola-
tions of sexual and reproductive health. One common barrier to the effective 
vindication of women’s rights in this area is the concept of extinctive prescrip-
tion. This is the concept that, due to the passing of time, certain rights either 
become extinguished or are no longer enforceable. Prescription is often set 
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out in national legislation, providing for specific periods within which certain 
rights can be vindicated. After the specified period passes, the rights become 
unenforceable or are extinguished. 
The case of GMJ v Attorney General,33 decided in the Botswana Court of 
Appeal on 26 October 2018, illustrates how the laws of prescription act to 
limit access to redress for sexual and reproductive health violations for women, 
and how court decisions can be used to clarify and simplify the requirements 
of access. 
The appellant (GMJ) had undergone a surgical procedure for removal 
of the womb resulting in severe complications which completely disrupted 
her life and physical and mental well-being. She issued summons against the 
Respondent, claiming damages for medical negligence and lack of proper post-
operative care. The Respondent filed a special plea of prescription on the 
grounds that the claim had prescribed. The Respondent argued the claim was 
filed after 3 years from the date of the cause of action, when the plaintiff first 
noticed symptoms and became aware of the injury. In terms of the Botswana 
Prescription Act,34 a claim for damages prescribes after 3 years from the date of 
knowledge of the injury giving rise to the claim. The question to be answered 
was the time a person would be considered to have knowledge of the injury, 
or the facts giving rise to the claim. The High Court agreed with the State 
and decided she obtained knowledge of the facts giving rise to the claim the 
moment GMJ experienced the symptoms of her problem, and therefore the 
claim had prescribed. 
GMJ filed an appeal with the Botswana Appeals Court and argued the point 
of knowledge of the facts giving rise to her claim could not have been the point 
when she became aware of the symptoms she had, in line with decided South 
African cases and based on similar prescription provisions.35 The South African 
Constitutional Court in Links v Member of the Executive Council, Department of 
Health, Northern Cape Province36 held that in cases involving medical profes-
sional negligence, the party relying on prescription has the duty to show that 
the plaintiff had enough facts to cause them to conclude there was fault on the 
part of the medical staff that caused their injury. The Court said: 
It seems to me that it would be unrealistic for the law to expect a litigant 
who has no knowledge of medicine to have knowledge of what caused his 
condition without having first had an opportunity of consulting a relevant 
medical professional or specialist for advice. That in turn requires that the 
litigant is in possession of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable person to 
suspect that something has gone wrong and to seek advice.37 
The Botswana Court of Appeal issued a judgment in favour of GMJ and 
reinstated her claim. The Court ruled that the suspicion of the cause of the 
Appellant’s injury was insufficient to constitute knowledge because she did not 
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the cause of her condition was a material fact for the purpose of determining 
who was at fault. Thus, the relevant date for the purposes of prescription was 
not the date she noticed the symptoms, but the date she became aware of the 
cause for the symptoms. 
Although the decision was solely grounded in the law of delict and concerned
civil law and procedure, the decision is very significant in the realization of wom-
en’s sexual and reproductive health and rights when it comes to accessing justice.
In line with CEDAW Committee General Recommendation 24 on Article 12 of
CEDAW, Botswana is obligated to respect, protect and fulfil women’s right to
reproductive health services through effective legislation, policy, implementation
and judicial action. This judgment is a step towards this obligation. 
Many women who have experienced violations, such as coerced or forced 
sterilization and other reproductive rights violations, are unable to obtain redress 
because of prescription, whether due to the lack of medical or other techni-
cal knowledge, the lack of access to legal advice, or personal circumstances. 
This case is an important step towards the realization of effective redress for 
violations, but it is only a start. A total elimination of prescription laws when 
it comes to violations of women’s rights would be the ultimate victory, either 
through constitutional interpretation or the creation of a totally different cause 
of action based on the rights afforded through international and national laws. 
4 Challenges 
From the cases discussed above and other experiences, the results of strategic 
litigation can be rewarding, but are not without challenges, both general, con-
tent-specific, and dependent on geographical location. Litigation takes time, 
and delays in the conclusion of cases from the judicial system, state responses, 
and handing down judgments are common. The delays are less of an issue in 
some countries than others. Mapingure’s case was initially filed in 2007 and the 
Supreme Court judgment was only issued 7 years later, in 2014. However, 
judgments are handed down quickly in other countries like Botswana. 
A major challenge to instituting strategic litigation is often associated pro-
hibitive costs, including lawyer fees, engagement of experts, court and messen-
ger/sheriff costs38. In addition, the risk of getting an adverse costs order in the 
event of an unsuccessful suit is daunting and may affect the decision to litigate 
in uncertain cases. In some cases, it may be possible to convince the Court not 
to award costs, especially in cases with important constitutional or national 
interest value. The High Court in Mapingure dismissed the claim but declined 
to award costs against her because of the national importance of the case. GMJ, 
however, had to deposit security for costs for the appeal and was in danger of 
having an adverse costs order against her, had she not succeeded in the case. 
The implementation of judgments sometimes depends on State goodwill or 
resources. In many jurisdictions, judgments cannot be enforced in the tradi-
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Court. For example, when the applicant in the Mapingure case in Zimbabwe 
was awarded damages by the Court she was not paid for a long time. She could 
not issue out process to attach State property to satisfy the award. Effectively, 
changes in law/policy can be of limited benefit for women. 
There are often difficulties in mobilizing affected clients to attend court or 
in maintaining the client’s involvement and interest, due to fear of stigmatiza-
tion and inadequate information. These difficulties also include lack of personal 
resources to attend court and the unavailability of adequate funding. A major 
issue affecting the efficacy of strategic SRHR litigation is general ignorance 
and negative attitudes towards SRHR by the public and courts.39 In addition, 
as illustrated above, prescription laws are often an issue in SRHR cases where 
it is intended to sue for damages or litigate against the State. 
Most importantly, the nature of cases relating to sexual and reproductive 
health and rights can be very traumatic to clients. The cases often relate to dis-
tressing experiences which continue to have a significant impact on their lives. 
They also relate to very personal issues which create additional stress relating to 
how such issue will be perceived in court and in the public domain. It is thus 
essential to provide clients with psycho-social support throughout the litiga-
tion process. 
5 Lessons Learnt 
It is important to explore ways in which some of the challenges outlined above 
can be mitigated. It helps to ensure that local lawyers and partner organizations 
maintain regular communication with clients, and to ensure that all decisions 
relating to the case are made with client’s consent and best interest. 
Collaboration is also a very strong tool in effective strategic litigation, as 
social movements identify cases and sustain advocacy. Sustained advocacy 
around the case is essential at the hearing and after judgment. Sustained advo-
cacy ensures the case becomes a catalyst for similar cases in other countries 
and ensures the value of judgments for continued advocacy; litigation cannot 
always provide redress to all. 
For efficiency, there should be thorough research of submissions to present 
the best arguments that will enable the judge to write judgments without fear 
of negative repercussions. The research of submissions should also ensure suf-
ficient evidence is obtained, including expert evidence to support technical 
arguments around health and SRHR. 
Where possible, it is also important to choose the best clients for strate-
gic litigation and protect their privacy by obtaining confidentiality orders in 
advance where necessary. The use of confidentiality orders is an important fac-
tor in ensuring that vulnerable clients can co-operate without fear of stigma or 
other negative repercussions. It is also important to utilize complaints mecha-
nisms and other non-litigious measures before proceeding to institute litiga-
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6 Conclusion 
Strategic litigation is a very effective tool for reform, especially by highlight-
ing the gaps in the law and the effect of the gaps on the lived realities of
women’s lives. It also serves as an important means of holding states account-
able to realize SRHR. Nevertheless, strategic litigation can be challenging,
especially considering differing interpretations and unwillingness of some
courts to embrace international norms that promote sexual and reproductive
rights. The value of the major role of the law in social change and cohesion
cannot be overlooked, however, and it is important to have an integrated
approach with litigation, advocacy, and other non-litigious means to achieve
social change. 
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Experiences from the Kenya 
National Commission on 
Human Rights (KNCHR) 
on the promotion and 
protection of sexual and 
reproductive health and rights
Shatikha S. Chivusia
1  Introduction
The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) is a National 
Human Rights Institution (NHRI) established under both the Constitution 
and Statute laws of Kenya. The Commission’s core mandate of protecting 
and promoting human rights was further enhanced under the Prevention of 
Torture Act (2017) to investigate complaints of torture, cruel and inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment within the country.
KNCHR enjoys ‘A’ status accreditation under the United Nations Paris 
Principles which were adopted by the General Assembly in 1993. They provide 
for the mandate of NHRIs to protect human rights through inter alia, receiv-
ing, investigating and resolving complaints; mediating conflicts and monitoring 
activities. Further, NHRIs are obliged to promote human rights observance 
through public education, outreach, media engagement, publications, training 
and capacity building as well as advising and assisting the government in respect 
thereto. Based upon these guidelines, the mandate of KNCHR is stipulated 
under its constitutive Act and implementation of the same has led to its above 
referred to accreditation as per the six criteria of the Paris Principles (broad 
mandate based on international human rights norms ad standards, autonomy 
from government, guaranteed under constitutive law, pluralism, adequate 
resources and adequate powers of investigation). More information about 
KNCHR may be found on its official website.
2  Understanding Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Rights
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHRs) are said to encompass 
all of those rights regarding ones’ sexual and reproductive health and by exten-
sion, life itself. Sexual and reproductive health rights cannot be actualized in 
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isolation as they are closely linked to other human rights such as the right to 
bodily integrity, the right to human dignity, the right to health/ highest attain-
able standard of health, the right to life, the right to privacy and freedom from 
violence and all forms of discrimination, amongst others. 
According to information available on the website of Choice for Youth and 
Sexuality.1 
‘The term SRHR combines four separate but interrelated concepts: Sexual Health 
(SH), Reproductive Health (RH), Sexual Rights (SR), and Reproductive Rights 
(RR). Sexual and Reproductive health and rights cover the right to decide if, when and 
how often to have children, the right to live free from disease, the right to have access to 
accurate, comprehensive and confidential information etc; while Sexual Rights cover the 
right to sexual pleasure, the right to sexual expression, the right to sexual privacy, the 
right to have access to the full range of contraceptives and the right to choose your partner 
amongst others’. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has defined sexual health as ‘a 
state of physical, emotional, mental and social well-being in relation to sexu-
ality’2 while the International Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD) Programme of Action described reproductive health as concerning 
peoples’ ability to reproduce and the freedom to make informed, free and 
responsible decisions about their reproductive behaviour based on access to a 
range of reproductive health data, goods, facilities and services. 
It is noteworthy that although internationally recognized, SRHR are still 
considered controversial and also contentious. This is especially so when issues 
of sexual and gender diversity that have not been fully embraced in many 
communities are mixed into the discussion. SRHR rest on the recognition of 
the basic rights of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly 
the number, spacing and timing of their children. In addition, parties should 
have the information and means to do so, plus the right to attain the highest 
standard of sexual and reproductive health. SRHR also encompass the right to 
make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and 
violence, as expressed in several human rights documents.3 It should also be 
noted that just as the right to the highest attainable standard of health does not 
only mean absence of disease and infirmity but also includes the right to the 
provision of preventive, curative and palliative health care, including underly-
ing determinants of health,4 the same is applicable to the right to sexual and 
reproductive health. It extends beyond sexual and reproductive health care to 
the underlying determinants such as access to safe and potable water, adequate 
sanitation, adequate food and nutrition, adequate housing, safe and healthy 
working conditions and environment, health-related education and informa-
tion, and effective protection from all forms of violence, torture and discrimi-
nation amongst other human rights violations that have a negative impact on 
the actualization of the right to sexual and reproductive health. 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights5 has rightly 
observed that numerous legal, procedural, practical and social barriers seri-
ously restrict people’s access to the full range of sexual and reproductive health 
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facilities, services, goods and information and that full enjoyment of this right 
remains a distant goal for many in the world, especially women and girls. The 
Committee singled out lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons 
and persons with disabilities as individuals and groups that experience multi-
ple and intersecting forms of discrimination. These groups’ situation is further 
exacerbated by their exclusion in both law and practice which places further 
restrictions on their full enjoyment of the right to sexual and reproductive 
health. 
3 Kenya’s Normative Framework on Sexual 
and Reproductive Health Rights 
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights are fundamental human rights 
that are guaranteed in various international and regional human rights instru-
ments as well as national laws and policies6 in Kenya. As a matter of fact, the 
supreme law of the country provides for the application of international treaties 
and conventions that Kenya has ratified alongside domestic law. Though there 
is currently no human rights instrument under international law that provides 
specifically for sexual and reproductive health and rights, there exists a plethora 
of provisions housed in various international and regional instruments which 
are geared towards the advancement of these rights. As was rightfully noted 
during the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 
Programme of Action);-
…sexual and reproductive health rights are not a new set of rights; rather they are 
rights already recognised in human rights instruments.7 
Amongst the instruments with specific protections on sexual and reproductive 
health rights are the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); Convention on the Elimination 
of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1966); Convention on the Elimination 
of all forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(1984); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006). At the African regional level, the 
chief instrument that provides for sexual and reproductive health and rights 
is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981)[ The African 
Charter] which states that every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best 
attainable state of physical and mental health. Similar provisions are contained 
in the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) and the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa popularly known as the ‘Maputo Protocol’ (2003). 
The international Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) promotes the right to health, includ-
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24 has also clearly indicated that women’s right to health includes their sexual 
and reproductive health thus implying that States have obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfill rights related to women’s sexual and reproductive health. 
The Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health maintains that women 
are entitled to reproductive health care services, goods and facilities. The same 
ought to be availed in adequate numbers, be physically and economically 
accessible, without discrimination, and be of good quality. 
The CESCR General Comment 14 explains that the provision of maternal 
health services is comparable to a core obligation which cannot be derogated 
from under any circumstances, and that States have the immediate obligation 
to take deliberate, concrete, and targeted steps towards fulfilling the right to 
health in the context of pregnancy and childbirth. The Committee considers 
the right to health in all its forms and at all levels to contain the following in 
every particular State party;-availability of functioning public health and health-
care facilities, goods and services, as well as programmes in sufficient quantity; 
accessibility physically, economically and to information in non-discriminatory 
terms; acceptable and of quality which entails, inter alia, skilled medical per-
sonnel; scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and hospital equipment; 
safe and potable water plus adequate sanitation. In its General Comment 22, 
the Committee has affirmed that the enjoyment of the right to health includes 
SRHR. The Committee further affirms that states must ensure the realization 
of the SRHR of women and girls on a non-discriminatory basis. 
The Children’s Convention also provides strong protection on their right to
access sexual and reproductive health services together with the rights to equal-
ity and non-discrimination. This includes protection of girls’ rights as a result of
the stigma surrounding sexuality in most societies and the attendant discrimina-
tion and inequalities that they face daily in life. The Committee on the Rights of
the Child (CRC) in its general comment 4 has also advocated for the realization
of children’s right to sexual and reproductive health services and obliged states
to ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health interventions. Such
realization would include adolescent access to short and long-term contracep-
tive methods, emergency contraception, safe abortion and post-abortion care
services irrespective of whether abortion itself is legal in the state parties’ juris-
diction. The CRC has on several occasions strongly condemned and called for
the eradication of socio-cultural practices that jeopardize children’s reproductive
rights such as child marriage and female genital mutilation. 
The adjudication of several cases on children’s rights to sexual and repro-
ductive health services by various International and regional human rights 
bodies is an indication of the strong advocacy for this right for children. For 
example, the United Nations Human Rights Council Committee held in KL 
v Peru (UNHRC 2005) that denying abortion services to a child who was car-
rying a pregnancy that posed a risk to her life and mental wellbeing amounted 
to a violation of her right to privacy, and also to cruel, inhuman and degrading 
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made similar findings in R and S v Poland (ECHR 2008) where a child had 
intentionally been obstructed from accessing abortion services. 
At the continental level, there exists a normative and institutional frame-
work in Africa for the promotion, protection and realization of SRHR, which 
continues to evolve and become stronger. Amongst these are the Maputo 
Protocol already cited above, the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in 
Africa, the Continental Policy Framework on SRHR, and the Maputo Action 
Plan. Further to the above are the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child, the African Youth Charter and the AU Gender Strategy. 
The Africa Charter which is the foundation of the African human rights 
system and the parent treaty of the Maputo Protocol enshrines the principle of 
non-discrimination on all grounds including on the basis of sex. It also obliges 
states to eliminate discrimination against women and girls and to protect their 
rights. It was the key determinant in the creation of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Rights of Women in Africa mandate and guarantees women’s right to 
health, including sexual and reproductive health. The adoption of the Maputo 
Protocol by the African Union in 2003 ushered in a new era in the advance-
ment of women’s human rights, including SRHR in Africa.8 The Maputo 
Protocol also calls upon States Parties to take all appropriate measures to ‘pro-
tect the reproductive rights of women by authorizing medical abortion in cases 
of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the continued pregnancy endangers 
the mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or 
the foetus. This provision has been hailed as affirming a substantive equality 
approach to addressing the sexual and reproductive health and rights of women 
in the region.9 
Women’s rights to sexual and reproductive health enumerated therein
include the rights to control their fertility, the number and spacing of children,
choice of contraception method, and access to family planning education. It is
noteworthy that this is the first ‘international human rights instrument to rec-
ognize abortion as a women’s right that should be enjoyed without restriction
or fear of being prosecuted under certain conditions. Many African countries
are however, yet to undertake the necessary legislative reforms needed towards
domesticating the relevant provisions of the Maputo Protocol especially in the
area of women’s sexual and reproductive rights. The practical reality is therefore
that many women and girls continue to have limited access to family planning
and accessing safe and available abortion services even in cases where it is legal. 
Three General Comments have been adopted with regard to the Maputo
Protocol two of which are by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights and explain their normative content. The comments also articulate meas-
ures which states should undertake to fulfil their obligations under the Protocol.
The first general comment on Article 14 (1) (d) and (e) with regard to women’s
rights and HIV, and the second general comment concerns the rights to reproduc-
tive freedom, family planning and safe abortion. The latter may also be utilized to
guide drafting and presentation of State periodic reports particularly when report-















Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 211 
reproductive health of women and girls. The Third General Comment, adopted
in 2017, jointly by the ACHPR and the African Committee of Experts on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child focuses on ending child marriages and refers to
both the Maputo Protocol and the African Children’s Charter. 
The revised Continental Policy Framework on SRHRs translated into the
Maputo Plan of Action provides guidance to African states on how to implement
the ICPD Programme of Action (UN 1994) and the Abuja Declaration (AU
2001). Of the Fifty-two countries that have signed the Maputo Protocol, only
forty have ratified it and seven of these with reservations, which mostly touch
on women and girls’ SRHR particularly with regard to marriage and access
to safe abortion. The import of this is that many factors still impede women’s
enjoyment of the provisions of the Maputo Plan of Action. Its implementation
is further hampered by factors such as inadequate health legislation and infra-
structure, weak political commitment and leadership, inadequate financing and
high donor dependency, coupled with poor women empowerment. The situa-
tion is further exacerbated by cultural norms and practices in highly patriarchal
societies, which continue to entrench and justify violation of women’s rights.10 
Another component of the continental legislative and normative frame-
work is the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa which reaffirms 
African states’ commitments to gender equality and parity and the protection 
of women and girls’ rights. Further, the African heads of state endorsed the 
Continental Policy Framework on Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights 
(CPF) in January 2006. It offers guidance to policy formulation by mem-
ber states in the implementation of the ICPD Plan of Action (PoA) and the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The CPF identified the following 
eight core strategic areas which it called for mainstreaming and harmonization 
into all development initiatives-maternal mortality and morbidity, infant and 
child mortality, contraceptive use and family planning services, unsafe abortion, 
sexually transmitted infections and HIV and Aids, Adolescent Reproductive 
Health, Female Genital Mutilation and Gender-based Violence. The CPF also 
identified the challenges highlighted above and sought to strengthen implemen-
tation of the recommendations of the Abuja Declaration of the 2001 Summit 
of Heads of State and Government to increase resources for the health sector as 
a means to realization of SRHR on the continent. 
With specific regard to youth and adolescents, the two main regional frame-
works are the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the 
African Youth Charter which both seek to prioritize youth development and 
empowerment through their participation in debates and decision-making. 
Further, Africa’s first Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment 
Strategy reaffirms its commitment to advancing gender equality and is expected 
to contribute to attaining Agenda 2063 visions for gender equality. During the 
consultative process on the formulation of the strategy, child marriage, FGM, 
gender-violence against women, eradication of maternal mortality and HIV 
and AIDS were given priority. Further, attention was also given to ensuring 
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affordable and accessible SRHR especially for the youth in terms of adolescent 
pregnancies, commercial sexual exploitation, lack of youth-friendly SRHR 
services and sexual violence/harassment in schools. 
3.1 Kenya’s Domestic Legal and Policy Framework 
Kenya’s domestic law contains provisions for the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, which includes the right to reproductive health care for 
every person. Provision for emergency medical treatment has also been made 
in absolute terms and on condition that it should never be denied. The State 
is further obliged to provide social security as appropriate, to persons who are 
unable to support themselves and their dependents. To realize this right, the 
Kenyan government has put in place several statutory provisions and policies 
amongst which is the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) Act, 
2011. This Act prohibits the practice of FGM, safeguards against violation of a 
person’s mental or physical integrity through the said act and other connected 
purposes. It defines what constitutes FGM, provides for the forms of crimes 
and punishments thereunder and also aims to reduce the scale of the practice 
with the target of eliminating it wholly. Methods of assisting the survivors 
of FGM in terms of medical assistance and actions that the government is 
supposed to undertake to eradicate the practice are also given. This law has 
rendered the practice of FGM a crime against the State and punishable by 
imprisonment and /or fines. Constitutional guarantees in Kenya for women 
and children to be free from all forms of discrimination are also available, with 
the right to dignity and physical integrity safeguarded. Further, freedom from 
violence; the right to health and the right not to be compelled to undergo any 
harmful cultural practices have been protected. 
Kenya also has the Sexual Offences Act 2006 which came into force in July 
2006 and makes provision for sexual offences, their definition, and prevention. 
It provides protection to all persons from harm, unlawful sexual acts and similar 
conduct. The law was hailed for bringing clarity on the definition and types of 
sexual offences apart from introducing more strict sentencing guidelines based 
on provision of ‘minimum sentences’. It also provides for the management 
of medical treatment and court processes that protect the dignity of victims. 
Unfortunately, however, the criminal justice system in Kenya has faced various 
challenges in addressing the plight of victims and survivors of sexual offences 
thus putting a dent to the expected achievements of this law. Further, few 
convictions in relation to the number of reported cases and the perceived high 
incidence of sexual crimes in the country point to constrain in the prosecution 
of sexual offences and thus the expected impact of this law. 
The 2001 Children’s Act of Kenya aimed to domesticate the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child. Among its provisions is prohibition of harmful cultural 
practices such as child marriages, FGM and sexual offences 
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There are also several policies in addition to the above laws that have been 
developed such as the National Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health 
Policy, the Contraceptive Commodities Security Strategy (2007–2012), the 
Contraceptive Policy and Strategy (2002–2006), Reproductive Health Policy 
of 2015 and an institutional framework to promote and protect the sexual and 
reproductive health rights of Kenyans. The Adolescent Reproductive Health 
and Development Policy, 2003, aims at enhancing SRH status of adolescents 
in Kenya and contributes towards realization of their full potential in national 
development. The Policy seeks to bring adolescent sexual and reproductive 
health and rights issues into the country’s mainstream health and development 
agenda. This is in line with the country’s international and regional obliga-
tions which include the Ministerial Commitment on Comprehensive Sexuality 
Education and SRH Services for Adolescents and Young People in Eastern 
and Southern Africa (ESA, 2013), the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the Program of Action of the International Conference on Population and 
Development. Added to these and other instruments already listed above is 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) approved by the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development in September 2000. The implementation of the 
Adolescent Reproductive Health and Development Policy is guided by the 
principles of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, responsive-
ness to the varying sexual and reproductive health needs of adolescents and 
provision of holistic and integrated ASRH information and services. The pol-
icy also recognizes the critical role parents, guardians and communities play in 
the promotion of SRHRs; involvement of adolescents in the planning, imple-
mentation, monitoring and evaluation of ASRH programs plus the utilization 
of evidence-based interventions and programming. 
The National Condom Policy and Strategy (2009–2014) on the other hand 
seeks to ensure adequate national supply of and access to condoms, coupled 
with public education and advocacy to increase use among those in need but 
not utilizing condoms. The policy and strategy was based on the findings of a 
study by the National AIDS Control Council (NACC) which estimated that 
about 1.5 million people had died of AIDS as of June 2000 since detection of 
the pandemic in Kenya in the early 1980s. The pandemic had resulted in more 
than 1 million children being orphaned, and a suspected significant drop in life 
expectancy at birth. The objectives of the Policy and Strategy provide that no 
barriers should exist to access and use condoms by those who need and want 
to use them. Further, that user charges and revolving funds in public service 
delivery points should be established bearing in mind equity considerations 
plus the cost of condoms by providers and users. Another objective is to have 
in place an effective management of condom supply pipeline. 
The National Reproductive Health Policy, 2007 consolidates efforts by 
the government to enhance the reproductive health status of all Kenyans by 
increasing equitable access to reproductive health services and by improving the 
quality, efficiency and effectiveness of services provided at all levels. The policy 
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lifestyles of individuals and communities in tandem with the Millennium 
development goals (MDGs). Its purpose is to improve maternal health, reduce 
neonatal and child mortality, reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS and promote 
women’s empowerment and gender equality. The policy was developed as a 
result of the response to the ICPD in 1994 which called for the development of 
comprehensive reproductive health policies, programmes and implementation 
plans. It emphasized the strategic roles of information, education and com-
munity mobilization and participation in promoting and protecting SRHR. 
On the other hand, the National Reproductive Health Policy is guided
by principles of respect for human rights and freedoms and provides for
the freedom of couples and individuals to decide responsibly the timing,
number and spacing of their children. The right to have access to requisite
information and education for making informed decisions is also protected.
The Policy further calls for all people to freely and responsibly decide on
all aspects of their sexuality, including the right to be free from conditions
that interfere with their sexual health. Other aspects are protection from
harmful practices, sexually acquired infections, complications associated with
menopause and andropause, and coercion into sexual acts and other forms
of sexual violence. The policy provides priority actions in Safe Motherhood,
Maternal and Neonatal Health, Family Planning and Adolescents/Youth
Sexual and Reproductive Health. Gender Issues, Sexual and Reproductive
Rights, HIV and AIDS, Reproductive Tract Infections, Infertility, Cancers
of Reproductive Organs and Reproductive Health for Elderly Persons are
also provided for. 
The above discussion indicates that clearly, Kenya is obliged by virtue of 
her legal regime to enforce the right to the highest attainable standard of health 
for its citizenry (including SRHR) and to take steps towards progressively 
realizing the rights recognized in the CESCR. This right has been interpreted 
variously including non-confinement to not only the right to health care only 
but expansion to include the right to control one’s health and body, the right 
to access essential health information and freedom from interference with one’s 
health, among others 
3.2 Access to SRHR goods and services in Kenya 
Apart from the legal framework available in Kenya with regard to the realiza-
tion of sexual and reproductive health rights, it is important to briefly discuss 
the status of health facilities and healthcare services in the country, which form 
part of the operating environment for KNCHR’s advocacy work. 
Provision of health care services in Kenya has on several occasions been crip-
pled and even grounded due to industrial action by its more than 600 doctors 
demanding for better terms of service, improvements to dilapidated public 
health facilities and for the government to address the prevailing huge short-
age of doctors. The worst of these strikes went on for more than a hundred 
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many patients due to lack of medical care.11 In January 2018, doctors, under 
the umbrella body known as the Kenya Medical Practitioners, Pharmacists and 
Dentists Union once again gave a strike notice and threatened to down their 
tools by February over alleged failure by universities and medical colleges to 
pay allowances due to their members.12 Fortunately, the industrial action was 
averted when the doctors’ body reached an agreement with the government 
over their terms of service. 
In addition to the doctors’ strikes, the provision of health care services is 
often further negatively impacted through frequent downing of tools by other 
medical practitioners especially nurses. Recently, one of their strikes went on 
for over one hundred and fifty days.13 Added to the situation are also strikes 
by university lecturers, which indirectly impacts health care provision due to 
their role in medical schools and affiliated referral hospitals. In the premises, 
the Kenyan public is many times left in a precarious position with regards to 
accessing health care services taking into account already existing numerous 
impediments that have to be surmounted.14 At the core of the many doctors’ 
strikes has always been the contention about devolution of health care services 
to county governments under the devolved system of government that was 
ushered in by the 2010 Constitution. Doctors preferred to have a national 
body responsible for management of their services and a scheme of employ-
ment as opposed to this status quo. 
4 The Experiences of KNCHR in Addressing 
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights 
The Paris Principles which came into effect in 1993 and on which the estab-
lishment of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) is grounded,
bestow on them a national mandate to protect and promote the respect for
human rights. This may be undertaken through various activities such as
receiving, investigating and resolving complaints of human rights violations;
mediating conflicts, monitoring and observing the national human rights
landscape, promoting observance of human rights through public education,
outreach, the media, publications, training and capacity building as well as
advising and assisting governments concerning the promotion and protection
of human rights. NHRIs form an integral part of the international human
rights mechanisms and have an essential role in promoting the implemen-
tation by states of international obligations with regard to actualization of
human sexual and reproductive health rights. More importantly, NHRIs can
play a crucial role in advancing SRHR at the national level through its pro-
motional and protective activities.15 KNCHR, being no exception to other
NHRIs, has likewise been endowed with a broad national mandate16 which
it has exercised in various ways. The following activities are illustrative of
KNCHR’s work with specific regard to the realization of reproductive and
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4.1 A Public Inquiry into Violations of Sexual 
and Reproductive Health Rights 
The 2008–09 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS)17 findings were 
quite disturbing. They contained indications that most Kenyan women’s first 
sexual intercourse was forced and against their will especially for women aged 
between 15 and 49 years (12%). The study further revealed that one in five 
Kenyan women (21 %) has experienced some form of sexual violence. In addi-
tion to the above, evidence from the Kenya Police Crime Report and Data for 
2007 indicated 876 rape cases, 1,984 cases of defilement, 181 cases of incest, 
198 cases of sodomy, 191 cases of indecent assault and 173 cases of abduction. 
In 2008, The Kenyan Police force listed ‘Offences against morality’ as making 
up 5% of the total reported crimes across the country. It was against this back-
drop that in 2009, the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) – Kenya and 
the Centre for Reproductive Rights of the United States of America (CRR),18 
filed a complaint with KNCHR regarding systematic violation of women’s 
reproductive health rights in many public health facilities. FIDA and CRR’s 
chief complaint was based on the findings of a joint study they had con-
ducted between November 2006 and May 2007 regarding Pumwani Maternity 
Hospital, which is Kenya’s largest maternal health care facility. The complaint 
prompted the Commission to launch an expanded Inquiry into the extent 
of violation of sexual and reproductive health and rights within the country 
in line with its mandate as an NHRI, to investigate or research matters in 
respect of human rights violations and make recommendations to improve the 
functioning of State organs. The objective of the Inquiry was to establish the 
extent and nature of violation of sexual and reproductive health and rights in 
the country and provide appropriate recommendations and redress measures. 
The nationwide public inquiry was conducted in 2011 and proved to
be a benchmark on the extent of the enjoyment of sexual and reproductive
health and rights as per Kenya’s 2010 Constitution. Other objectives of the
inquiry were to: 
• establish the adequacy and efficacy or otherwise of the legal and policy 
framework governing the implementation of sexual and reproductive 
health rights in Kenya; 
• assess the extent to which the government and non-state actors comply 
with their obligations relating to sexual and reproductive health rights, 
• determine the extent of awareness and pursuit of sexual and reproductive 
health rights in Kenya and 
• identify and document cases of violation of sexual and reproductive health 
rights in Kenya. 
In summary, the inquiry revealed that SRHR in Kenya are violated on several 
grounds amongst which are unavailability of essential sexual and reproductive 
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cost, high charges levied on the services- making them beyond the reach of 
majority indigent persons, poor quality of the available services and the lack of 
sensitivity to the cultural norms and beliefs of the people in service delivery. 
Further, the State was found to have failed to comply with its international and 
regional obligation to dedicate the requisite minimum of its available resources 
to progressively realize the right to sexual and reproductive health, especially 
under the Abuja Declaration already mentioned above. 
With regard to sexual violence, a WHO Report has documented that vari-
ous forms of sexual violence take place in Kenya under differing contexts.19 The
contexts include rape by strangers, within marriage and dating relationships plus
systemic rape during armed conflict. Unwanted sexual advances also known as
sexual harassment at the work place (such demand for sex in return for favours,
services or promotion at work), defilement and sexual abuse of persons with
disabilities, forced marriage or cohabitation including child marriages, denial of
the right to use contraception or the choice to use other measures to prevent
unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, forced abortion, forced
prostitution and trafficking of persons for purposes of sexual exploitation, and
violent acts against the sexual integrity of mainly women through such acts as
female genital mutilation and forced virginity inspections being some of the
other contexts. The KNCHR inquiry received a lot of witness submissions on
the issue of sexual violence. Of particular note were presentations from areas
that had experienced heightened conflicts where it was used as a weapon of
subjugation. Reports of incidences of marital rape were also received.20 
Another finding of the Inquiry was that effects of sexual violence were pro-
found on the victim’s reproductive health. This was apart from the resultant 
unwanted pregnancies and eventual unsafe abortions. Other effects noted were 
sexually transmitted infections including HIV and AIDS, gynaecological com-
plications, stigma, psychological trauma and in extreme cases disability or even 
death. Evidence also indicated rejection and abandonment by partners espe-
cially for female victims. Factors that perpetuate sexual violence were found 
to be numerous and amongst those recorded as disproportionately affecting 
women compared to men included:-
‘the unequal power relations where laws, policies, community practices and beliefs 
‘conspire’ to deprive women autonomy in private and public spheres’.21 
An earlier report22 that had also made similar findings listed low levels of aware-
ness of the law among the public, socioeconomic barriers amongst women, 
inability to negotiate safe sex and harmful cultural practices or traditional beliefs 
together with the culture of impunity that has normalized sexual abuse of 
females in most societies as key causes of sexual violence. The complexity of 
the Kenyan justice system from the perspective of the common person, who 
also finds it intimidating, was also singled out as a perpetuating factor.23 Among 
the identified barriers to access remedies by survivors of sexual violence were 
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of distance and cost, absence of integrated services, difficulty in accessing docu-
mentation to prove sexual violation, in particular the notorious P3 Form24 plus 
the burdensome and often humiliating justice system which has already been 
mentioned above. 
The KNCHR Inquiry further found that incidents of sexual violence 
continue despite the various national, regional and international frameworks 
already in place and aimed at addressing this phenomenon. On this basis, 
KNCHR made several recommendations to the Kenyan government which 
would strengthen how to minimize sexual violence and to safeguard reproduc-
tive health rights. Key recommendations were for Kenya to;-
• Urgently ratify the Optional Protocol to CEDAW to enable citizens file 
individual complaints to the Monitoring Committee under its procedures. 
• Provide survivors of sexual violence with medico-legal and psychosocial 
support 
• The Ministry of Health to work with stakeholders to disseminate and pop-
ularize the Guidelines on Management of Sexual Offences 
• Expand the range of health facilities to have capacity to serve survivors of 
sexual and gender-based violence countrywide 
• Remove barriers that hinder access to justice in respect of cases of sexual 
violence with a review of the prosecution requirements that are of a tech-
nical nature 
On its part, KNCHR undertook to create awareness on sexual violence, edu-
cate the public on procedures to be followed when violation occurs and to 
continuously monitor and document cases of sexual violence with the aim 
of holding the duty bearers accountable. The findings from the inquiry were 
published into a report25 that continues to be used for advocacy purposes and 
to inform policy and legislative interventions by various government agencies. 
The report also made a number of fundamental recommendations for con-
sideration by other stakeholders.26 As a follow-up to these recommendations, 
KNCHR carried out an audit exercise in 2017 to measure the extent to which 
the state has implemented the same. Of particular concern was progression 
made towards realizing the highest standard of health as provided for in the 
Constitution. While the audit exercise is still on-going and has yet to be final-
ized, preliminary findings indicate a noticeable improvement in several areas. 
Among these is the provision of free maternal health care in public facilities 
that has led to an increased number of women delivering in hospitals and 
thus enhancing safe delivery by pregnant mothers. In addition, a policy on 
free maternal health care has been formulated and there is an increase in the 
uptake of family planning facilities and services. Several structural measures 
have also been put in place to enhance accessibility of family planning facili-
ties and services. These facts not withstanding however, much still needs to be 
done to enhance the realization of sexual and reproductive rights in Kenya. 
Still in existence are barriers towards access to justice by survivors of sexual 
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violence, especially those stemming from political violence and unrest, from 
defilement cases, and notable delays in the prosecution and finalization of 
sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) cases. Added to this is the heavy 
financial weight that survivors of SGBV bear as currently there exists no public 
structure to support them financially or even provide them with a safe haven 
in instances where violations occur domestic relations. Added to the above, 
sexual minorities continue to face discrimination and stigma in accessing health 
services while the vulnerable and marginalized groups encompassing adoles-
cents/youth, people with disabilities, people living with HIV and AIDS and 
refugees have not been prioritized. This gap can be addressed through provi-
sion of appropriate services and centres at county level. Preparation of the final 
audit report is still under way and the findings therefrom will provide another 
key advocacy tool in Kenya’s journey towards the protection, promotion and 
fulfilment of Sexual and reproductive health rights. 
Further to the aforesaid, the commission, in partnership with the Africa 
Alliance for Women’s Reproductive Health and Rights (IPAS)27 Kenya has 
embarked on advocacy efforts to move the Kenyan state to lift its reservations 
under Article 14 (2) (C) of the Maputo Protocol.28 The advocacy exercise 
targets members of parliament as critical actors due to their legislative mandate 
and especially with regard to voting on Kenya’s ratification of international 
treaties and conventions. A component of the exercise will include training 
and awareness-raising amongst parliamentarians on the effects that this reserva-
tion places on Kenyan women and girls especially during conflict times. Joined 
with this are efforts by KNCHR to lobby the Ministry of Health to enact 
Guidelines on Abortion as provided for under the Constitution which once 
adopted shall go a long way in procuring emergency abortion when required. 
The above exercises by KNCHR provide an example of how NHRIs 
can effectively address realization of SRRH in their countries. While the full 
implementation of KNCHR’s recommendations by the state and other actors 
has proved limited so far, the documentation of evidence-based violations of 
SRHR in Kenya in 2012 provides a benchmark against which future similar 
exercises may be measured. Further, the Inquiry report provides a baseline for 
the government and other actors to monitor and measure improvement of req-
uisite services and goods to the public in actualization of the various relevant 
rights. It will prove valuable in addressing gaps and trends towards realizing 
sexual and reproductive health rights in Kenya. 
5 Monitoring, Documentation and Redress of Electoral 
Related Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) 
Cases During and after the 2017 Elections 
Kenya’s history of electoral violence can be traced back to its independence 
elections and continues to incorporate sexual violence as a weapon. The aim 
of electoral-related sexual violence is mainly to limit and or punish expression 
of choice or even intimidate and punish those perceived to have alternative 
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political views. It should be noted that sexual violence strikes at the core of 
human dignity and is often accompanied by violation of several other human 
rights such as the rights to life; dignity; liberty and security of the person. 
Further, sexual violence infringes on the rights to freedom from torture, cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment; freedom from discrimination; and the right 
to highest attainable standard of health. The physical and mental consequences 
attendant to sexual violence have been found to be extremely dire to the sur-
vivors, their families and even society at large. 
During Kenya’s 2007/8 Post election violence, KNCHR, together with 
other stakeholders including the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election 
Violence popularly known as the Waki Commission29 and later the Truth 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) documented over 900 cases 
on sexual violence. KNCHR’s documentation efforts resulted in its now-
famous report titled ‘On the Brink of the Precipice’30 which found that women 
and children had been particularly targeted for rape on the basis of their eth-
nicity and thus perceived political affiliation. Opportunistic rape also occurred 
in the internally displaced persons’ [IDP] camps with perpetrators being both 
security agents and civilians. Though efforts for accountability by KNCHR 
and other actors suffered a setback when the Office of the Director for Public 
Prosecutions held that none of the files brought before his office contained 
sufficient evidence to warrant prosecutions, KNCHR continues to date to 
press for justice for the survivors of the 2007/08 post-election violence in 
various ways. First was through filing two cases in court to seek compensa-
tion for the 2007/8 sexual violence survivors which are still ongoing, and also 
through being part of the Transitional Justice Network (TJN) that comprises 
civil society actors and government agencies working together with the office 
of the Attorney General to set up a framework for reparations to survivors of 
sexual violence. 
In furtherance of its tradition to monitor and document human rights issues 
during the electoral period, KNCHR once again worked in partnership with 
a number of civil society organizations and individuals to document cases of 
sexual and gender-based violence between April 2017 and April 2018 which 
surrounded Kenya’s 2017 General Elections. The 2017 electoral environment 
culminated in civil unrest by way of political protests and use of violent force 
by law enforcement agents. In total, two hundred and one (201) cases were 
recorded in the commission’s publication known as ‘Silhouettes of Brutality’31 
with the conclusive finding that the chief perpetrators were both civilian and 
the security agents. According to records within the Commission’s purview, 
security agents were responsible for 54.55% and civilian for 45.45% of sexual 
violence linked to the 2017 electoral cycle. 
The type and forms of sexual violence included gang rape and rape at 
over 71% with the least percentage being of attempted defilement at 1.07%. 
Sodomy contributed to 1.60% of the reported cases, 9% of the cases affected 
minors aged between 7 and 17, which further depicts the vulnerability of this 
category of persons. Incidents of gang-rape involved 2–6 perpetrators and also 
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affected minors and elderly persons. Sexual assault which accounted for 1.6% of 
the cases was manifested through beating of men’s private parts while women 
reported being groped on their breasts and private parts. 
Cases of sexual and gender-based violence were widespread within the 
country and covered areas such as Bungoma in western Kenya, the capital City 
of Nairobi plus Migori and Kisumu in Nyanza region. 
A total of Four reports namely: Fallacious Vote, Mirage at Dusk, Still a 
Mirage and Silhouettes of Brutality were produced by KNCHR. They give 
a human rights account of the 2017 election period in Kenya and record the 
numerous violations that occurred in the period when Kenyans set out at vari-
ous stages to exercise their civil and political right to vote. It may therefore 
be stated categorically and without contradiction that sexual and gender-based 
violence (SGBV) formed an integral part of the violations experienced. 
Included in the abovementioned reports are highlights of the various chal-
lenges that KNCHR faced in documenting the cases and also in seeking redress 
for the survivors. Amongst the recorded challenges are low levels of report-
ing by the citizenry due to fear of victimization by alleged perpetrators some 
of whom were community members well known to survivors, and fear of 
reprisals from security agents some who may still be serving in the locations 
where they committed the crimes. Another factor that may have contributed 
to low reporting was scepticism that attaches to the procedure that requires 
such reports to be made at police stations to colleagues of some of the perpetra-
tors. The possibility that officers may fail to take the reports seriously or make 
the necessary effort to bring their colleagues to book or even impartially sup-
port prosecution of the cases through production of evidence and witnesses are 
real. Kenya’s law also requires that collaborative medical evidence be collected 
within the recommended 72 hours after commission of a crime. This require-
ment often acts as an impediment since most victims may not be able to access 
health facilities within that period due to the attendant insecurity that prevails 
in the course of violent protests and police shoot outs. KNCHR urges NHRIs 
to note such and other relevant facts in order to seek ways of ameliorating them 
in the course of conducting their mandate under similar situations. Indeed 
in most conservative societies, sexual violence is a taboo subject that victims 
would rather maintain silence about and find alternative ways of coping with 
rather than risk exposure and the attendant stigmatization that may occur as a 
result of seeking medical attention or reporting. 
Despite the fact that up to date the SGBV survivors of the 2007/8 elec-
tion violence in Kenya have yet to achieve justice, there is a lot to learn from 
KNCHR’s exercise of its mandate during times of civil strife and division in 
society. NHRIs must of necessity step out to undertake proper documentation 
of the happenings for posterity and for use in seeking accountability at future 
opportune times. Such impartial objective reports can also be utilized to har-
ness support from well-wishers in addressing sexual violence and thus provide 




        










         
222 Shatikha S. Chivusia
The reports could also form bases for evidence based interventions and formu-
lation of policy and legislative reforms where gaps exist. 
6 Conclusion 
It remains evident that the right to sexual and reproductive health though not 
placed in any specific international instrument has still found expression and 
protection within provisions of various instruments at international, regional 
and local levels. NHRIs operating in monist states, such as Kenya, can sup-
port the realization of this right at national level through various means as 
the above examples from KNCHR’s experiences illustrate. It is pertinent that 
NHRIs with a different legal framework will likewise find the above exam-
ples valuable. As far as it’s practicable and within their mandate, it’s impera-
tive that NHRIs enhance efforts to advocate for ratification and thereafter 
domestication of relevant international and regional instruments. Such efforts 
will contribute to strengthening the protection and promotion of sexual and 
reproductive health rights at domestic level. This will be especially so when 
such efforts are complemented with strategies that align national law to each 
country’s international obligations. Such multi-dimensional approaches will 
definitely prove worthwhile in providing a framework that gives stronger safe-
guards to the actualization of sexual and reproductive health rights to each 
NHRIs individual constituency. 
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The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) and 
the subsequent platform in 1995,1 Platform for Action of the Fourth World 
Conference on Women (FWCW),2 pave the way to galvanize policy and 
program commitments to better address the Sexual and Reproductive Health 
and Rights (SRHR) of women in general and adolescent girls, in particular. 
Though the political commitment was concretely conceived during these two 
conferences, SRHR of adolescents and States’ obligations towards their full 
realization were already embodied in prior international and regional human 
rights instruments, including the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child (the African Children’s Charter/the Charter). Focusing on the 
African regional mechanism created through the African Children’s Charter, 
the current chapter examines the role that the African Committee of Experts 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC/the Committee) could 
play in monitoring implementation the SRHR of adolescents by State Parties 
of the Charter. In doing so, the chapter attempts to provide a critical reflection 
on the mandate of the ACERWC and the extent to which the Committee 
is engaged in addressing matters of SRHR while discharging its monitoring 
mandate.
Drawing from the 1998 joint statement by the World Health Organization, 
the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the United Nations Population 
Fund, the chapter defines the term ‘adolescents’ as group of people between 
the ages of 10 and 19. With regard to the term ‘child’, the article recognizes 
the definition adopted by the African Children’s Charter- ‘any person under 
the age of 18’. From these definitions, one may learn that not all adolescents 
are treated as children, the former clearly extends to include those between the 
ages of 18 and 19, hence monitoring protection and promotion of their rights 
may not fall within the mandate of the ACERWC. Therefore, from the onset 
it should be noted that the scope of the chapter is limited to deal with issues 
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of SRHR of adolescents, i.e., those between the ages of 10 and 18. However, 
in certain instances, the chapter may also include all children, where the rights 
and protections apply to all, and not only adolescents. 
2 Sexual and reproductive health and rights of 
adolescent children: setting the context 
Constituting a significant number globally, adolescents, like many other groups, 
have specific concerns, which include challenges in relation their SRHR. 
Though adolescents are ‘relatively better educated, healthier, more aware of 
their rights and better equipped to advocate on their own behalf than the previ-
ous generations, many still face threats to their SRHR’.3 Reports confirm that 
adolescents, particularly in African countries, are generally uninformed or mis-
informed about their sexuality and reproductive health promoting behaviors.4 
Lack of an in-depth knowledge about modern contraceptives, safe sex and safe 
abortion, limited access to adolescent friendly Sexual and Reproductive Health 
(SRH) services is reported as the major challenge of SRHR of adolescents in 
Africa.5 As International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) states, adoles-
cents are ‘sexual beings with diverse needs, desires, hopes, dreams, problems, 
concerns, preferences and priorities, most of which are still unmet’.6 These 
unmet needs of adolescents are consequently producing various threats to their 
rights and welfare, such as child marriage, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) 
and various forms of sexual abuse. Due to lack of access to a full range of appro-
priate and freely chosen contraceptives, adolescent girls experience unwanted 
pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections (STIs). The challenges are often 
exacerbated among adolescents who are in vulnerable situation, including chil-
dren residing in rural areas, children with disabilities, children on the move, 
and belonging to economically disadvantaged households or socially excluded 
ethnic groups. 
Despite the existing challenges, due to controversies related to adolescent 
sexuality and the general lack of knowledge about the SRH needs of adoles-
cents, very few countries in Africa have adequately responded and set up the 
required normative and institutional standards. In fact, most countries have 
introduced restrictive laws and policies which fail to recognize adolescent chil-
dren’s capacity to make decisions about their sexual and reproductive lives and 
health. Many still find it sensitive and controversial to relate the discourse of 
children’s rights with SRHR. In some cases, what comes to one’s mind when 
she/he thinks of a ‘child’, may not allow the person to relate SRHR with 
the interest of children. Such perspectives, this chapter argues, emanate from 
the very understanding that society has about children, which usually attaches 
an unqualified reservation on children’s capacity to make informed decisions. 
Hence, before proceeding to the main part of this article, it would be necessary 
to provide conceptual clarification on children’s rights and how they relate to 
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With regard to addressing the challenges of SRH of adolescents, it can be 
noted that a consensus has been reached to apply the hybrid model; this can 
be inferred from the agreement reached during international conferences, such 
as the ICPD and FWCW. According to the ICPD and FWCW framework 
documents, the human rights of women and girls include their right to have 
control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexu-
ality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination 
and violence. In relation to adolescents, the ICPD provides that ‘full attention 
should be given to meeting the educational and service needs of adolescents 
to enable them to deal in a positive and responsible way with their sexuality’.7 
Particularly, Chapter VII of the Program of Action of the ICPD states that 
countries should strive to address ‘adolescent sexual and reproductive health 
issues, including unwanted pregnancy, unsafe abortion, and STDs and HIV/ 
AIDS, through the promotion of responsible and healthy reproductive and 
sexual behaviour, including voluntary abstinence, and the provision of appro-
priate services and counselling specifically suitable for that age group’. The 
document also prescribes that countries must ensure that programs and atti-
tudes of health-care providers do not restrict adolescents’ access to the services 
and information they need. However, recognizing the inevitable challenges 
that children in this age group could face and the role parents should play in 
the upbringing of their children, the Program of Action also requires countries, 
in their attempt to comply with these standards, must safeguard the right of 
adolescents to privacy, confidentiality, respect and informed consent, while 
respecting cultural values and religious beliefs as well as the rights, duties and 
responsibilities of parents. 
Looking at these aspirations and call for actions, it is very clear that the 
principles of autonomy, participation, equality and non-discrimination form 
the basis of the terms of the consensus reached by the participating States. 
However, it should also be noted that the framework documents also rec-
ognize the respect of cultural values and the roles and responsibilities of par-
ents. This entails that the framework documents advocate for ‘a hybrid model’ 
by recognizing both principles of the ‘child’s autonomy’ and ‘protection’ as 
explained in the child liberation and child protection approaches respectively. 
2.1 Autonomy of adolescent children vis-à-vis parental authority 
The discourse around why children must be protected and the extent to which
parental, or legal guardians, authority exercised over children has been explained
in the three major child rights theories; namely the John Eekelaar’s interest
theory, the fiduciary theory, and the theory of paternalism.8 Getting into the
details of these theories is not within the scope of this chapter, however; a brief
mention on the ‘interest theory’ would be important as it helps to clearly set the
context of the discussions in the forthcoming section of this article. 
Drawing inspiration from Joseph Raz’s theory of rights,9 John Eekelaar’s 
interest theory asserts that children have three distinct interests which are 
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separable from the interests of their parents: basic, development and autonomy 
interests.10 Autonomy interests relate to the freedom of the child to choose his 
or her own lifestyle and to enter social relations according to his or her own 
inclinations uncontrolled by the authority of the adult world, parents or insti-
tutions.11 Of course, the theory argues that autonomy of the child should be 
respected by taking into consideration the intellectual understanding, which 
should also be supplemented by emotional maturity, of the concerned child;12 
a notion which is in line with the concept of ‘the evolving capacities of the 
child’ as recognized by international instruments. 
In line with Eekelaar’s interest theory, this chapter argues that recognizing 
the role of parents should not impede the rights of adolescent children, subject 
to their evolving capacities, to make autonomous decisions about their sexual 
and reproductive health. Practically, however, the application of this principle 
could rather be challenging due to the widely-held and historically rooted 
belief that adolescents are incapable of making positive decisions about their 
own sexual and reproductive health.13 This notion of rather unregulated paren-
tal autonomy led many jurisdictions in the world to hold the position that until 
a minor attains majority, only parents or legal guardians could provide consent 
for access to SRH services.14 
With a view to addressing this tension between parental authority and the 
child’s autonomy, countries tend to use different laws and policies allowing 
or preventing adolescents’ access to SRH Services. The laws and policies may 
cover various instances where minimum age could be required to get access 
for various services, such as: legislation for age of medical decision-making 
like HIV counseling, testing, and treatment without parental consent (and 
whether the adolescent’s status would be reported to her/his parents), contra-
ceptives (with and without parental consent); emergency contraceptives (with 
and without parental consent); safe abortions and post-abortion care (with and 
without parental consent); antenatal Care (with and without parental consent); 
and sexual intercourse (including the age for statutory rape). 
The minimum age may vary depending on the nature or seriousness of the 
treatment. With regard to the age for sexual consent, though majority of the 
countries in Africa do not have any clear standards in their legislations, there 
are some with laws and policies regulating age of consent to sex. Countries like 
Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Ivory Coast and Equatorial Guinea, have 
set the age of consent to sex at 18, below which any sexual activity is subject 
to criminal sanctions. There are also some countries with a lower age of con-
sent such as: Comoros (13), Zambia (14), Algeria (15), Botswana (16), Angola 
(15), and Mozambique (16). Other countries set a higher age like the case in 
Namibia (19) and Burundi (20).15 
Such age-based laws tend to either preclude consent by adolescents below 
the set age, by requiring parental or guardian consent, or require that they 
demonstrate maturity to overcome their presumed incompetency. Minimum 
age laws are often defended on the ground that ‘age is an efficient proxy for 
competency…an easily measured, inescapable attribute and a quality that 
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everyone has experienced or will experience’.16 The age-based rule has its 
own advantage as it allows adolescents over the prescribed age to presumed 
competent and be treated the same as adults in providing informed consent 
to matters related to their SRH needs. As IPPF states, ‘this avoids the seri-
ous problems that arise in discretionary systems where service providers are 
unwilling to recognize minors’ competency, particularly in SRH decision-
making’.17 Recognizing the advantage of the age-based rule, the Committee 
on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the CRC Committee) has 
also encouraged States Parties to give consideration to the introduction of such 
approaches in their laws. 
On the other hand, the age-based approach may preclude adolescents under 
the prescribed age from being recognized as capable to decide. In setting mini-
mum ages, States should then undertake a balancing act between the need 
to protect and the desire to empower, and ensure that setting minimum age 
should aim at promoting rights and not to impede them. It should recognize 
‘the right of any child below that minimum age and who is able to demonstrate 
sufficient understanding to be entitled to give or refuse consent’. 
The principle of evolving capacity of the adolescent child, therefore, plays 
a pivotal role in reconciling the competing interests of parental authority and 
autonomy of the child. Hence, it should be noted that parental decision and 
authority on issues of SRH of adolescents can be valid so long as it is consistent 
with the requirement of the evolving capacities of the child. Furthermore, age 
limits and parental consent should not be applied to all services in relation to 
SRH services as there are rights that adolescents are entitled to claim without 
the consent of a parent or guardian, irrespective of age. 
3 International and African regional instruments 
and initiatives on SRHR of adolescents 
The principles included in the Program of Actions agreed to at the ICPD and 
FWCW are recognized in various international and African regional human 
rights instruments. The rights and protections include: the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
the right to life, the right to privacy, the right to reproductive self-determina-
tion, the right to consent to marriage, the right to be free from discrimination, 
the right to not be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment, the right to be free from sexual violence, the right to 
be free from practices that harm women and girls, and the right to education 
and information. The application of these general provisions is meant to ben-
efit all persons, hence adolescents are able to enjoy the protections accorded 
through these instruments as adults. 
In addition to these general instruments, specific protections are also pro-
vided as they apply to matters of SRHR of adolescents. For instance, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) states that every child has an 
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extent the child’s survival and development.18 States Parties shall also recog-
nize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest standard of health19 
and develop family planning education and services.20 Similarly, at the African 
level, the African Union (AU) has also adopted various regional instruments 
which could be relevant to matters of SRHR of adolescents. As discussed 
in the following sections, the African Children’s Charter is one of the key 
regional human rights documents that contain numerous provisions which 
could be applicable to matters of SRHR of adolescent children. 
In addition to the above-mentioned instruments, there are various docu-
ments and initiatives, both at the global and regional level, which provide 
guidance, primarily for states, on the nature and application of SRHR as they 
relate to adolescents. At the global level, the CRC Committee has developed 
General Comments on adolescent health and development in the context of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and on the Implementation of the 
Rights of the Child during Adolescence. The 2014 Joint General Comment 
by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and 
the CRC Committee on the Rights of the Child on harmful practices also 
provides relevant standards concerning the notable link between SRHR and 
harmful traditional practices in line with the rights of adolescent children. 
In a similar vein, the African continental bodies such as the African Union 
Commission (AUC), and the Human Rights Organs have developed policy 
documents and frameworks on SRHR and adolescent children. These include, 
the joint General Comment developed by the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’ (ACHPR) and the ACERWC on child marriage;21 the 
General Comments by the ACHPR on women’s human rights and HIV 
as prescribed under Article 14 (1) (d) and (e) of the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa;22 
the AU’s Continental Policy Framework for Sexual and Reproductive Health 
and Rights (2005), and the Maputo plan of action 2016–2030 for the opera-
tionalization of the continental policy framework for sexual and reproductive 
health and rights.23 
3.1 The African Children’s Charter 
Adopted in 1990 and came in to force in 1999, as of October 2020, the African
Children’s Charter is ratified by 49 African Countries.24 Though the adoption of
this Charter was influenced by its predecessor child rights instruments, such as,
the CRC, the 1924 and the 1959 Declarations, it has revealed itself with some
form of peculiarities to advance the protection of children in Africa.25 Relevant
to the theme of this chapter, the African Children’s Charter includes provisions
that can apply to protect the SRHR of adolescents. For instance, the African
Children’s Charter states that ‘State Parties shall take specific, legislative, admin-
istrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment especially physical or mental injury
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the child’. The elements of this provision should be understood as they cover
various aspects. Applying the protection under similar provisions in international
and regional laws to matters of SRHR, human rights bodies have found that the
denial of sexual and reproductive health services to adolescents can amount to
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Other protections are also available in
the right to education, parental responsibilities, protection against harmful social
and traditional practices, the right to health and health services. 
The provisions under article 14 have particular relevance. Article 14 (1) of
the Charter guarantees every child’s right to ‘enjoy the best attainable state of
physical, mental and spiritual health’, while article 14 (2) enumerates illustrative,
non-exhaustive list of States Parties’ obligations. The illustrations under article
14 (2) covers States’ obligations to reduce child mortality, access to health care
services to all children, ensuring adequate nutrition, drinking safe water, health
education and establishment of health care mechanisms, and resource mobiliza-
tion for implementation of health care services. Hence, in defining the right to
health and health services under article 14 (1), one should consider the elements
presented under article 14(2) of the Charter, which then enables States to take a
broader approach and include SRH and services in implementing their obliga-
tions. In line with this approach of adopting a purposive interpretation of the
right to health and health services, the CESCR Committee states ‘the right to
health as an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate health
care but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and
potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition
and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and access to
health-related education and information, including on sexual and reproductive
health’.26 This entails, .implementation of the obligations under article 14 of the
African Children’s Charter ensures the existence of accessible health care services
to all, which also respond to the SRH needs of adolescent children. Moreover,
it should also be noted that States obligations under the right to health goes
beyond provision of goods and services, and include ensuring ‘both freedoms
and entitlements, including the right to control one’s health and body, including
sexual and reproductive freedom, and the right to be free from interference’. 
Drawing inspiration from the CRC Committee, the ACERWC has also 
identified what it calls ‘general principles’ of the Charter which aim at ensuring 
a common philosophical approach to the spectrum of areas addressed by the 
Charter. The principles of non-discrimination, the best interests of the child, 
the right to life, survival and development, and respect for the views of the 
child, set the underlying and fundamental values that are relevant to the realiza-
tion of all children’s rights, including SRHR. 
4 The Role of the ACERWC in Monitoring 
the implementation of SRHR under 
the African Children’s Charter 
The African Children’s Charter establishes the ACERWC to promote and 
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of the African Children’s Charter, the ACERWC monitors implementation of 
the Charter. Accordingly, the ACERWC may receive and consider State Party 
Reports on the status of implementation of the African Children’s Charter, 
receive and consider Communications, and resort to any appropriate method 
of investigations to address any matter under the Charter. 
4.1 The role of the State Party reporting mechanism within the ACERWC 
In line with article 43 of the Charter, State Parties shall submit reports to the 
ACERWC on measures that they have taken to give effect to and imple-
ment the provisions of the Charter. The Reports serve as the basis for the 
Committee’s evaluation of the degree to which the Charter is implemented 
by the respective State Parties. Hence, the Reports should contain informa-
tion which enables the Committee understand the administrative, judicial and 
other measures that the Government has taken to implement the Charter, and 
indicate factors and difficulties that are affecting the fulfilment of the obliga-
tions contained in the charter. 
According to the Committee’s Procedure of Consideration of State Party
Reports, the Committee considers State Party Reports during one of its
Ordinary Sessions in the presence of representatives of the concerned county.27 
Once the Committee finalizes its discussion with the State Party concerned
and other stakeholders, it then prepares its concluding observations and rec-
ommendations. The concluding observations and recommendations, inter alia,
highlight the progress that the State Party has achieved in implementing the
provisions of the Charter, the major issues of concern, and the Committee’s
suggestions and recommendations on what needs to be done in a better way. 
The contents of the concluding observations and recommendations are
aligned with what the State Parties are expected to include in their reports in
accordance with the Committee’s Guidelines on Periodic State Party Reports.
Accordingly, the concluding observations and recommendations focus on the
following major issues: General measures of implementation; Definition of
the child; General principles; Civil rights and freedoms; Economic, social and
cultural rights; Family environment and alternative care; Rights and protection
of vulnerable children; Harmful practices and exploitation’ Administration of
juvenile justice; and Responsibilities of the child. 
The State Party reporting mechanism gives the Committee an ample 
opportunity to play a valuable role in monitoring implementation of States’ 
obligations to realize SRHR of adolescents as protected under the African 
Children’s Charter. The Committee’s role in this regard can be introduced at 
various stages of the State Party reporting procedure. Looking at Committee’s 
Guidelines, one may learn that State Parties are under obligation to provide 
information on SRHR of adolescents as part of the following clusters of rights 
and obligations: General measures of implementation; General principles; 
Economic, social and cultural rights; Rights and protection of children in vul-
nerable situation; and Harmful practices. 
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The principle of non-discrimination is of particular significance in the area 
of SRHR of adolescents, where discrimination may be manifested through 
various instances in different forms. For instance, gender inequality and social 
norms may discriminate against and hinder fulfilment of the SRHR of adoles-
cent girls in general and those in vulnerable situation in particular. Adolescents 
who belong to a particular group, such as lesbian, gay, transgender and bisex-
ual, may also face stigma and discrimination in accessing SRH services which 
respond to their particular needs. Where adolescents age or gender is joined 
with another basis for discrimination, such as disability, race, or migration status,
the discrimination they face in exercising their SRHR can be greatly exacer-
bated and also manifest in unique ways. Therefore, States should proactively 
take targeted measures to ensure that adolescents facing multiple forms of dis-
crimination are able to exercise their sexual and reproductive rights on the basis 
of substantive equality. Particularly, due to the disproportionate impact this 
has on girls, guaranteeing all adolescents’ right to make autonomous decisions 
about their sexual and reproductive health and rights is a critical component of 
the right to equality and non-discrimination. In line with this, treaty monitor-
ing bodies, such as the CEDAW Committee, recognize that restrictive laws 
on sexual and reproductive health services, such as laws restricting the legality 
of specific services and requiring third-party authorization, violate the right to 
non-discrimination. 
Similarly, the principle of the best interests of the child is of a particu-
lar relevance to realize the full implementation of the standards of SRHR of 
adolescents. For example, if the best interests of the child so require, States 
may justify intervention to order the medical treatment of a child even if a 
parent has refused consent. Similarly, in cases where the child’s views and/or 
interests are distinct from those of parents, the best interests test can be used to 
legitimately respect the child’s right to receive sexual and reproductive health 
services, including counseling and treatment, and override parental consent. 
With regard to the principle of life, survival and development, as Sutherland, 
states ‘it would be difficult to imagine anything more fundamental in the whole 
panoply of human rights than recognition of the right to life’.28 In line with 
this, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) has described ‘the 
right to life’ as ‘the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even 
in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation’. Indeed, 
‘the right to life’, as it applies to all human beings, seems to get a universal 
acceptance and had already been guaranteed to all people by various interna-
tional and regional instruments. In addition to the right to life, by guaranteeing 
the right to survival and development, article 5 goes further and recognizes 
State Parties’ obligation to take measures to ensure the survival, protection and 
development of the child. The right to survival and development is defined by 
treaty bodies, such as the CRC Committee, in its broadest sense as ‘a holistic 
concept, embracing the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological 
and social development’. Therefore, as part of their obligation, States Parties 
are under obligation to ensure a full and harmonious development of the child, 
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including at the spiritual, moral and social levels, where education, provision of 
health services, the provision of adequate information or knowledge on nutri-
tion, hygiene and environmental sanitation play a great role. 
Despite the far-reaching relevance of the right to education to matters of 
SRH of children, the Committee’s Guidelines appears to be relatively limiting 
as it requires States to report only on the measures they have taken to address 
the challenges of girls who become pregnant while they are in schools.29 Despite 
the limiting approach adopted by the Guidelines, it would then be paramount 
for the Committee to adopt a holistic approach to the right to education and 
require the reporting States to furnish more information regarding the meas-
ures it has undertaken in ensuring the implementation of SRHR of children 
through education. As mentioned above, the Charter prescribes that educa-
tion must ensure the promotion and development of physical development 
of the child and foster human rights and fundamental freedoms in line with 
international and regional instruments. The information States should provide 
in this regard may include the measures they have undertaken to introduce a 
comprehensive reproductive and sexuality education for adolescent children. 
Referring to the obligations under article 14 of the African Children’s 
Charter, the Committee’s Guidelines set one of the most directly applicable 
obligations of States concerning implementation of SRHR of children.30 The 
Guidelines require, State Parties to provide relevant and updated information 
on the measures taken to ensure that every child enjoys the best attainable 
state of physical, mental and spiritual health. Particularly, States are required to 
report on the measures taken to reduce infant and child mortality; to ensure 
access to health and health services, which also includes SRH Services, to 
ensure appropriate health care for expectant and nursing mothers; and to pre-
vent transmission of HIV from mother to child. Looking at the particulars 
that the Guidelines provide, it seems that, similar to the case of the right to 
education, the Committee’s Reporting Guidelines chooses to follow a restric-
tive approach. The current article is of the view that ensuring every child’s 
enjoyment of the best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health, 
requires a more comprehensive response, which definitely goes beyond what 
has been enumerated in the Committee’s Reporting Guidelines. 
State Parties have also the obligation to provide relevant and updated infor-
mation on the nature, type and prevalence of harmful social and cultural prac-
tices within its jurisdiction. As part of their reports, States are expected to 
identify practices which could stem from deeply entrenched discriminatory 
views as they relate to SRHR. The role and position of girls in society, for 
instance, may legitimize and perpetuate various forms of violence against the 
SRHR of girls. In particular, States Parties need to provide information on the 
measures they have undertaken to address the adverse effects of such harmful 
practices on the SRHR of adolescents, such as such as child marriage, FGM, 
practices that prevent women from controlling their own fertility, son prefer-
ence, female infanticide, early pregnancy and bride price. 
From the above discussions, one may learn that the State Party reporting 
mechanism creates an ample opportunity for the Committee to address the 
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challenges that children in Africa are facing in relation SRHR. This would, 
however, require the Committee to better mainstream SRHR and attempt to 
call upon, particularly through the concluding observations and recommenda-
tions, African States to better address the challenges of adolescents in relation 
to their SRHR. 
Looking at the current practice within the Committee, one may learn that 
the ACERWC’s attempt to include issues of SRHR in its concluding obser-
vations and recommendations seems to be general and limited in nature and 
content. As it can be gathered from most of the concluding observations and 
recommendations, the Committee attempts to address SRHR of adolescents, 
mainly, as they relate to the right to health and health services. For instance, 
in its concluding observations and recommendations to the Governments of 
Eritrea,31 Cameroon,32 Ghana,33 Tanzania,34 Chad,35 Comoros,36 Niger,37 and 
Sierra Leone,38 the Committee recommends to the respective State Parties to 
ensure provision of health services which is appropriate to children’s health 
needs and staffed with adequate and trained health personnel.39 The Committee 
has also constantly urged State Parties to increase budgetary allocation to the 
health sector and ensure health services are easily accessible to all children 
in the respective country, including to those in rural areas and in vulnerable 
situations.40 
While monitoring the implementation of article 14 on the right to 
health, it is only in limited cases that the Committee specifically refers to the 
SRHR challenges of adolescents. For instance, in its recommendations to the 
Government of Sierra Leone, the Committee notes that the State Party should 
work towards addressing the specific health needs of adolescents by providing 
age-appropriate information and sensitization about reproductive health and 
sexually transmitted diseases/infections.41 Similarly, in its recommendations to 
the Government of Ghana, the Committee states that the Government should 
provide sufficient contraception especially to children to prevent unwanted 
pregnancies and STIs, and ensure that Family Planning Centres exist through-
out its territory and are staffed with adequate and well-trained personnel to 
address the sexual and reproductive needs of children.42 The Committee also 
addresses the challenges of HIV/AIDS by calling on State Parties to increase 
the number of health professionals trained on management of HIV/AIDS and 
the availability of ART to pregnant women and children who are living with 
the virus.43 
Though the Committee takes an encouraging step towards addressing
issues related to SRHR of adolescents, most of the Committee’s observa-
tions and recommendations are general in nature and limited only to ‘basic
health and services’, which is not in line with the comprehensive nature of
the protection under Article 14 of the Charter. This limited approach to
monitoring the right to health and health services can be inferred from the
fact that in most of its observations and recommendations, the Committee
contentiously refer only to implementation of national health policies, dis-
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personnel and quality of service delivered in health centres, budget alloca-
tion for the health sector, and universal immunization. In addition to the
protection under Article 14 of the Charter, the Committee has also used
other clusters of rights to monitor State Parties obligations to implement
SRHR of adolescents. The most commonly used clusters of rights in this
regard relate to State Parties obligation under Article 27 of the Charter on
sexual exploitation, and Article 21 on protection against harmful social and
cultural practices. 
4.2 The role of the communication and investigation 
procedures within the ACERWC 
In line with article 44 of the ACERWC, which provides the locus standi and 
criteria for consideration of Communications, the ACERWC has adopted 
the Revised Guidelines for the Consideration of Communications. Among 
the Communications brought before the ACERWC, one is most relevant to 
matters of SRHR; i.e., Institute for Human Right and Development in Africa and 
Finders Group Initiative on behalf of TFA (a minor) v. the Republic of Cameroon,44 a 
case particularly features rape at the center of its allegations Establishing viola-
tions of various articles of the Charter, the Committee pronounces that rape 
forms a gender based violence which amounts to gender based discrimination. 
The Committee reached at this conclusion considering the fact that rape dis-
proportionately affects women and nullifies the enjoyment of several of their 
human rights. As discrimination is understood to be a differential treatment on 
a prohibited ground and that nullifies the enjoyment of rights. The Committee 
then recommends for the Government of Cameroon, among others, to enact 
and implement a legislation eliminating all forms of violence, including sexual 
violence against children; to train its police, prosecutors, and judiciary; estab-
lish a mechanism to support victims of sexual abuse, and to work towards 
the elimination of practices, custom, and stereotypes that legitimize abuse of 
children. The Decision and its recommendations, therefore, immensely con-
tribute for implementation of SRHR of adolescents as violence against girls, 
such as rape, directly affects their reproductive rights and their right to sexual
health. 
In line with its mandate under article 45 (i) of the Charter, and the subse-
quent Guidelines that the Committee adopted, the ACERWC, in recent years, 
has conducted investigation missions to Countries such as South Sudan, Central 
African Republic (CAR) and Tanzania.45 Though the main focuses of the 
investigations are not directly related to SRHR of adolescents, the Committee 
in its findings and recommendations indeed attempted to point out issues, 
though not adequately, relevant to therein. For instance, the Committee’s 
reports on its investigative missions to South Sudan and CAR clearly cover 
various forms of violations that children in the respective countries are facing, 
sexual violence being one of them. In assessing the impact of conflict on chil-
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which these wars are being waged directly upon the children in the countries 
is apparent from the violent abduction of children, and the confirmed incidents 
of rape of both girls and boys.46 In South Sudan, the Committee highlighted 
the particular SRHR challenges of adolescent girls, especially those living in 
the Protection of Civilian Centers (POCs).47 Investigating the challenges of 
children in conflict settings, the Committee could have done more by referring 
to the obligations of the respective States to address maters such as increased 
exposure to coerced sex, early and forced marriage and childbearing, increased 
risk-taking associated with gender roles in family circles, and reduced availabil-
ity of adolescent sexual and reproductive health services. Similarly, in its inves-
tigation mission to Tanzania, concerning the case of children with albinism,48 
the Committee has overlooked to address the SRHR challenges of adoles-
cents with albinism. Using its wider mandate in investigations, the Committee 
should also strengthen its role in monitoring the full implementation of SRHR 
of adolescents, by initiating the procedure on its own motion, suo motu. 
5 Conclusion 
Taking the diverse range of barriers that adolescents are facing in relation 
to their right to sexual and reproductive health services, the current article 
attempts to explain the role that the ACERWC could play in monitoring the 
implementation of SRHR of adolescent children in Africa. While encouraging 
steps have been taken, particularly through State Party, Communications and 
Investigation procedures, it is noted that the ACERWC’s response to the chal-
lenges of adolescent children in matters related to SRHR happens to be rather 
limited. Much remains to be done especially in Africa where laws, cultural 
practices, social norms that stigmatize adolescents’ sexuality and limit access to 
information on sex and sexuality for adolescent children, are adversely impact-
ing on their development and behaviour. The ACERWC should strategically 
engage countries with restrictive laws and policies which prohibit adolescents 
from accessing sexual and reproductive health services, and provide guidance 
on addressing the major barriers for the realization of SRHR rights of adoles-
cent children in Africa. Such normative barriers may include laws and poli-
cies which deny adolescents the right to access sexual and reproductive health 
services, laws and policies which require parental or judicial notification or 
authorization. The Committee should also pronounce itself on special protec-
tion measures for adolescent children; including protection against violations 
of adolescents’ reproductive rights, such as measures to control girls’ sexuality 
and forced or coerced medical interventions. 
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